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Abstract 
This thesis is an examination of the ASEAN’s prospects in establishing regional 
competition policy in the Southeast Asia region, a topic of contemporary relevance in light 
of the ASEAN’s recent foray into the economic integration field on 31 December 2015. It 
questions whether the current approach undertaken by the ASEAN could contribute to an 
effective regional competition policy under the regional market integration. In answering 
this question, the thesis first critically surveys the current terrain of regional competition 
laws and policies in order to determine the possible existence of an optimal template. It 
argues that although the EU model is oft used as a source of inspiration, each regional 
organisation conceives different configurations of the model in order to best adjust to the 
local regional contexts. 
The thesis makes an inquiry into the narratives of the ASEAN’s competition policy, as 
well as the ASEAN’s specific considerations in the development of competition policy, 
before comparing the findings to the actual approaches taken by the ASEAN in its pursuit 
of regional competition policy. This thesis reveals that the actual approach taken by the 
ASEAN demonstrates an important discrepancy from the economic integration goal. The 
ASEAN applies a soft harmonisation approach regarding substantive competition law 
while refraining from establishing a centralised institution or a representative institution. 
The sole organ with regards to competition policy at the regional level is an expert organ. 
The thesis also conducts an investigation into the reception of the ASEAN’s regional 
policy by the member states in order to ascertain the possibility of the achievement of the 
ASEAN’s aspiration of regional competition policy. The study reveals that despite some 
shared similarities in the broad principles of competition law amongst the member states, 
the various competition law regimes are not harmonised thus creating challenging obstacle 
to the ASEAN’s ambition. The thesis then concludes that the ASEAN’s approach to 
regional competition law is unlikely to be effective. 
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 Introduction Chapter 1
The 20
th
 century witnessed a surge in regional competition law agreements, a phenomenon 
now apparent in several continents and encompassing more than sixty states. As an 
illustration, there are the European Union (EU) in Europe; the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) in 
Africa; the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community, the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the Americas and the Caribbean; and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia. It is indisputable that regional competition law 
and policy are no longer reserved for developed economies and in most cases, involve 
developing economies.
1
 There is no definitive classification or measurement of 
development. Each international organisation appears to employ distinct criteria in its 
classification. The United Nations’ (UN) definition of a developing economy is intended to 
reflect basic economic conditions by utilising the exchange-rate based method, having 
determined that this method would more accurately measure the growth and changes in 
developing economies.
2
 In contrast, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) distinguishes 
between advanced economies, and emerging market and developing economies.
3
 This 
distinction is based on population, exports of goods and services, and the gross domestic 
product (GDP) valued by purchasing power parity (PPP). The World Bank on the other 
hand, categorises countries according to gross national income (GNI).
4
 Countries or 
economies with a GNI per capita of USD 1,045 or less are low-income economies; middle-
income economies should have a GNI per capita of between USD 1,045 and 12,736; and 
high-income economies exceed USD 12,736.  
Although a generalisation, income-based or growth-based definitions are convenient for 
locating countries within a meaningful category and for grouping together countries with 
outward similarities. Many commentators have contested this method on the basis that it 
ignores the roots of low-income levels and neglects social, political, and other variables, 
such as physical infrastructure.
5
 These affect the level of competition or the prospects of an 
effective implementation of a competition law regime. Without commenting on the 
theoretical debate regarding their appropriateness or suitability, this thesis uses the term 
“developing economy” and mostly follows the IMF classification for its advantageous ease 
                                                 
1
 There is a general abandonment of the term “developing country” in favour of “developing economy.” See, 
in particular, the UN switch in 2013: UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects (2013). 
2
 UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects (2015) 137-143. 
3
 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (April 2015) 147-164. 
4
 World Bank, Country and Lending Groups <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups>. 
5
 See, for example, Indig, Tamar and Gal, Michal S., ‘Lifting the Veil: Rethinking the Classification of 
Developing Economies for Competition Law and Policy’ in Gal, Michal S. et al. (eds), The Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2015). 
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of use and availability of information. Furthermore, the IMF categorisation best reflects the 
level of diversity experienced in Southeast Asia. 
The ASEAN was the latest addition to the movement of the regionalisation of competition 
law in the 21
st
 century. In 2007, at the 39
th
 Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, 
the ASEAN leaders agreed to form a regional single market with a competition policy as 
an important part of the mechanism.  This marked the ASEAN’s first endeavour into the 
realm of regional competition policy. It was argued that the ASEAN’s regionalisation 
process had been slow and difficult due to political fragmentation, internal conflicts, and 
external pressures.
6
 Others, however, asserted that the slowness was by design since the 
original conception for the ASEAN was that it should merely be a loosely formed 
cooperation in Southeast Asia.
7
 
The ASEAN regroups ten countries in the Southeast Asia region: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Singapore, and Vietnam. The concept of “Southeast Asia” is in itself an artificial construct 
having been referred to as such by the Western Allies in the aftermath of the World War 
II.
8
 The ten ASEAN member states [hereinafter AMSs] represent the full spectrum of 
political, legal, and ideological diversity.
9
 Politically, the ASEAN includes countries 
governed by democracies, monarchies, military juntas and communist parties that have 
varying interpretations of the relationship between the private sector and the government.
10
 
Cambodia
11
 and Malaysia
12
 have a constitutional monarchy while Brunei Darussalam has 
the system of Malay Islamic monarchy.
13
 Thailand, while officially a constitutional 
monarchy,
14
 is currently under the rule of the military junta. Singapore supports a 
parliamentary republic political system.
15
 The Philippines, Indonesia,
16
 and most recently 
Myanmar
17
 are presidential republics. In terms of population within the region, the 
ASEAN’s overall population places it third after China and India at 621 million, with 
Indonesia holding the largest population within the region at 252 million. Brunei 
                                                 
6
 Hung, Lin Chun, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional Integration under International Law?, 9 Chinese J. of 
Int’l L 821 (2010). 
7
 Imada, Pearl, Montes, Manuel and Naya, Seiji, A Free Trade Area: Implications for ASEAN (ISEAS 1991). 
8
 Tan, Kevin Y.L., The Making and Remaking of Constitutions in Southeast Asia: An Overview, 6 Sing. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L. (2002). 
9
 Desierto, Diane A., Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional Developments in South and 
Southeast Asia, 36 Int’l J. Legal Info. 387 (2008). 
10
 Hung, Lin Chun, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional Integration under International Law?, 9 Chinese J. of 
Int’l L 821 (2010). 
11
 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia [1993] art. 1. 
12
 The Federal Constitution of Malaysia [1957] art. 1. Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy in which 
the head of State is the Yang di- Pertuan Agong and the head of government is the Prime Minister. The Yang 
di- Pertuan Agong is elected for a five-year term by and from the rulers of the nine States in Peninsular 
Malaysia which have retained their hereditary Malay royal family. 
13
 The Constitution of Brunei Darussalam [1959] art. 4. 
14
 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand [2007] sec. 2. 
15
 The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore [1965] art. 3. 
16
 The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia [1945] art. 4. 
17
 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar [2008] art. 16. 
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Darussalam has a population of only 0.4 million.
18
 The legal systems of the AMSs also 
vary considerably, ranging from common to civil law systems or a hybrid of both.
19
 Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, and Singapore have common law systems; the Philippines and 
Thailand use a hybrid of civil and common legal systems; Indonesia has a civil law system; 
Vietnam inherited the French civil law system but this is located in communist legal 
theory; Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia are still struggling to find a legal identity. In the 
global economy, the contribution of the ASEAN to world GDP, in PPP dollars, is six per 
cent, which amounts to 6.5 trillion dollars.
20
 Furthermore, the GDP per capita of the AMSs 
demonstrates significant diversity.
21
 Only Singapore and Brunei Darussalam report a GDP 
per capita of above USD 40,000 followed at a distance by Malaysia at USD 11,049 while 
Cambodia ranks the lowest at USD 1,081. The rest of the AMSs’ GDP per capita ranges 
between USD 6,000 to 1,200. According to the IMF, Singapore is the only advanced 
economy in the region. Brunei Darussalam is a developing economy whose main source of 
earnings is from fuel exports. The other AMSs are all classified as emerging markets and 
developing economies. Among these developing economies, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Myanmar are classed as low-income developing countries.
22
 In applying the World Bank 
criteria, Cambodia is a low-income economy, Singapore is a high-income economy and the 
rest of the AMSs are middle-income economies.
23
 According to the UN classification, 
most of the AMSs are developing economies although Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar 
figure among least developed countries. In the same classification report, Myanmar 
appeared twice, both as a developing economy and as a least developed country.
24
 In the 
end, the sole shared trait among the AMSs is their geographical proximity. 
 Background on the ASEAN25 1.1.
1.1.1. The Formation of the ASEAN 
At the initiation of Thailand,
26
 the ASEAN was established by the ASEAN Declaration of 
1967
27
 as a regional intergovernmental organisation by five founding member states: 
                                                 
18
 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (April 2014). 
19
 Haas, Deborah A., Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the 
Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 809 (1994). 
20
 World Economic Outlook Database. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 World Economic Outlook Database, 147-152. 
23
 World Bank, Country and Lending Groups  <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-
groups>. 
24
 World Economic Situation and Prospects, 137-143. 
25
 For more information on the conception and evolution of ASEAN see, Khoman, Thanat, ‘ASEAN 
Conception and Evolution’ in Sandhu, K.S. et al. (eds), The ASEAN Reader (ISEAS 1992). [Providing a 
personal account of one of the initiators and original signatories of the ASEAN Declaration]; Irvine, Roger, 
‘The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-1975’ in Broinowski, Allison (ed), Understanding ASEAN 
(Macmillan 1982); Palmer, Ronald D. and Reckford, Thomas J., Building ASEAN: 20 Years of Southeast 
Asian Cooperation (Praeger 1987); Severino, Rodolfo C., ASEAN (ISEAS 2008). 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It was born out of a 
combination of external threats and domestic challenges.
28
 The ASEAN Declaration was 
drafted against a background of political discordance in the region fuelled by general 
apprehension over new territories arbitrarily acquired through colonial intervention.
29
 
During that time, Indonesia had a Konfrontasi (Borneo confrontation) with Malaysia, 
Singapore was ejected from the Federation of Malaysia, a dispute between Malaysia and 
the Philippines over North Borneo remained unresolved, and Malaysia was distrustful of 
Thailand over the latter’s lack of cooperation in combatting the Malayan Communist Party. 
Despite the evident discord, a degree of concordance emerged between these states in their 
stance against communism and authoritarian regimes,
30
 which are collectively referred to 
as “common problems among countries of Southeast Asia” in the ASEAN Declaration. 
The ASEAN Declaration is a two-page document of only three articles describing the 
rationale for the establishment of the ASEAN and its ambitious objectives. It cites 
cooperation in various fields (including economic, social, cultural, technical, and 
educational), the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding by the respect 
of justice and the rule of law, and adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter as the organisation’s aims and purposes.31 Given the political climate of the 
region, it is evident that the ASEAN’s primary objective was to prevent regional conflicts, 
build mutual confidence, and promote regional stability and security by laying a regional 
foundation for the pursuit of economic development. However, the ASEAN Declaration 
refrains from giving any directions on how to achieve these expansive aims and purposes. 
It was later suggested that economic cooperation was included as an afterthought merely to 
dispel suspicion over the ASEAN becoming a military alliance.
32
 While the formulation of 
the ASEAN Declaration is laudable for its achievement amidst regional political instability, 
its weakness lies in its lack of measures regarding how the goals of the organisation were 
to be pursued. In its own words, the ASEAN Declaration represents the organisation’s 
modus operandi of building on small voluntary steps and informal arrangements while 
moving towards more binding and institutionalised agreements.
33
 As its name suggests, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
26
 Khoman, Thanat, ‘ASEAN Conception and Evolution’ in Sandhu, K.S. et al. (eds), The ASEAN Reader 
(ISEAS 1992). 
27
 The ASEAN Declaration [1967]. [alternatively known as the Bangkok Declaration] 
28
 Hung, Lin Chun, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional Integration under International Law?, 9 Chinese J. of 
Int’l L 821 (2010). 
29
 For more in depth information on the conflictual political climate surrounding Southeast Asia, see, Leifer, 
Michael, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (Routledge 1989); Haacke, Jürgen, ASEAN's Diplomatic 
and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (Routledge 2005); Roberts, Christopher B., 
ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Routledge 2012). 
30
 Roberts, Christopher B., ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Routledge 
2012) 178. 
31
 The ASEAN Declaration, , art. 2. 
32
 Chia, Siow Yue and Plummer, Michael G., ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, 
Challenges and Future Directions (Cambridge University Press 2015) 1. 
33
 ASEAN, ASEAN History <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history>. 
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ASEAN membership is open to all states within the Southeast Asia region subscribing to 
its aims, principles, and purposes.
34
 
It is noteworthy that while it is the largest in scope and membership, the ASEAN was not 
the first regional organisation in the Southeast Asia region. Previous regional organisations 
included the MAPHILINDO and the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) which were 
both dismantled in the wake of the establishment of the much larger ASEAN. The 
MAPHILINDO, using the first syllables of its three member states, was composed of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, regrouping the three Malay-based populations of 
the region, and sought to resolve their conflicting territorial claims. It ended prematurely 
because of the hostilities generated by Indonesia’s Konfrontasi.35 Another regional 
organisation was the ASA, composed of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, which 
emphasised cooperation in economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative matters. 
The ASA’s life was cut short due to the dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over 
North Borneo.
36
 North Borneo later became Sabah as part of the Malaysian Federation in 
1963. 
The ASEAN membership was expanded over time to finally include the whole Southeast 
Asia region, with the exception of Timor Leste, in accordance with the ASEAN 
Declaration. It was first joined by Brunei Darussalam in 1994, as soon as the latter gained 
independence from the United Kingdom. Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia 
(often collectively referred to as the CLMV) entered the ASEAN during the period 
between 1995 until 1999. It was argued that the fear of perceived external threats, 
including the looming unified economic blocs of the EU and the NAFTA, played a role in 
the successful expansion of the ASEAN.
37
 The increase in the number of the AMSs 
engendered new and challenging issues, in particular an increase in the existing diversity in 
the economic development between the AMSs. 
1.1.2. The Transformation of the ASEAN 
During its 48-year existence, the ASEAN has constantly evolved. Given its humble 
origins, a fundamental change in both structure and the ideological content was crucial to 
                                                 
34
 The ASEAN Declaration, , art. 4. 
35
 Fifield, Russel H., National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Co-operation in 
International Politics (ISEAS 1979) 3. 
36
 Irvine, Roger, ‘The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-1975’ in Broinowski, Allison (ed), Understanding 
ASEAN (Macmillan 1982) 9. 
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 Haas, Deborah A., Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the 
Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 809 (1994); Roberts, Christopher B., ASEAN 
Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Routledge 2012). 
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its future survival.
38
 The ASEAN’s transformation was necessary to give a new purpose to 
the organisation in order to maintain and gain political momentum. 
 Economic Cooperation39 1.1.2.1.
The changes in the ASEAN were ushered in because of the expansion of membership 
accompanied by the perceived fear of the rapid growth of China and India
40
 which led to 
the realisation that the ASEAN needed to be reinvented.
41
 The Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord
42
 marked a crucial point as the ASEAN’s first cornerstone to economic 
cooperation. It aimed to expand the ASEAN cooperation in economics, social, cultural and 
political areas. Primarily, it provided the general framework of trade and industrial 
cooperation that led to the establishment of various programmes including the ASEAN 
Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA),
43
 the ASEAN Industrial Projects,
44
 the ASEAN 
Industrial Complementation,
45
 and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Scheme.
46
 None of 
these efforts would yield adequate results in the development of intra-regional trade and 
investment. It was described as a “futile attempt”47 largely because of the PTA’s flexibility 
which contributed to widespread abuse of exclusion lists that has weakened the PTA 
scheme to the point of ridicule by critics.
48
 
Concerned about the rapid proliferation of free trade areas and custom unions, such as the 
EU and the NAFTA, the leaders of the ASEAN decided to make similar attempts to deepen 
economic cooperation.
49
 With the support of Thailand and Singapore, the ASEAN 
                                                 
38
 Hung, Lin Chun, ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional Integration under International Law?, 9 Chinese J. of 
Int’l L 821 (2010). 
39
 For more information, see, Kenevan, Peter and Winden, Andrew, Flexible Free Trade Area: The ASEAN 
Free Trade Area, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 224 (1993); Davidson, Paul J., ASEAN: The Evolving Legal Framework 
for Economic Cooperation (Times Academic Press 2002). 
40
 Tay, Simon S. C., The ASEAN Charter: Between National Sovereignty and the Region's Constitutional 
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43
 ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreements [1977]. 
44
 Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects [1980]. 
45
 Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation [1981]. 
46
 ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Scheme [1983]. 
47
 White, George O. III, From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to compete in a Global Marketplace: The 
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 Many observers mocked the inclusion of snowploughs and other Southeast Asian nonessentials in the 
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Area, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 224 (1993); White, George O. III, From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to compete in 
a Global Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 177 (2000). 
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 Lopez, Carolina Alberto and Matutes, Jacint Soler, Open Regionalism Versus Discrimanatory Trading 
Agreements: Institutional and Empirical Analysis, 14 ASEAN Econ. Bull. 253 (1998); White, George O. III, 
From Snowplows to Siopao—Trying to compete in a Global Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 177 (2000). 
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undertook another economic cooperation project.
50
 Following the fourth ASEAN Summit 
in 1992, the ASEAN leaders established the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) through the 
adoption of a series of three important documents. The first document was the Singapore 
Declaration
51
 describing the ASEAN’s intention to forge closer political and economic 
cooperation. Regarding the economic cooperation, the document serves as an outline of 
economic measures to be taken in order to achieve the AFTA. The Framework on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation
52
 provided the principles of the ASEAN 
economic cooperation and stressed that the AFTA was only one of the mechanisms in 
place relating to trade cooperation. Finally, the primary vehicle of the AFTA was the 
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT).
53
 The CEPT was 
an agreed effective tariff ranging from 0% to 5% applied to certain manufactured goods 
originating from the AMSs. It takes precedence over the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture 
Scheme and the goods covered in the PTA
 
shall be transferred to the CEPT.
54
 In avoiding a 
repetition of the PTA’s inefficient performance, the CEPT was drafted more precisely with 
less flexibility for the AMSs. What is striking about the CEPT is the lack of a concrete 
mechanism for dispute resolution. While the AMSs can submit their unresolved issues to 
the AFTA Council – a ministerial-level council established by the Singapore Declaration 
to supervise, coordinate and review the implementation of the AFTA
55– the CEPT fails to 
proscribe the Council’s role in dispute resolution. Ultimately, the AMSs are encouraged to 
resolve any disputes in a peaceful and amicable manner.
56
 It was suggested that the AFTA 
was actually created to give the ASEAN new political purpose after the end of the US-
Soviet confrontation and the Cambodian Crisis.
57
 Indeed, it appears that the purpose of the 
AFTA is not for trade liberalisation or the increase of ASEAN intra-regional trade, but 
rather to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).
58
 
 Towards the ASEAN Community 1.1.2.2.
The final transformation commenced at the ASEAN Summit in December 1997 when the 
ASEAN leaders produced the ASEAN Vision 2020
59
: they envisioned a peaceful and stable 
region and planned to forge closer economic integration within the ASEAN by the year 
2020. Thus, the ASEAN Vision 2020 departed from the ASEAN’s political and security 
intergovernmental origin and started steering it in a new direction. In this regard, it was 
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51
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53
 Agreement on The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme For the ASEAN Free Trade 
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 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997). 
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argued that the ASEAN’s morphology emerged more from perceptions of external threats, 
in particular the economic rise of China and India, than from an internal conviction of the 
benefits of stronger intra-regional integration.
60
 Another impetus for the ASEAN’s most 
important transformation was the effect of the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997 when the ASEAN’s inability to react to crises was revealed and the necessity of 
better cooperation at the regional level was recognised.
61
 The ASEAN failed to present a 
united front to effectively resolve the crisis and instead left the AMSs to recover 
independently.
62
  
Following the ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN leaders decided, in the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II,
63
 that the ASEAN Community would be supported by three pillars: the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
(ASCC), and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The choice of language leaves no 
doubt that ASEAN’s transformation is modelled on the EU. The economic pillar is 
believed to be the most feasible of the three.
64
 The AEC’s goal is regional economic 
integration with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and the freer 
flow of capital.
65
 It envisages the following key characteristics: a single market and 
production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic 
development and a region fully integrated into the global economy. In 2007, the ASEAN 
leaders agreed by consensus to accelerate the establishment of the AEC, originally planned 
for 2020, to 2015.
66
 The reason behind this unexpected acceleration was the ASEAN 
leaders’ satisfaction with the progress towards narrowing the development gap within the 
region. They were in agreement that decreasing the deadline of the AEC would encourage 
a more enthusiastic attitude towards stronger regional integration.
67
 Nonetheless, the 
formal establishment of the ASEAN Community comprising of the ASEAN Political-
Security Community, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the ASEAN Economic 
Community was later delayed to 31 December 2015.
68
 
The ASEAN Charter
69
 was adopted to facilitate economic integration and enhance security 
cooperation among the AMSs. It arrived with much anticipation that it could be the 
harbinger of the new ASEAN, one which focused on more meaningful regional integration 
                                                 
60
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and departed from the tradition of non-interference and mutual respect.
70
 In reality, the 
ASEAN Charter did little more than grant the ASEAN a legal personality which is rather 
inconsequential in light of the its institutional capacity.
71
 Furthermore, it was argued that 
the ASEAN had always had legal personality
72
 although this had never been publicly 
acknowledged before the ASEAN Charter. While the ASEAN Charter failed to meet the 
expectations and the ASEAN’s own ambitious goals, observers were quick to defend it.73 
What it did achieve was to guide the ASEAN in an unprecedented direction; one that 
focuses on a rule-based approach and a more formal institution. 
 The Beginning of the ASEAN Competition Policy 1.2.
At the 39
th
 Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM), the ASEAN leaders 
agreed to prioritise the ASEAN market integration as the main projected plan. The 
objective was to form a single regional market with competition policy as an important part 
of the mechanism.
74
 This marked the first time that competition policy had ever been 
mentioned within the ASEAN. There is no other public record that suggests the ASEAN’s 
interest in competition law and policy derive from external or internal pressures. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that at that time, only four AMSs had introduced and 
implemented competition law: Thailand,
75
 Indonesia,
76
 Singapore
77
 and Vietnam.
78
 There 
is considerable variance in the range and depth of the national competition regulations in 
these four regimes and questions may arise as to the effectiveness of the enforcement of 
the competition laws. For these four AMSs, the primary emphasis would be on how to 
harmonise and make their existing national competition laws more effective within the 
regional common framework. For the AMSs without established competition law, the 
primary focus would be on how best to introduce domestic competition law. Therefore, it 
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is reasonable to deduce that the AMSs’ experiences were not strong enough to influence 
the organisation to adopt a regional competition law and policy regime. The only plausible 
justification regarding the origin of ASEAN competition law is the organisation’s internal 
conviction that there was a natural correlation between trade liberalisation, a single 
regional market and a competition policy. Once the ASEAN leaders had fixed their sights 
on the establishment of a regional economic community with a single regional market, it 
was only natural they would want to introduce a competition policy. 
The management and development of the ASEAN competition policy was placed under the 
authority the Sectoral Bodies and under the purview of the AEM. Moreover, the ASEAN 
Expert Group on Competition (AEGC) was also established in order to promote the 
exchange of information, experience and cooperation on competition policy within the 
region.
79
 The AEGC does not have the status of a competition authority in that it is not 
charged with any enforcement responsibilities. It merely functions as a regional network 
forum to help coordinate and encourage the introduction of national competition laws. 
Since its conception, the AEGC has been working consistently on capacity building in 
respect of domestic competition policies with the AMSs’ national authorities.80 
Finally, at the 13
th
 ASEAN Summit on 20 November 2007,
81
 the AMSs adopted the 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint
82
 to serve as a master plan to facilitate and ensure 
the coherence of the AEC. The Blueprint is significant in that it represents a shift from a 
style of operation that depended more on leaders’ declarations, to one that is more 
methodical and relies on a collectively endorsed set of objectives.
83
 According to the 
Blueprint, each AMS is committed to implementing national competition law by 2015. By 
admitting that the main objective of the competition policy is to “foster a culture of fair 
competition,”84 the Blueprint calls attention to competition advocacy. The emphasis on 
advocacy is reflected in the Blueprint’s first action plan regarding competition policy 
which is to introduce competition policy in all AMSs by the AEC deadline of 2015 through 
the aides of capacity building programmes and regional guidelines. The AMSs’ 
commitment to the implementation of competition policy is to “ensure a level playing field 
and incubate a culture of fair business competition for enhanced regional economic 
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performance in the long run.”85 The ASEAN’s reluctance to push beyond competition 
advocacy is understandable in light of the AMSs’ significant differences in economic and 
social structures. Moreover, it was claimed that a “uniform system would only be equitable 
when countries enjoy the same levels of economic development, research and development 
capability, infrastructure and technological prowess.”86 Put differently, a unified regional 
competition law is too ambitious for the ASEAN’s current state of diversity. Furthermore, 
since the ASEAN is not a supranational organisation
87
 it neither has a regional institution 
nor a judicial organ to implement and enforce competition law. 
Because of the lack of a central institution within which to develop competition law, the 
Blueprint sets out to establish “a network of authorities or agencies responsible for 
competition policy to serve as a forum for discussing and coordinating competition 
policies”.88 It remains unclear whether the Blueprint’s “network of authorities or agencies” 
will be different to the already established AEGC since they share similar characteristics as 
a regional discussion and cooperation platform. The network has yet to be introduced.  The 
AEGC first met in 2008
89
 and agreed to focus on building up competition policy 
capabilities and best practices in the member countries during the following three to five 
years. Following the goal specified in the Blueprint, the AEGC released the ASEAN 
Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy,
90
 a self-proclaimed “pioneering attempt”91 to 
achieve a highly competitive economic region. The Guidelines I are based on the 
experiences of both the AMSs and the wider international community and have as their 
aim the harmonisation of the AMSs’ competition rules. They were later complemented by 
the Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies in Competition Policy and Law for 
ASEAN
92
 which concentrate more on the development of competition law enforcement 
mechanisms. The AEGC hopes that both Guidelines will raise the awareness of 
competition policy, stimulate the development of best practice in competition policy, and 
enhance cooperation between the AMSs. To date, these are the only two documents 
established by the ASEAN in pursuit of a regional competition policy framework. 
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 The Scope and Nature of the Thesis 1.3.
The ASEAN’s efforts to establish a regional competition policy are often overlooked by 
the literature even when the discussion is about global competition law or regional 
competition laws.
93
 It is plausible that this is due to the ASEAN’s relatively recent interest 
in competition law and the region’s moderate impact on the global market. In light of the 
arrival of the AEC where competition policy occupies an important place, there is a 
pressing need to examine the ASEAN’s competition policy. This thesis aims to bridge the 
gap in the literature by providing a detailed analysis of the ASEAN’s approach to regional 
competition policy. In doing so, it is hoped that it will contribute to the expansion of the 
literature of the ASEAN competition law. While the subject of the present study is 
specifically the ASEAN, the findings of this thesis could contribute to a better 
understanding of competition law regimes in developing economies  and contribute to the 
more general literature on global competition law. Another purpose of this thesis is to 
expand the discourse on the issues surrounding developing economies’ endeavours in 
establishing and enforcing competition law both at the national and the regional level. 
As the title would suggest, this thesis is essentially an analysis of the prospect of an 
effective regional competition policy framework within the ASEAN region. It attempts to 
answer whether the current approach undertaken by the ASEAN could contribute to an 
effective regional competition policy under the fast-approaching economic integration. To 
answer the primary research question, the thesis must first determine whether there is an 
optimal template for a regional competition policy on which the ASEAN’s endeavour 
could be based. This particular question would lead to an examination of important 
regional competition law regimes in the world, including the experiences of developing 
economies. However essential the experiments of other regional organisations may be, 
they are not the primary subject of this study and thus are only examined to the extent that 
they aid the understanding of the ASEAN’s efforts. This thesis will then make an in depth 
inquiry into the narratives of the ASEAN’s competition policy, as well as the ASEAN’s 
specific considerations in the development of competition policy before comparing the 
findings to the actual approaches taken by the ASEAN in its pursuit of regional 
competition policy. Lastly, an investigation into the reception of the ASEAN’s regional 
policy by the AMSs is imperative in order to ascertain the possibility of the achievement of 
the ASEAN’s aspirations. 
The present study incorporates analyses from different perspectives. Historical and legal 
economic methodologies are employed to help answering these research questions. While a 
comparison of different regimes is inevitable during the course of the study, this thesis is 
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not a comparative study in the strict sense and shall not engage in the theoretical rhetoric of 
comparative methodology. The thesis involves a review of both primary and secondary 
sources. Primary materials consist of laws, regulations, cases, official public statements 
and official reports from the ASEAN and the AMSs. Secondary sources containing 
academic articles, legal opinions and working papers are also consulted. In recognition of 
the challenge of transparency encountered throughout the study, the thesis is confined to 
using publicly available material. Although there has been significant improvement in this 
regard, most of the discussions behind the development and drafting of important ASEAN 
agreements and other official documents remain shrouded in mystery. All the materials 
used in this thesis are stated as of December 2015. 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 begins with a review of the current landscape 
of regional approaches to competition law. Chapter 3 examines the goals and challenges of 
the ASEAN competition policy. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 investigate the substantive and 
institutional approaches, respectively, taken by the ASEAN towards its announced goals. 
Chapter 6 then compares the AMSs’ domestic competition laws with the ASEAN’s 
competition policy. 
 Regional Harmonisation of Competition Policy Chapter 2
“Harmonisation of competition laws and policy is an integral part of 
effective economic integration in regional trade agreements. Nations 
committed to trade liberalisation will not allow inconsistent or 
discriminatory application of competition laws to nullify the benefits gained 
from dismantling formal trade barriers, competition law harmonisation, 
however does not follow a single model.”94 
In recent years, competition law and policy framework have been among the most common 
features in the ongoing process of regionalisation.
95
 Cernat employed the term “new wave 
of regionalism”96 to describe the proliferation of regional competition law agreements and 
the new dynamism of a more ambitious and deeper level of integration that goes beyond 
information sharing and comity. At the regional level, several trade arrangements have 
included competition laws and policies on an area-wide basis. This trend towards 
harmonisation now covers many corners of the world. For instance, African developments 
include the COMESA, the EAC, the ECOWAS, the WAEMU, the SADC, and the SACU. 
Asian development has seen the formation of the ASEAN while the Americas and 
Caribbean formations include the MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, the CARICOM, 
and the NAFTA. Thus, more than fifty regional trading partners are now involved in 
regional competition law agreements.
97
 It is important to note that regional competition 
law agreements are no longer reserved for developed economies but have extended to 
include developing economies, and in some instances are reserved exclusively for 
developing economies. What is striking about such agreements is the diversity of their 
institutional features, varying provision for competition, and differing implementation 
success.
98
 
There are a number of reasons for the proliferation of regional competition policies.
99
 The 
most obvious of these is that competition policy is regarded as a necessary complement to 
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trade policy, and especially to regional trade liberalisation and market integration within 
specific geographical regions.
100
 Furthermore, regional competition agreement makes it 
easier to detect and regulate anticompetitive conduct with trans-border dimensions, thus 
enhancing the ability of a single national competition authority confined within the scope 
of its territory to act against such practices.
101
 
This chapter offers a review of the regional approach to competition policy. It first 
examines the definition of harmonisation. Since the concept is central to the thesis, it is 
imperative to clarify the terms. The chapter then briefly describes various configurations of 
regional competition laws. The experiences of these regional arrangements will provide a 
helpful guide to locating the ASEAN’s approach to competition policy. Dabbah once noted 
that “looking at different regional communities established around the world, it is clear that 
there has been too much borrowing from the EU experience and at the same time 
extremely little – if any – consultation on the experience of other regions in the field of 
competition law.”102 In response to his observation, this chapter will focus more on 
developing economies’ experiences with regional competition law. Finally, the chapter 
discusses some nominal issues that arise when jurisdictions in developing economies 
venture into competition law at regional level. 
 Defining Harmonisation 2.1.
The terms “harmonisation” and “convergence” are often confused and used 
interchangeably. Gerber referred to convergence as being independent choices made by the 
states while harmonisation refers to decisions resulting from international agreements.
103
 
Harmonisation implies that the states are bound by the agreements and have no choice but 
to comply or face sanction. Within the harmonisation process, there is a distinction 
between “hard harmonisation” and “soft harmonisation.” Hard harmonisation is used to 
describe binding multilateralism.
104
 Binding multilateralism in the field of competition law 
can take on the form of legally binding multilateral agreements, international competition 
law codes or international competition law regimes, with an international institution 
capable of handling international competition cases.
105
 Interest in multilateral competition 
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law was shown as early as the 1920s with the creation of the World Economic 
Conference.
106
 The project was abruptly dropped due to political and economic problems. 
The proposal was re-considered and abandoned on several further occasions.  
Non-binding multilateralism is known as soft harmonisation.
107
 Soft harmonisation 
revolves around recommendations, best practices and guidelines and can cover both 
substantive and procedural issues. Soft harmonisation resorts to the power of persuasion 
rather than hard binding obligations. Legally, this means that countries are neither obliged 
to subscribe to nor implement the recommendations, guidelines or best practices resulting 
from the non-binding multilateralism into their domestic legislations. In this respect, soft 
harmonisation is similar to the term “convergence” which describes the transformation 
from a state of difference to increasing similarity without binding obligations from a 
multilateral source.
108
 
Soft harmonisation was an instant success because countries are more accepting and show 
less reticence towards it. Despite not having binding legal force, it gained a foothold in the 
field of competition law. In contrast to hard harmonisation, countries appear more willing 
to establish common understandings in the field of competition law through consultation 
and cooperation than through binding obligations.
109
 Admittedly, non-binding 
multilateralism is more flexible and more practical than binding commitments. It is less 
time-consuming and does not suffer from the long and arduous negotiations that are often 
linked to binding multilateralism. Consequently, it is also easier to amend and update non-
binding commitments. Because of its non-binding character, soft harmonisation does not 
pose a threat to nations' sovereignty. It appears that soft harmonisation responds well to 
new competition law jurisdictions’ requirement of accepted up-to-date best practices in the 
field accompanied by a large margin of discretion that national competition authorities 
could enjoy.
110
 It was suggested that the fact that the US fully supported this alternative 
favoured its chance of success.
111
 Nonetheless, soft harmonisation also has its 
disadvantages. Ironically, its shortcomings are inherent in its principal characteristic which 
is the lack of binding obligations. Non-binding multilateralism could translate into 
uncertainty. Soft harmonisation has been justifiably criticised for leaving too much to the 
discretion of national authorities.
112
 Furthermore, the language used in the 
recommendations, guidelines and best practices appears too general and does not provide 
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sufficient guidance on how best to implement the commitments within domestic 
competition law regime.
113
 
Harmonisation of competition laws can occur at three distinct levels: substantive law, 
procedural requirements, and enforcement practices.
114
 The harmonisation of substantive 
law rests on the assumption that economic integration can only occur after member states 
have adopted competition laws and policies that are generally consistent. It can either be a 
part of a regional trade agreement or a conditional clause for regional economic formation. 
An example of a direct and explicit linkage between harmonisation of general competition 
law standards and economic integration is the EU. In this regard, market integration and 
competition law harmonisation exist on a relatively parallel track. The structural 
reorganisation of regional markets is a major objective of regional integration and regional 
arrangements are aimed at- and have resulted in increased cross-border investment. 
Accordingly, an obvious target for harmonisation of procedural requirements is in the area 
of merger control. This can be harmonised by creating parallel procedures, establishing 
direct enforcement cooperation, or creating a single merger system. Harmonising 
enforcement practices means coordinating the enforcement of existing competition laws by 
related national authorities. Enforcement coordination is a necessary complement for 
substantive law harmonisation in the sense that it could bring about more tangible benefits. 
The most obvious example of this is the EU’s creation of a supranational enforcement 
authority. The harmonisation of enforcement practices is also attempted in a more limited 
capacity under cooperation agreements which typically contain four types of 
cooperation:
115
 
1. Exchanging information and data that might be relevant to the other 
country’s enforcement activities;116 
2. Notifying other authorities and consulting with them about areas where 
enforcement conduct in one country is likely to create friction with another 
country;
117
 
3. Assisting other enforcement agencies with investigations that those agencies 
are carrying out in their own territory;
118
 
4. Coordinating parallel investigations into similar conduct.119 
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 Regional Competition Law 2.2.
Regional competition agreements are often entered into by neighbouring countries. They 
appear in various configurations in both the scope of the arrangement and the institutional 
features. This section will categorise these agreements according to the degree of 
harmonisation. The least developed regional agreements are limited to broad and non-
binding language with no realistic intention of disciplining anticompetitive conduct. The 
NAFTA is the best-known agreement in this category. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
are region-wide common competition regimes that not only impose substantive rules 
directly on participating states and private undertakings but also establish a supranational 
authority to enforce those rules. Except for the EU, which still offers an exemplary model, 
it is rare to find a region with such an advanced regime and most regional cooperation falls 
somewhere between these extremes.
120
 The EU and the NAFTA, despite being at opposite 
ends of the spectrum, both enjoy successful harmonisation and convergence within the 
regional framework; however developing economies’ efforts at regionalisation do not yield 
the same results. This categorisation coincides with the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) report in which regional trade agreements are 
divided into two families: the North American style that focuses more on coordination and 
cooperation provisions, and the European-style agreements that are oriented towards more 
substantive rules.
121
 The experience of developing economies in regional harmonisation 
warrant special attention due the disparity between the proposed goal for harmonisation 
and the actual approach taken to achieve it. 
2.2.1. Regional (Preferential) Trade Agreements 
“Regional trade agreements seek to reduce obstacles to trade within a specific geographical 
region.”122 Typically, competition law only plays a marginal role in these regional 
agreements since there is little evidence that competition provisions have been an 
important focus of negotiations leading to such agreements and they appear not to have 
played a major role in implementation.
123
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The NAFTA 
A prominent regional trade agreement is the NAFTA, a trade bloc comprising the US, 
Canada and Mexico. A requirement of the NAFTA is that each party adopt or maintain 
measures to proscribe anticompetitive activity and take appropriate measures against it.
124
 
Under this requirement, Mexico was obliged to enact a comprehensive competition law in 
1993.
125
 The NAFTA does not contain any substantive rules whether general or specific 
regarding the field of competition nor does it establish a supranational authority in charge 
of enforcing competition regulations. It does, however, contain provisions on cooperation 
and coordination among national competition authorities.
126
 The NAFTA provisions seem 
to reflect the US’s vision of the institution of global competition law as opposed to far-
reaching harmonisation with common competition rules and a centralised competition 
authority. It prefers a more practical approach based on cooperation in the enforcement of 
domestic competition laws between countries with similar economic, political and legal 
backgrounds. The NAFTA has established a Working Group to oversee convergence in 
participatory states. 
The NAFTA does not rely on supranational institutions for enforcement since the 
agreement does not include market integration. It is merely a free trade area. Instead of 
depending on a centralised institution, the NAFTA calls upon members to consult with one 
another on the effectiveness of their national competition laws and to cooperate in the 
enforcement of those laws via mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation, and the 
exchange of information.
127
 What is interesting in the case of the NAFTA is that despite 
having a dispute settlement mechanism involving multilateral panels, the competition 
provisions are expressly excluded from the dispute settlement procedures.
128
 This is 
evidently a unique feature of competition law provisions in regional trade area 
agreements.
129
 Consequently, disputes on competition policy between participating parties 
are settled by informal cooperation
130
 or in rare circumstances, taken to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).
131
 “One conclusion is that something is seriously wrong with the 
competition rules of the NAFTA when the Parties have to resolve their competition-related 
issues by the dispute procedures of the WTO.”132 It is precisely this absence of dispute 
resolution mechanism for competition law matters that contributes to the NAFTA’s limited 
effectiveness. Yet, in spite of their non-binding nature, countries still include competition 
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chapters in regional trade agreements. It was suggested this particular feature contains 
symbolic value which contain the possibility to lead to a natural improvement in 
cooperation between national authorities.
133
 
It should be noted that the NAFTA countries’ experience in the field of competition law 
differs from other regional groups. By the time the Agreement came into force, all three 
members had already enacted domestic competition laws.
134
 Thus the NAFTA only serves 
to coordinate existing competition law regimes; it is not concerned with implementing 
competition law. Admittedly, the three regimes do diverge in some aspects. The Mexican 
law leans more towards economic efficiency and producer welfare; the American law 
favours consumer welfare while the Canadian law falls somewhere between these.
135
 
Nonetheless, this divergence is not significant and does not warrant serious consideration; 
there are more similarities between the three countries than differences.
136
 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
Another notable example of regional trade agreement is the EFTA. It was established as a 
free trade zone by the Stockholm Convention
137
 in 1960 which was later revised by the 
Vaduz Convention.
138
 The original signatory states were Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The EFTA was created in 
response to the EU’s progressive move towards integration.139 It was essentially 
established as an alternative for states which disagreed with the integration approach or did 
not wish to join the EU.
140
 Its purpose is to pursue economic objectives notably the 
operation of free trade between members in industrial products. The EFTA Convention 
contains competition law related provisions, namely, the prohibition of anticompetitive 
agreement, the prohibition of abuse of dominant posititon,
141
 and state aid.
142
 The EFTA 
has undergone various changes in membership: Finland joined as an associate member in 
1961 before fully joined in 1981, Iceland joined in 1970, and Lichtenstein in 1991. There 
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have been some withdrawals as well: Denmark and the UK withdrew in 1973, Portugal in 
1986, and finally Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. Current members of the EFTA are 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 
Later in 1992, the Agreement on the European Economic Area was signed and came into 
force on 1 January 1994 uniting the EU members with the EFTA members
143
 with a view 
to form the European Economic Area (EEA). Most of the EFTA members had already 
applied to the EU membership by the time the EEA Agreement came into effect.
144
 Today, 
the EFTA states party to the EEA Agreement are Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway. 
Switzerland, while not part of the EEA, concluded a separate bilateral agreement with the 
EU. The EEA Agreement is a hybrid between a free trade area and an economic integration 
community.
145
 For many of the members, the EFTA was a stepping stone to the 
membership of the EU and they thus supported the creation of the EEA.
146
 The EEA 
objective is a continuous economic relationship aided by the development of a common set 
of rules for trade and competition. More specifically, its economic objective is to extend 
the EU’s internal market rules to the EFTA states that are a part of the EEA with the 
exception of the custom union and common policies in taxation, agriculture, and fishery 
(although the EEA Agreement contains provisions on trade in agricultural and fishery 
products). The EEA Agreement has accepted the EU legislation almost in its entirety in 
relevant domain including the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Through this document, the process of soft harmonisation between the EU and the 
EFTA rules is ensured. 
Competition rules are considered essential to the successful creation of the EEA
147
 and 
have accordingly been included in the EEA Agreement. The EEA Agreement contains the 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements
148
 which mirrors Article 101 of the TFEU.
149
 Its 
prohibition of abuse of dominant position
150
 reflects Article 102 of the TFEU. Together 
with Protocol 24,
151
 the EEA Agreement
152
 extend the reach of the EU merger control 
regime
153
 throughout the EEA. Finally, the EEA Agreement also contains the control of 
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state aid.
154
 The EEA rules apply only when a conduct or agreement is likely to have an 
effect on trade between the EEA contracting parties
155
 or merger realised in the territory of 
the EFTA states.
156
 
A number of new institutions were created as a result of the EEA Agreement. Of particular 
importance to the competition law domain is the creation of the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court.
157
 Here again, both supranational institutions are 
modelled after the EU institutions namely the EU Commission and the CJEU. The ESA is 
responsible for the investigation and the enforcement of the competition rules in its area 
with similar powers to the EU Commission.
158
 The decisions of the ESA are subject to the 
judicial review handled by the EFTA Court. The Court, composed of seven judges, is 
capable of handling disputes between the ESA and member states, hearing appeal 
concerning decisions of the ESA in the field of competition, the settlement of disputes 
between EFTA states, and giving advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA 
Agreement. 
“A two pillar system” 159 was conceived to enforce the EEA competition rules in which the 
EU institutions are kept separated from those of the EFTA yet both institutions have the 
responsibility of maintaining the EEA system. This mechanism is implemented in 
pursuance of the promotion of the harmonisation of the EEA and the EU law. In this 
regard, both the EU Commission and the ESA function as competition enforcement bodies 
of the EEA Agreement. The choice of this system was governed by the idea that effective 
implementation of the substantive EEA competition rules had to be ensured in the whole of 
the territory covered by the EEA Agreement.
160
 The two pillar system is approved by the 
CJEU
161
 and later by the EFTA Court.
162
 
The EEA Agreement provides certain mechanisms to ascertain harmonisation between 
contracting EFTA states and the EU internal market structure. Firstly, the EU Commission 
and the ESA are under obligation to cooperate.
163
 Secondly, there is a certain regard of 
supremacy benefitting the CJEU since the ESA and the EFTA Court must decide in 
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accordance with the rulings of the CJEU.
164
 If disputes were to arise between the EFTA 
Court and the CJEU relative to the interpretation of the EEA Agreement, the EEA Joint 
Committee, which is responsible of the management of the Agreement, will intervene in 
attempt to reach an agreement.
165
 Ultimately, if an agreement cannot be reached after three 
months, the CJEU can give a ruling at the request of the contracting parties to the dispute. 
In practice, the EFTA Court generally follows the CJEU decisions.
166
 Lastly, in the case of 
disparity between national laws and the EEA rules, the latter would prevail.
167
 This 
particular mechanism is in place to guarantee homogeneity of the EEA since the EEA 
Agreement lacks legislative power and its provisions cannot be directly applied but must be 
transposed into national law by contracting members. The harmonisation mechanism is 
complemented by the EFTA states’ eagerness to incorporate EU internal market legislation 
into their national regimes.
168
 
Both the mechanisms and the members’ eagerness contribute to a sufficient level of 
effectiveness attained by the EEA. However, there have been concerns that the EEA’s 
harmonisation approach only assists countries in improving their legal qualifications to the 
accession to the EU while doing little to improve the economic qualifications.
169
 It 
inevitably calls into question the level of harmonisation actually achieved through the 
EEA. The EFTA’s standing as a standalone free trade area is also ambiguous since its 
effectiveness is entirely dependent to that of the EU as a result of the EEA Agreement. In 
this regard, the EFTA wears an appearance of a precursor to the full membership of the 
EU.
170
 Historically, many members left the EFTA to join the EU: UK, Denmark, Portugal, 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the EEA Agreement 
introduced important changes to the EFTA states considering that at the time of its 
conclusion many countries did not enact national competition law or it was rarely 
enforced.
171
 Its usefulness and effectiveness regarding harmonisation should not be easily 
ignored. 
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2.2.2. The European Integration Model 
The EU is testament to the effectiveness of regional competition law. It features at the most 
advanced end of the spectrum with its region-wide common substantive and procedural 
competition rules complemented by a supranational competition authority enforcing those 
rules. This high degree of harmonisation reflects a correspondingly high level of economic 
integration.
172
 The EU’s origin dates to the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community
173
 before the establishment of the European Economic Community in 
1957.
174
 The initial denomination of the European Economic Community was replaced by 
the European Community by the Treaty on European Union in 1992
175
 which in turn was 
incorporated into the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.
176
 Later, the Treaty 
of Lisbon renamed the Treaty of Rome as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It also renumbered the Articles and renamed some institutions. In this thesis, the 
names and numbers used those stated in the TFEU. One of the principal objectives of the 
formation of the EU was the establishment of an internal market with the free movement of 
goods, capital, services and people.
177
 In this regard, the principle of free competition was 
established early
178
 to assist with the unification of a competitive single economic area.
179
 
Competition law was recognised as fundamental to the goal of integration.
180
 Gerber 
agreed that competition law has a pivotal role in the process of integration and added that it 
is the integration aspect that has made the EU competition law special.
181
 
The EU has a comprehensive body of substantive provisions regarding competition rules. 
The principal EU competition rules can now be found in Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU
182
 prohibiting anticompetitive agreements which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Internal Market and abuse of 
dominant position.
183
 The competition rules are affirmed as essential for the 
accomplishment of the task entrusted to the EU and in particular, the functioning of the 
Internal Market.
184
 The provisions of merger control are not included in the Treaty but 
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instead were introduced by the EC Regulation 4064/89.
185
 The current merger regulation is 
Regulation 139/2004.
186
 
The substantive provisions are complemented by regional and national institutions in the 
enforcement of the regional competition rules. Given the novelty and almost revolutionary 
concept of the EU competition law, the creation of a new supranational institution was 
considered unavoidable in order to establish a proper culture of competition.
187
 The EU has 
exclusive competence in the establishment of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the Internal Market.
188
 Accordingly, the initial responsibility of the 
enforcement of competition rules is shouldered by the European Commission.
189
 The 
Commission is equipped with extensive powers from investigating to imposing penalties 
on relevant undertakings or member states.
190
 It appears that a centralised institution is in 
the best position to establish uniform regional competition law among member states as 
well as ensure market integration.
191
 Moreover, the Commission is not restrained by a 
myopic state-centric vision. The principle of subsidiarity is that the EU shall only act of 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
member states in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence.
192
 Later, and in 
accordance with this principle, a decisive change was introduced when Regulation 1/2003 
empowered national competition authorities and national courts with the direct application 
of the EU competition rules.
193
 The Commission, consequently, concentrates on serious 
competition issues with an intra-regional dimension. 
Since the Treaty of Nice
194
 the judicial review body of first instance of the Commission 
decisions in competition cases is the General Court of the European Union (GCEU). Its 
role is the assessment of the legality of the decision in light of the TFEU. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
195
 in turn, hears appeals of the GCEU decisions 
strictly on points of law
196
 and preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the 
Treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 
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agencies of the Union from national courts.
197
 The European Competition Network (ECN), 
established by Regulation 1/2003,
198
 further strengthens the enforcement of EU 
competition law by offering a forum where the Commission and national competition 
authorities meet to discuss their common interests, coordinate their enforcement efforts as 
well as ensure an efficient allocation of resources. The Commission Notice of 2004 helps 
regulate the issue of case allocation between members and the Commission or among 
members.
199
 The ECN is a valuable platform of coordination and cooperation that 
considers all of the twenty-eight member states
200
. It has systems of competition law that 
are largely modelled after the EU competition law.
201
 
Dabbah boldly proclaimed that there has been no field in which European ideas have been 
more important or influential, within the EU or internationally, than the field of 
competition law.
202
 Indeed, it is likely that the effectiveness of the EU competition law 
regime within its jurisdiction helps support the recognition of its distinctiveness beyond the 
EU. The EU competition law owes its effectiveness to the robust substantive provisions 
coupled with effective enforcement attempts by both national and regional competition 
authorities. Moreover, its continued enforcement differentiates it from other regional 
competition law regimes. It is thus not surprising that the EU is considered to be the 
laboratory of regional competition law.
203
 The EU’s success has inspired policymakers 
from developing economies to seek insight and guidance from the EU when deciding to 
adopt or adapt existing competition laws.
204
 In this respect, the EU’s influence can be felt 
when other legislatures and competition authorities use the EU model as a reference for the 
enactment and interpretation of national competition laws. Furthermore, the EU is actively 
seeking to establish the EU model on the global stage.
205
 Such was the case of the 
Economic Partnership with the CARICOM,
206
 whereby member states are obliged to 
establish a CARICOM Competition Commission.
207
 It is possible that the active 
involvement of the EU is motivated by the perception that regional competition law in 
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developing economies is for promoting sustainable development.
208
 The EU also plays an 
active role in many international organisations such as the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the OECD, and the International Competition 
Network (ICN).
209
 For instance, The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition
 
is heavily influenced by the EU model.
210 
The task of promoting the EU model does have its challenges. It should be remembered 
that the unique characteristic of the EU competition law is its integration of the regional 
organisation. In this respect, competition law is simply another means, regardless of how 
pivotal, of eliminating the barriers between member states and helping to establish the 
Internal Market. Nonetheless, Botta positively concluded that the EU would continue to 
actively export its competition law model through its network of bilateral trade and 
association agreements.
211
 
2.2.3. Developing Jurisdictions’ Experiences with Regional Competition 
Law 
Small and developing economies could gain special benefits from the convergence efforts 
of competition laws.
212
 Because developing economies tend to have scarce resources and 
little experience in competition law, they are rarely in a position to make credible threats to 
deter the anticompetitive conduct of foreign companies. This problem could perhaps be 
resolved if they pooled their resources at a regional level. Moreover, regional cooperation 
could enlarge the scope of competence in the enforcement of competition law since 
restraints on competition would no longer be restricted to one region; it would expand 
across borders. Finally, regional cooperation could provide a forum for developing 
economies to analyse Western experiences and assess the merits of their proposals 
regarding global competition law. In light of its potential, there have been many attempts 
to regionalise small and developing economies. Although there are many possible 
configurations, Drexl identified three patterns in developing economies’ approaches to 
regional competition law: a centralised approach, a convergence/soft harmonisation 
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approach, and a “download” approach.213 He further advised that the centralised approach 
is unsuitable for developing economies. 
 The Centralised Approach 2.2.3.1.
The WAEMU 
The WAEMU could serve as a cautionary tale for overly ambitious attempts at regional 
integration.
214
 Its integration process began with the adoption of a common currency, the 
CFA franc, under the auspices of the Monetary Union of West Africa (UMOA)
215
 and 
signed in 1994 by seven West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo. Guinea-Bissau was the last to join in 1997. The Treaty of 
Dakar
216
 would later be introduced to transform the existing monetary union into full 
economic integration with the creation of a common market under the auspice of the 
WAEMU. 
The Treaty of Dakar institutes common competition law: the prohibition of anticompetitive 
agreements with the object or effect of restraining or distorting competition within the 
Union, abuse of dominant position in the common market or in a significant party of the 
common market, and state aid.
217
 The WAEMU Council of Ministers, a political organ 
with national representatives, has exclusive competence to legislate on these matters
218
 
consequently reducing member states’ competence to merger control and unfair 
competition. The Treaty of Dakar also established a supranational enforcement organ 
called the WAEMU Competition Commission with a mandate to enforce regional 
competition law and cooperate with member states in the enforcement of the law.
219
 The 
Commission can conduct independent investigations into alleged anticompetitive conduct 
without a request from member countries or affected undertakings. The Treaty of Dakar 
established the principle of direct applicability and supremacy of the Union’s 
regulations.
220
 In addition, the WAEMU Court of Justice ambitiously stated that the 
WAEMU competition law had supremacy over member states’ competition laws since the 
WAEMU’s law purports to be centralising.221 The Court of Justice further refrained from 
identifying the limit of the applicability of regional competition law, thus suggesting that 
regional competition law applies even when there is only a small element of intra-
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community market and is not limited to the effect on trade between member states. It 
follows that the Commission’s exclusive enforcement power is extended accordingly. It is 
not surprising that the Court’s opinion was heavily criticised for its deviation from the 
Treaty’s intent. It was argued that the Treaty of Dakar merely created common substantive 
rules and entrusted the Council of Ministers to direct the Commission in its competition-
related enforcement.
222
 It did not create an exclusive community regulatory authority that 
would supplant the national authority. In light of the Court’s interpretation, Senegal, a 
member country with the most experience in competition law enforcement,
223
 was forced 
to withdraw enforcement of its own competition law to make room for the WAEMU even 
though the latter’s credibility and efficiency had not been affirmed.224 Also of concern is 
the well-documented fact that the Commission’s resources are extremely limited.225 Not 
only has the Court succeeded in alienating an important member with a reliable 
competition regime but local problems would not be addressed if the national authority had 
to defer to and await the enforcement of a supranational body.
226
 Regardless of the 
criticism and discontent expressed, the interpretation of the Court has been upheld by 
members who have refrained from implementing their domestic competition laws in favour 
of referring cases to the WAEMU Commission.
227
 National competition authorities’ 
competence is thus limited to unfair competition, price regulation and merger control. 
Consequently, national authorities have creatively enlarged the scope of application of 
those provisions.
228
 However, member states may still participate in the regional decision-
making process through the Advisory Committee on Competition, which is based on the 
European Competition Network (ECN) that can give opinions on pending cases. While the 
Advisory Committee’s opinion is not binding, it has been observed that the Commission 
generally follows it.
229
 
                                                 
222
 Weick, Daniel P., Competition Law and Policy in Senegal: A Cautionary Tale for Regional Integration?, 
33 World Competition 521 (2010). 
223
 Senegal has begun its competition law enforcement since the enactment of its competition law in 1994, 
see, Loi n° 94-63 du 22 août 1994 sur les Prix, la Concurrence et le Contentieux Economique. 
224
 Fox, Eleanor M. and Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law (West 2010). 
225
 Bakhoum, Mor and Molestina, Julia, ‘Institutional Coherence and Effectiveness of a Regional 
Competition Policy: the Case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)’ in Drexl, 
Josef et al. (eds), Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2012). 
226
 Fox, Eleanor M., ‘Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a Competition Law 
Fit for Developing Countries’ in Drexl, Josef et al. (eds), Competition Policy and Regional Integration in 
Developing Countries (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012). 
227
 Weick, Daniel P., Competition Law and Policy in Senegal: A Cautionary Tale for Regional Integration?, 
33 World Competition 521 (2010). 
228
 UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal 
(UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/1, 2007). 
229
 Bakhoum, Mor and Molestina, Julia, ‘Institutional Coherence and Effectiveness of a Regional 
Competition Policy: the Case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)’ in Drexl, 
Josef et al. (eds), Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2012). 
30 
 
Despite being hailed as “the most successful of all the regional agreements [in developing 
jurisdictions] in terms of enforcement,”230 in reality the WAEMU’s competition law 
regime’s effectiveness is limited by its over-centralised enforcement as previously 
demonstrated. The UNCTAD Peer Review Report suggested a reallocation of competence 
whereby national competition authorities can conduct the initial investigation, leaving the 
Commission to make the final decision.
231
 Such restructuring, while not ideal since the 
principle of subsidiarity comparable to that of the EU would be more appropriate, would 
undoubtedly reconnect national competition authorities in the regional structure as well as 
help the WAEMU gain from the experiences of more established national authorities.  
The COMESA 
“To date, the COMESA remains one of the most successful regional economic cooperation 
and integration groups in Africa.”232 In comparison to the experience of the WAEMU, the 
COMESA experience with regional competition law appears to be more measured. 
In 1993, the COMESA Treaty
233
 was signed to replace the Preferential Trade Area 
Treaty.
234
 This sub-regional organisation has a large membership comprising of a block of 
the EAC and the SADC. The COMESA was designed to provide economic integration at 
community level with competition law as one of the core economic tools. The COMESA 
Treaty provides some elements of competition law, namely prohibitions of collusion and 
state aid control.
235
 At the same time, the Treaty also encourages member states to adopt 
and enforce their own domestic competition laws. When the Treaty was adopted, some 
member states had already enacted national competition laws but the laws were deemed 
inadequate.
236
 In this regard, regional competition law is necessary in order to assure 
harmonisation and consistency in the enforcement of the law. 
The COMESA Competition Regulations would later come to complement regional 
competition law inaugurated by the COMESA Treaty. They prohibit anticompetitive 
agreements, abuse of dominant position, cartel arrangements, and merger control.
237
 They 
also establish the COMESA Competition Commission as a corporate body capable of 
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enforcing regional competition law.
238
 The Commission has the power to monitor and 
investigate anticompetitive behaviours, mediate disputes between member states 
concerning anticompetitive conduct and coordinate with national competition authorities in 
the enforcement of regional competition law within the regional block.
239
 It can only 
intervene when there is an effect on trade between member states. The Commission can 
also initiate an investigation on its own without waiting for notification or a request from 
member states. The decisions of the Commission can be appealed to the Board of 
Commissioners.
240
 In turn, the latter’s decision can be heard by the COMESA Court of 
Justice that can conduct a judicial review of the acts of all COMESA institutions.
241
 
Unlike the WAEMU and more like the experience of the EU, the principle of subsidiarity 
applies in this case. The COMESA Commission shares jurisdiction of regional competition 
law with national competition authorities with the Commission having supremacy in case 
of conflicts.
242
 Members are required to create conditions conducive to achieving the aims 
of the common market and the implementation of the COMESA Treaty and to refrain from 
undermining these aims. With a comprehensive substantive provisions complemented by 
enforcement by both national and regional competition authorities, the COMESA’s attempt 
at regional competition law has all the necessary elements to achieve effectiveness. 
 The Harmonisation Approach 2.2.3.2.
The MERCOSUR was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción.
243
 It consists of four 
sovereign countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay. Bolivia, Chile, 
Columbia, Ecuador and Peru are associate member states. The MERCOSUR’s main 
objective is to promote free trade and free movement of people, goods and currency.
244
 In 
light of this objective, it is necessary for member states “to harmonise their legislation in 
the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process.”245 The field of 
competition law was regarded as a necessary step towards regional integration and 
attempts were made to harmonise members’ different domestic competition laws and 
policies. However, it was not until 1996 when the Fortaleza Protocol
246
 was signed that an 
ambitious set of guidelines to establish a harmonised competition policy was adopted. 
Among other institutional innovations, the Fortaleza Protocol requires all members to 
establish national competition laws that apply to all sectors of the economy, and an 
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autonomous competition agency capable of its enforcement. For the purpose of creating a 
common competition policy, the Fortaleza Protocol advocates greater harmonisation of 
domestic competition laws in the area of anticompetitive conduct and merger controls. 
This measure was of crucial importance in light of member states’ frequent adoption of 
anti-dumping measures against each other which consequently impeded trade within the 
community.
247
 
The MERCOSUR Trade Commission, composed of four members and four alternates from 
each member state
248
 and the Committee for the Defence of Competition, consisted of 
national competition authorities, are the two organs in charge of monitoring the 
enforcement of the Fortaleza Protocol.
249
 Both organs are not supranational but 
intergovernmental bodies. The Committee for the Defence of Competition handles the 
investigation of cross-border competition cases at the request of member states in 
cooperation with the national competition authorities of the state in which the infringing 
party is domiciled.
250
 In contrast, competition issues with no regional element fall 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of member states.
251
 The Committee recommends 
sanctions or any other appropriate measures to the Trade Commission if the infringement 
has MERCOSUR implications.
252
 It cannot impose sanctions or measures by its own. The 
Trade Commission then, taking into account the recommendation of the Committee, adopts 
a Directive applying sanctions or other enforcement measures.
253
 The national authorities 
of the defendant’s domicile are under obligation to apply this Directive. In this regard, the 
Trade Commission is the sole organ with adjudicating power relative to cross-border 
competition issues among member states. However, its power is only indirectly since it 
requires actual enforcement from national authorities. While it is true that both the Trade 
Commission and the Committee for the Defence of Competition are composed of 
representative from the member states, the former is awarded a better status since it is an 
intergovernmental organ with decision making power within the MERCOSUR
254
 and can 
thus be entrusted with adopting Directives applying enforcement measures. 
Following the MERCOSUR philosophy, the Fortaleza Protocol did not create any 
supranational institution. Consequently, the effectiveness of the regional competition 
regime relies solely on the national competition authorities’ power of enforcement.255 In 
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theory, the absence of a centralised institution does not necessary translate to 
ineffectiveness in competition law regime provided that national competition authorities 
are capable of fulfilling in the role of regional enforcement. Nonetheless, this is not the 
case for the MERCOSUR.
256
 Consequently, the MERCOSUR’s ambitious policy of 
economic integration has had limited success. Another contributing factor to this limitation 
is the economic instability of member states.
257
 The unequal development of members is 
also an important factor. Some members, namely Paraguay and Uruguay, lack experience 
and expertise in the field of competition law enforcement.
258
 Moreover, members are also 
resistant to anti-dumping and state aid control provisions in a perceived reaction to Brazil’s 
trade dominance in the region.
259
 
 The “Download”260 Approach 2.2.3.3.
The term “download” approach refers to the process of transferring supranational rules 
from a regional institution directly into national norms. This feature is unique to the 
Andean Community. 
The Andean Community was created in 1969 by the Cartagena Agreement
261
 originally as 
a free trade area, a custom union with common external tariffs and trade policy. The 
Andean Community achieved the elimination of tariffs in 1993.
262
 It has undergone some 
changes in membership and the current members are Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador and 
Peru.
263
 The Cartagena Agreement simply mandates member states to adopt regulations 
dealing with restrictive business practices without any explicit competition provisions. It 
was Decision 285
264
 that established substantive regulations and supranational authority in 
the field of competition law in intra-regional cases. It includes provisions on collusion and 
the abuse of dominant position. The Board of Commission, established by the Cartagena 
Agreement, is in charge of overseeing the enforcement of Decision 285. At the request of 
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member countries or affected private parties, the Board will conduct investigations and 
authorise countries to impose corrective measures. It cannot impose sanctions directly on 
undertakings. Due to the restriction on the power of the competition authority, no 
anticompetitive practices were detected nor sanctioned under this rule.
265
 It was not until 
2005, with the introduction of Decision 608
266
, that the Andean Community gained a more 
effective regional competition regime. Decision 608 forbids agreements and collusion that 
restrict competition as well as the abuse of dominant position by undertakings that may 
affect trade among member states. It directly addresses the weakness of Decision 285 by, 
among others, giving enforcement power to the General Secretariat in cross-border cases 
as well as the power to directly impose sanctions on undertakings. Addressing the issue of 
absence of comprehensive competition law in certain member states, it allows members to 
directly apply the Community’s competition law regime – hence the denomination 
“download” approach. Member states are to refrain from adopting rules that contradict the 
aims or the Community law.
267
 Furthermore, the Andean Community has also established 
an Advisory Committee for the Protection of Competition, composed of representatives of 
national authorities, to facilitate the exchange of information between member states. 
The justification of the download approach is to allow states without national competition 
law to provisionally use supranational rules until the adoption of comprehensive domestic 
competition law. This method should help circumvent traditional challenges, namely 
resource restrictions and political and institutional obstacles, when adopting new 
competition rules and building a competition culture. On the other hand, by avoiding 
addressing these challenges, the download approach would inevitably lead to the 
implementation of supranational rules without the necessary support of the local context. 
Another difficulty resides in the interpretation of Decision 608 because its language is 
unclear regarding the extent of the flexibility given to members when downloading the 
Andean Community’s competition rules. It follows that the interesting download approach 
to regional harmonisation may only obtain minimal effectiveness in the long run since it 
only allows temporary solution to use regional competition rules without aiding the actual 
harmonisation process within members’ regimes. 
 Special Considerations for Developing Jurisdictions’ Regional 2.3.
Harmonisation of Competition Law 
Developing economies often face unique issues in enforcing competition law due to their 
natural inclination for accommodating anticompetitive practices.
268
 Their low level of 
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economic development, often accompanied by institutional design problems and complex 
government regulation and bureaucracy, aggravate the difficulties facing developing 
countries.
269
 As has been previously shown, developing economies’ regional efforts in the 
field of competition law have had limited success despite showing great potential. This 
seems to reinforce Dabbah’s belief that it would be premature to fully embrace the regional 
option.
270
 Nonetheless, sometimes a premature regional effort can serve as added 
motivation for developing economies to pay attention to and commit to introducing 
competition law. 
This section takes a step further by examining the reasons behind the limited success of 
developing economies’ regional competition law. Despite the idiosyncrasy of each regional 
organisation’s experience, some common causal issues emerge. Here, the principal issues 
are divided in three groups: resources restriction, the nature of member states, and the 
allocation of competence between regional institutions and member states. 
2.3.1. Overcoming Resource Restriction 
“Possibly the main enforcement obstacle faced by developing and small jurisdictions 
involves enforcement resource constraints – both financial and human.”271 Resource 
scarcity is not limited to financial affairs but extends to that of human capabilities. In order 
to effectively enforce competition law, jurisdictions need qualified personnel, preferably 
with some experience. Plagued by restricted resources, many countries cannot justify the 
investment required to commence their own competition law regime. It is seemingly more 
logical to create communal enforcement at a regional level by pooling resources with 
neighbours. The benefits of this method seem apparent: “[j]oining forces to create some 
form of participatory governance, jurisdictions can reduce, inter alia, limitations resulting 
from scarce enforcement resources, political economy constraints, and limited ability to 
create credible enforcement threats”.272 Beckford further attested to the idea that regional 
competition law is “the optimal solution”273 for resource-constrained countries to achieve 
the goal of regional competition policy. 
The vision of pooling resources in the administrative design and enforcement of regional 
competition law is not, however, universally shared. “[T]o the extent that a regional 
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arrangement is an agreement for a community-wide competition law, and especially one 
with centralised enforcement, all of the problems that undermine successful national 
enforcement, other than lack of economies of scale, recur.”274 Regionalising competition 
law does not provide immunity from the problems of resource restriction. Furthermore, 
there are few incentives to conceding precious financial and human resources to a regional 
organisation when the same resources are needed in the national jurisdiction. The 
WAEMU serves as an exemplary tale of the persistence of resource starvation at regional 
level. In 2012, the WAEMU Competition Commission only recorded three ex-officio 
members of staff.
275
 It would seem that despite the effort of gathering the resources, the 
problem would still exist and simply manifest differently. It should not be forgotten that 
creating a regional competition law regime, especially when using a centralised approach, 
involves the direct costs of building a new institution (or institutions) and the resources for 
its operation.
276
 Such costs can be burdensome, especially for countries whose resources 
are already scarce. Moreover, the cost of complying with the obligations of the regional 
arrangement, especially the effective enforcement of domestic competition law, for a state 
with inadequate institutional and regulatory capacity can be too costly for that state.
277
 It is 
apparent now that regionalisation does not automatically solve the problem of restricted 
resources. Only with clear communal resolve and some sacrifice can participating states 
overcome this particular challenge.
278
 
2.3.2. The Nature of Member States 
The nature of participating members in regional integration directly affects the appropriate 
level of integration. In theory, smaller groups of countries with similar political and 
economic backgrounds and levels of development would be best suited to the centralised 
approach, the deepest form of integration. In contrast, larger groups of countries with 
diverse economic characteristics and differing levels of development cannot afford to 
adopt the centralised approach.
279
 Earlier in this chapter  the case of the WAEMU was 
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analysed and it was noted that over-centralisation halted the progress of Senegal’s 
competition law regime as well as stifled other new jurisdictions in the nascent state. The 
MERCOSUR members also faced internal political and economic divisions on the 
importance of a free market which resulted in the slow implementation of its regulations.
280
 
On the other hand, Drexl argued that “the implementation of common competition policy 
does not require a similar level of economic development of the participating states. What 
matters more is the concrete application of the rules to the individual cases.” 281 His focus 
is on the willingness to commit on the part of members as it is believed that commitment 
could overcome local contextual obstacles. Nonetheless, commitment to regional 
obligations is not absolute and may waver when faced with political and financial 
instability. If sufficient numbers of member states find themselves in such predicaments, 
this would in turn reduce the potential benefits that other members could gain from 
regional organisation. Such was the case with the COMESA when it prompted some 
members to leave and join a smaller and more stable regional agreement.
282
 
2.3.3. The Negotiation of the Allocation of Regulatory Competence 
between Member States and Regional Institutions 
Theoretically, the incentive for states to join a regional arrangement is the potential 
benefits to be gained in relation to the costs and burden in the form of requirements 
resulting from the arrangement. The benefits, in this case, are not restricted to competition 
law, especially if the regional competition agreement is merely part of a wider trade 
agreement. It is a challenge to convince states to abandon their sovereignty in favour of the 
regional organisation. The unwillingness to join is not reserved exclusively for developing 
economies with elementary experience in competition law enforcement. Indeed, “the 
greater the ability of a country to solve its anticompetitive issues on its own, the lower its 
incentive to cede sovereignty.”283 This is principally because “[n]ations normally have 
myopic vision and bounded concern.”284 Developing regional institutions must carefully 
package their product as politically acceptable for participating countries. One way to 
convince them of the regional competition authority’s usefulness is to introduce an 
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institutional feature that favours the participation of national authorities in the decision-
making process at the central level.
285
 Furthermore, it must be clarified that members 
would preserve their sovereignty over competition cases which do not raise regional 
competition issues. Responding to this concern, the EU’s principle of subsidiarity seems 
appropriate. 
It should be noted that the difficulty in negotiating the allocation of competence between 
member states and regional institution is more pronounced the deeper the integration 
approach is. In this regard, the negotiation is most demanding for an institution with a 
centralised orientation. Among other forms of regionalisation, the negotiation of the 
allocation of competence continues even within the framework of mere collaboration. An 
effective cooperation and coordination mechanism between members and between 
members and the regional authority is crucial in order to avoid the risk of overlapping 
competences. Weak collaboration between members and the community could still occur 
even in looser forms of regional harmonisation.
286
 
 Conclusion 2.4.
This chapter has explored a variety of available configurations of regional competition law 
which range from the loosely connected form of regional trade agreements to fully 
integrated systems. The experiences demonstrated in this chapter have shown that an ideal 
model suitable for all states does not exist. Each configuration must navigate both the 
particular and shared challenges of regional competition law. The experiences of 
developing economies are of particular interest to the ASEAN, on which this thesis is 
based. It is imperative that the ASEAN, as the late-comer to the foray, learns from others’ 
experiences so as not to commit the same errors from the inception of the regime. 
While there are many available models for the ASEAN to carefully choose from, the local 
context of both the member states and the region will be ignored at its peril. There is no 
shortage of examples in this regard: the WAEMU disregarded the advantages of national 
competition authorities in favour of its over-regionalisation approach to competition law. 
The result has been an unsatisfactory enforcement of regional competition law. The 
COMESA ignored some member states’ inability to fulfil their regional obligations due to 
national political and economic instability, leading to a reduction in gains from the 
arrangement and the eventual departure of some of the member states. The MERCOSUR 
underestimated the importance of unequal development levels and differences in even a 
basic understanding of the philosophy underlying competition policy.  
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 The ASEAN’s Considerations Regarding Regional Chapter 3
Competition Law 
When the ASEAN leaders agreed to prioritise the ASEAN single market integration as the 
main project and endorsed the creation of the AEGC, this decision set the stage for the 
formation of a regional single market with competition policy as an important part of the 
mechanism. Following the example of the EU model, the ASEAN leaders placed 
competition policy at the centre of the AEC’s structure. Since inventing a new path can be 
difficult and costly, there is nothing wrong with travelling down a path well-travelled. 
However, developing economies deserve a competition law regime that fits the facts of 
their market and responds to their conditions and needs.
287
 A competition law that is so 
designed and characterised is imperative in order to obtain greater legitimacy and 
acceptance from national vested interests. This will result in better implementation. 
Consequently, the ASEAN, whose members are primarily developing economies, also 
need to take into consideration the reality of its own market and conditions when 
considering regional competition law in this region. 
Chapter 1 has established that there is a lack of literature about competition law in the 
Southeast Asian region. Some efforts have been made to overcome this situation.
288
 For 
instance, Aldaba
289
 detailed the emerging issues in the development of competition policy 
in the ASEAN as being: the lack of a culture of competition; resistance from various 
interests and lobby groups; the inadequate regulatory and legal structures; conflicts with 
other national policies; and the differences in competition policy between members. 
Wong
290
 believed that the EU experience was not easy to replicate, especially not by the 
ASEAN that lacks a uniform understanding of competition law, substantive similarities in 
national competition laws, and a transnational enforcement body. Lee and Fukunaga
291
 
further identified two main difficulties in the process of harmonisation of the ASEAN 
competition law – diverse national preferences and the associated non-economic goals. 
Nonetheless, they insisted that these two issues should be only addressed after the 
introduction of the AEC since they expected some crucial changes within the ASEAN 
institutional structure, including the ASEAN Charter
292
 itself. Despite the welcome 
attempts at identifying potential issues in the development of the ASEAN competition law, 
they do not appear specific to the ASEAN and the AMSs. They more resemble the 
challenges encountered by all new and developing competition law regimes. As seen in 
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Chapter 2, these issues are quite common in developing economies. This chapter will 
examine the question of the ASEAN’s specific considerations for its development of 
competition law. It will first begin with an examination of the need for competition law in 
the region before analysing possible and foreseeable obstacles unique to the ASEAN 
cause. The ASEAN faces some specific challenges of its own due to its aversion to binding 
agreements on competition law and policy. It has expressed a preference for the 
harmonisation approach, similar to the experience of the MERCOSUR. This preference 
can be explained by the fact that the ASEAN is still constrained by several factors, notably 
the traditional ASEAN Way, the diversity gap between the AMSs’ economic conditions 
and competition law regimes. 
 Reasons for Competition Law in the ASEAN 3.1.
Determining the goals of competition law is a precondition to building a body of coherent 
competition rules.
293
 Bork insisted that unveiling the goals of competition law is linked to 
revealing the identity of competition law itself.
294
 The objectives of competition law will 
directly influence how competition law is shaped and enforced.
295
 Consequently, it is 
essential to carefully and clearly specify the objectives of competition law while bearing in 
mind the practical realities of business. Unclear goals will leave margins of interpretation 
in the hands of competition authorities and may divert competition enforcement from its 
original purposes: “[w]hat [competition law] aims for must accord with what is 
economically feasible.”296 In reality, it is impossible to define with absolute specificity any 
economic regulation since the economy changes almost constantly. Nonetheless, 
competition law should have enough flexibility and discretional room for interpretation by 
authorities while not hindering the ultimate goal or goals set in the legislation. 
Defining the objectives of competition law serves two general purposes. First, the 
objectives inform the enforcement and application of the law.
297
 They can alert policy 
makers and decision makers to any discrepancies between actual and desired outcomes 
from current enforcement and assist in aligning the outcomes to the stated objectives.
298
 
Secondly, the objectives can elevate the accountability of competition authorities through 
increasing transparency in order to “facilitate reasoned debate to the extent that they make 
explicit the rationale for decisions in individual cases”.299 In order to reveal the goals of 
competition law, one has to first look into the language of the statute.
300
 However, in the 
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field of competition law the language used in the statutes may be too vague and malleable 
for this approach.
301
 It was also recommended that the legislative history be looked into, 
but unfortunately this approach is not always useful either.
302
 As a result, the ambiguous 
language used in the statutes has led to too many academic debates over the true legislative 
intent behind the enactment of competition law. The search for the goals of competition 
law should not be strictly confined to legislative intent since competition law is capable of 
having wider overriding goals.
303
 Restricting debate to legislative intent could lead to a 
great restriction of viewpoint.
304
 Competition law is believed to belong to an order where 
different disciplines, factors and interests are interwoven and evolve constantly according 
to changes related to the relevant time period.
305
  
There is no doubt that searching for the goals beyond legislative intent is not an easy task. 
Yet, despite Bork’s insistence, the debate on the goals of competition law is ongoing and it 
would appear that there is still no consensus on this matter. As Dabbah opined, “[p]erhaps 
no aspect of the field of competition law has given rise to a more heated debate than the 
issue of the goals of competition law.”306 It is plausible that the absence of a unanimous 
answer, despite various academic writings and competition authorities’ enforcement, is the 
major factor behind the persistent debate on the most appropriate goals of competition law. 
Moreover, this debate has branched out beyond national level to regional and international 
level.
307
 The possibilities range from economic to socio-political goals. 
Determining the goals of competition law is also “the focal point of the convergence 
strategy.”308 If all competition law systems move towards the same set goal, convergence 
is the expected outcome generating an increasingly uniform normative framework for 
global competition. However, this hypothesis rests upon the assumption that the stated 
goals and the goals actually pursued by competition officials or national governments are 
identical. It has been noted before that the two are often dissimilar.
309
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It is true that the lack of consensus on the goals of competition law may not matter much as 
long as it is universally believed that competition is “good” and should be encouraged and 
that anticompetitive restriction is “bad” and should be condemned.310 Yet, in light of the 
regionalisation of competition policy, consensus on the goals of competition law does 
matter. It is vital to address the issue of the goals of competition law from the very 
beginning. 
Many goals have been advocated under competition law, but no exhaustive list has been 
drawn up.
311
 The difficulty in unveiling the identity of the goals of competition law lies in 
the fluid nature of competition law itself. Economic factors do not remain static and the 
understanding of competition law has to adapt accordingly.
312
 As competition law systems 
develop, there will inevitably be changes in the focus accorded various policy objectives 
within the same jurisdiction. The goals of competition law also vary according to the 
jurisdiction since they are related to each country’s definition of competition.313 Because 
competition law is likely to be influenced by a country’s social and historical context, it is 
to be expected that countries may respond to different objectives.
314
 In general, the identity 
of competition law remains veiled
315
 and there is little awareness of how they have 
developed, why they were created and the extent to which the systems have achieved their 
intended goals.
316
 This lack of awareness leads to the question of whether it is possible to 
overcome this difficulty or whether it is at all desirable to do
317
 given the potential 
conflicts this question would inevitably unleash. 
Generally, the goals discussed can be classified into three categories: economic, social and 
political. The social and political goals are sometimes referred to as “non-economic goals,” 
“extra-competition policies” or “non-competition law proper policies.”318 The wording of 
the latter in particular suggests that competition policy should not be concerned with them 
and that some degree of discretion is required in their implementation, thus, reducing the 
legal certainties expected from having identifiable goals. Some doubts have been cast on 
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whether these non-economic goals are simply reflexes or have beneficial side effects.
319
 It 
can be argued that they are achievable through other trade policies.
320
 
 The Economic Goals: this category includes economic efficiency, promotion of 
trade, economic liberalisation and enhancing the development of a market 
economy. It is implemented by proscribing and preventing occurrences of pricing 
above the marginal cost of production. This goal is widely considered to be the 
primary aim of modern competition law.
321
 However, there is no shortage of 
scholars arguing that economic efficiency should not be considered as the only goal 
of competition law since it completely overlooks the issue of income distribution 
among consumer and producers.
322
 
 The Social Goals: under this category, competition law is seen as a safeguard to 
social values. It covers the idea of safeguarding the consumer from undue exercise 
of market power and the dispersion of socio-economic power of large firms, safe 
guarding the interest of small and medium-sized firms, protecting democratic 
values and principles, protecting public interest and ensuring market fairness and 
equity.
323
 In other words, the social goals are motivated by the risks of private 
power, the principles of justice and economic equity in market democracy.
324
 This 
category is sometimes criticised for it populist nature.
325
 
 The Political Goals: this category relates to wide political aims such as regional 
market integration, prevention of the concentration of economic power, promotion 
of national interests, global enhancement of the international competitiveness of 
domestic firms and industries, national economic developments, financial stability 
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and reducing unemployment.
326
 It is undeniable that there is a political aspect 
inherent in the nature of competition law. 
Admittedly, these three categories could conflict with each other.
327
 They sometimes are 
designed to not coincide.
328
 It is therefore hard to imagine such diverse expectations being 
consistent with one another.
329
 A lack of consensus in this area may lead to important 
hurdles in achieving regional harmonisation, a goal that the ASEAN wishes to reach. 
However, it seems that these concerns are not particularly problematic because it is enough 
to have commonalities in certain core principles of competition law. Accordingly, 
convergence is to be expected as countries increasingly look to other experiences for 
lessons and as increasing numbers of countries seek to become partners in the global 
trading system.
330
 It is also argued that convergence in this area cannot be achieved since 
competition law is dynamic and constantly evolving.
331
 Other criticisms are that certain 
goals adopted by strong countries will prevail over other goals advocated by weaker 
countries.
332
 
There is also an ongoing debate on whether competition law should have a single or 
multiple goals. Leading advocates for a single goal believe that efficiency is the ultimate 
goal of competition law while competition is only an interim goal that will often be close 
enough to the ultimate goal to allow the judiciary to look no further.
333
 Focusing on one 
well-defined concept of competition law has the advantage of simplicity in ensuring 
coherence throughout the system of competition law resulting in legal certainties for the 
subjects of the law, most notably the firms. However, Stucke
334
 argued that different 
competition scenarios require different concepts of what competition is. These different 
concepts are in turn connected to different objectives of competition law and, hence, the 
establishment of a single well-defined objective is simply impossible. There was strong 
opposition to his theory since different competition scenarios do not necessarily require 
different objectives of competition law. Instead, what is needed is a different approach in 
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order to deal with varying competition problems.
335
 If a state or a region acknowledges 
multiple goals of competition law, these various goals need to be balanced against each 
other when competition law is applied in order to avoid conflicts between them.
336
 
On one hand, competition law needs to serve multiple goals and must be flexible in order 
to serve different societal needs at different times. On the other hand, competition law 
needs to be clear, transparent and predictable in order to ensure legal certainty. “Managing 
with multiple goals is obviously complicated”337 and often conflicting. A legitimate social 
goal in the competition policy could have the effect of distorting prices away from the 
prices associated with economic optimality. A state may offer special conditions and 
incentives that could limit, restrict, or reduce national competition in order to attract 
foreign investment. Poverty reduction initiatives may favour small, inefficient enterprises 
at the expense of more efficient ones. It was argued that in some instances, the pursuit of 
non-economic goals may not be damaging provided that economic welfare considerations 
were taken into account.
338
 The neglect of economic considerations may reduce 
competition or be in direct conflict with the maximisation of economic welfare. The EU 
competition law, and its political goal of market integration, serves as an example for this 
scenario. Frequently, the aims overlook economic welfare for the benefit of enabling cross-
border trade and stimulating competition in the region. 
This section examines which of these scenarios the ASEAN’s harmonisation of 
competition law and policy falls into. An examination of any state or region’s goal of 
competition law would be incomplete without looking at other experiences. Establishing an 
understanding of the goals of different competition law systems is crucial for a better 
understanding of the ASEAN’s experience in the same field. This section will start with an 
overview of the goals of the EU competition law since this is regarded as the reference 
model for regional competition law. The US model, frequently regarded as another 
referential model, will not be examined in this section since it does not encompass the 
experience from a regional organisation’s point of view.339 Special attention is paid to 
other developing economies’ experiences in order to better appreciate how other 
developing economies adapt the established models to their local situations. 
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3.1.1. General Goals of Competition Law 
 European Union 3.1.1.1.
Gerber argued that there is little awareness of how European systems of competition law 
have developed, why they were created and the extent to which the systems have achieved 
their intended goals.
340
 The lack of discussion is due to the possibility of revealing major 
differences of opinion that might lead to division. European academics have long realised 
that substantive and institutional problems that have arisen in connection with the EU 
competition law are due to an implicit divergence of the objectives of EU competition 
policy.
341
 
Despite being called competition law, competition is not an aim in itself.
342
 The law is 
often used to pursue other goals. 
343
 These include economic welfare and the strengthening 
of the single market; protection of small business, economic freedom and ensuring 
fairness; social, political and environmental goals; and industrial or trade policy to herald 
national industrial champions or to prevent them from coming under foreign ownership. In 
the EU, competition law has one dominant objective – to further market integration. 
However, consumer welfare and economic efficiency are increasing in importance. 
The Integration Goal 
The promotion of market integration is the dominant objective of the EU competition 
law.
344
 The competition rules laid down in Article 101
345
 and 102 TFEU
346
 were the 
necessary compliments to the ultimate (the establishment of a common market)
347
 and 
intermediate goals
348
 of the Community since agreement or abusive conduct and state 
measures can create an obstacle to trade between member states. 
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Most commentators
349
 have accepted that market integration has traditionally been the 
unifying aim of the EU competition policy. 
[A] genuine single market cannot be brought about except through free 
competition. If the market were to remain subject to the arbitrary decisions 
of the cartels or to the restrictive practices of monopolies, then the benefits 
of the single market would soon be offset by the effects of price-fixing and 
production quotas.
350
 
This is understandable since competition law serves as part of an overall policy to promote 
the regional as well as national economy.
351
 The aim in this case is to break down barriers 
to cross-border trade within the EU. This feature was said to be unique to the EU 
competition law.
352
 The existence of the market integration goal explains the 
Commission’s hostility to agreements or business practices that prevent or hinder cross-
border trade.
353
 It is seen most clearly in cases where companies allocate different national 
territories, either among themselves (in a horizontal-market sharing cartel), or to different 
distributors (in vertical distribution arrangements.)
354
 
There may be a conflict between the objective of market integration and economic welfare. 
Motta used the example of forbidding price discrimination across national borders to 
illustrate that there is generally no economic rationale for forbidding such practices.
355
 
However, even though this is considered to be the primary goal of European competition 
law, it does not stand alone and economic considerations need to be taken into account.
356
 
Ignoring economic efficiency in favour of market integration could lead to contrary 
outcomes; instead of promoting integration, the Commission could be retarding it.
357
 In 
GlaxoSmithKline, if the Commission were to win its case to restrict parallel importing, the 
company would cease trading in Spain and Greece. This would be detrimental to 
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consumers in these countries. A similar case took place in 1998
358
 and 1983.
359
 The result 
of the United Distillers’ case was an increase in the price of some brands in the UK and the 
subsequent withdrawal from trade of Johnny Walker Red Label in the UK with an obvious 
reduction in consumer welfare. This marked an apparent difference between the brand 
promoted in the UK and in continental Europe.
360
 It should be noted that this conflict only 
arose at Community level. 
The integration goal seems to have declined in importance in EU competition law, 
coinciding with the rising in prominence of the consumer welfare goal. Nonetheless, it was 
argued that the objective of market integration still remained relevant in EU competition 
law.
361
 
Consumer Welfare 
Perret was convinced that consideration of consumer welfare is not a recent concept and 
was present during the formative years of the competition rules in the EU.
362
 While it is 
true that the first decisions of the Commission and the CJEU refer to the generic benefits of 
competition, such as lower prices and technological advances,
363
 there is a strong belief 
that the market integration ideal assumes the interest of consumers.
364
 The interest in 
consumer welfare also appears in the Commission’s report on Competition Policy.365 
Furthermore, Article 101 TFEU explicitly mentions consumer welfare.
366
 
There is a need to reconcile the objective of market integration with the objective of 
consumer welfare.
367
 A consumer-focused approach that protects weaker consumers or 
certain groups could potentially conflict with an approach that focuses more on the 
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economic aspects of competition law. The latter approach would lead to more aggressive 
competition law enforcement. 
Economic Efficiency 
Some scholars still believe that economic efficiency is the primary goal.
368
 Others consider 
economic efficiency to be a fairly new objective that was not part of older decisions.369 The 
notion of economic efficiency is increasingly present in merger control and in the 
discussion surrounding the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU
370
 but with a different 
meaning– namely, the arguments that a dominant undertaking presents to the authority to 
justify its behaviour.
371
 
The efficiency and integration goals of the EU competition law are potentially 
conflicting.
372
 For example, some manufacturers may seek to confine the activities of 
retailers to certain territories. This behaviour could be considered economically efficient, 
yet it might be an infringement of the European market’s integration goal.  In EU law, 
economic welfare and consumer welfare are often closely associated
373
 making it difficult 
to distinguish between the two goals. Moreover, American commentators often criticised 
the EU competition policy for protecting the competitors rather than protecting the process 
of competition. The latter would happen with an economic approach. This comment is less 
true today.
374
 
 Developing Economies 3.1.1.2.
It is generally acknowledged that “the enactment of competition legislation has become a 
global phenomenon.”375 In a short period of time, the ICN saw its membership soar from 
14 jurisdictions at its launch in October 2001 to 123 competition agencies from over 108 
jurisdictions in 2012.
376
 The enactment of competition policy in an emerging economy was 
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once likened to “giving a silk tie to a starving man” by Godek.377 Now, competition policy 
is no longer a luxury but has become necessary if a country wants to join an exclusive club 
of countries who have competition law. Enacting competition legislation has been 
compared to having a proper dress to enter members of an elite club.
378
 Continuing the 
metaphor, countries tend to too quickly put on these dresses without careful consideration 
beforehand regarding whether the dresses are suitable for their style, size or stature. The 
states’ eagerness to conform to what they perceive as the global standard has contributed to 
the proliferation of national competition laws and policies. This is reflected in competition 
law literature where few question the necessity of competition law. The question is often 
ignored, taken for granted or simply left unasked.
379
 There is much debate on whether 
countries with smaller markets and in an early stage of development should pursue 
different goals from countries with larger economies.
380
 However, there is no single 
“correct” or “best” goal of competition law that could be applied to any jurisdiction 
regardless of the local economic and socio-political climates. 
In contrast to the smooth development of competition laws in western countries, the 
emergence of competition laws in developing economies have been more abrupt.
381
 They 
are not a result of internal development but often a “top-down” legislative approach 
whereby the competition legislations are taken from western countries’ models. The danger 
resides in introducing a predefined set of goals which came with the imported legislations.  
Another explanation for the abrupt emergence of competition laws in developing 
economies is the interventions from international institutions such as the UNCTAD, the 
OECD, the World Bank and in particular, the Bretton Woods Institutions: the IMF and the 
WTO
382
 who forced developing economies to adopt liberalisation, privatisation and 
competition laws. While fighting anticompetitive practices seems desirable for developing 
economies, the transposition of these competition laws need to be carefully considered. 
The predefined goals of the above-mentioned organisations for developing economies are 
to open their markets and force their integration into the global market economy.
383
 It 
means that developing economies’ markets are made available to global competition, in 
particular, international undertakings. Enacting competition law as an accompaniment to 
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liberalisation was considered as merely a façade for the actual objective of protecting 
competition that gives international undertakings enhanced access to developing 
economies’ markets.384 This suspicion of western countries’ motives for encouraging 
competition laws in developing economies was shared by Fox
385
 who believed that western 
countries hide behind liberalisation and efficiency to advocate for their version of a 
universal norm for competition law. 
Finally, competition law was seen as an essential part of the efforts by developing 
economies and countries with economies in transition to restructure their domestic 
economies and integrate them fully into the global economy.
386
 This was to exploit new 
opportunities to compete and, in particular, to facilitate the move from monopolisation to 
demonopolisation, and from state control and planning to liberalisation and privatisation.
387
 
In this regard, the introduction of competition law into national legal systems is a matter of 
internal choice and a part of the aim to become competitive in a globalised economy. 
On the surface, it appears that the goals of competition law in developed and developing 
economies converge and, as the ICN reported, so do the goals of unilateral conduct laws. 
These tend to coincide with the goals of ensuring an effective competitive process, 
economic freedom, economic efficiency, and consumer welfare.
388
 However, the 
convergence is in appearance only and does not translate into enforcement. The same 
concept does not always carry the same significance in a different jurisdiction. In fact, 
most of the respondents to the ICN report either do not define the terms or have a different 
understanding of the terms.
389
 
It would appear that developing economies are not content with blindly importing the 
western models and make an effort to adapt the laws to their specific national needs. 
Contrary to developed economies, reforming and developing economies tend to have 
broader goals of competition law in order to assist them with creating a stable economic 
environment. Their concern seems wider than that of developed economies and they 
cannot focus solely on economic efficiency to bring about free and fair competition. They 
tend to make poverty eradication and wealth redistribution their top priorities.
390
 Some of 
the goals stated in developing economies’ competition laws are: to expand opportunities 
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for domestic enterprises to participate in world markets;
391
 to promote employment; to 
advance social and economic welfare; to provide the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
with an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy; to increase the economic 
opportunities of historically disadvantage persons;
392
 and to protect access to basic 
needs.
393
 It is to be noted that unlike the US and the EU, developing economies do not 
share the ongoing dilemma about whether single or multiple goals are most suitable for 
them. They seem to have readily adopted the idea of multiple goals. 
Some authors maintain that the reasoning behind the multiplicity of social and political 
goals was the politicians’ desire to create jobs and attract foreign investment.394 Both serve 
to minimise the social unrest associated with the hardships that typically follow economic 
reforms. In other words, the policymakers are buying social peace. Even when social peace 
is not a pressing concern, policymakers are aware that it is crucial to increase both 
domestic and foreign investment to fully benefit from market reforms and to ensure their 
re-election.
395
 
These multitudes of goals “constitute not only an administrative nightmare but a source of 
immense confusion.”396 Moreover, industrial and trade policies to protect local industries 
through high import duties also come into conflict with the economic goal of competition 
policy.
397
 In this regard, it is unavoidable that competition policy takes a back seat to 
industrial and trade policies. It seems accepted that multiple goals contradict the primary 
competition policy goal–that of economic efficiency. The order of importance is said to be 
resolved politically. Thus, the various goals are implemented in order to ensure that there 
will always be a legitimate political vehicle available to give expression to latent societal 
goals.
398
 In return, the lack of clarity and a penchant for political resolution contribute to 
fears in the private sector and cools its activities, thus deliberately creating a false positive. 
Unlike the developed economies’ models, there has been no attempt to balance the goal of 
economic efficiency with social and political goals. The former is always circumvented for 
the benefit of the latter since developing economies put more emphasis on issues not 
pertaining to economic efficiency or the competition process. 
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3.1.2. The ASEAN’s View 
This section begins with an examination of the reasons for competition law from the 
perspective of both the ASEAN and the AMSs before proceeding to a comparison with 
other regimes’ experiences on the subject. It will conclude with a closer look at the issues 
associated with the goals of competition law. 
 Regional Level 3.1.2.1.
The ASEAN and the AMSs did not shy away from the global trend of adhering to the elite 
club’s dress code. They dived straight into the question of how best to establish a 
competition law regime without sufficient prior consideration of the necessity for- or the 
suitability of a competition policy. Currently, seven AMSs, namely Indonesia,
399
 
Malaysia,
400
 Myanmar,
401
 the Philippines,
402
 Singapore,
403
 Thailand,
404
 and Vietnam,
405
 
have enacted national competition laws. At first glance, it would appear that the seven 
dresses donned by these countries are not cut from the same cloth nor worn in the same 
way. The remaining countries: Brunei, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, were expected to follow 
in their footsteps before the arrival of the AEC in 2015 per their commitment enshrined in 
the Blueprint.
406
 (Further discussion on the competition landscape in the AMSs can be 
found in Chapter 6). 
The reasons behind instituting competition law might not seem important at this stage, 
especially as the ASEAN has explicitly announced its intention to introduce competition 
policy in all the AMSs before the creation of the region’s economic community in 2015407 
and as most AMSs have already enacted national competition laws. However, the same 
argument can be made to support examining this important question. The AMSs’ 
established competition law is not without flaws. Defining the rationale behind the 
existence of each nation’s competition law could help reformulate and direct them towards 
compatibility with the ASEAN regional policy. Furthermore, it could help tailor the 
remaining AMSs’ competition laws in a way that would keep them aligned with existing 
members’ competition regimes as well as the ASEAN approach. 
The question about the reasons for competition law has never been easy to answer, 
particularly in the context of the ASEAN where its ten members could not give identical 
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answers. While adapting the law to local conditions is encouraged, too much divergence 
has the potential to harm the ASEAN’s aim for harmonisation at regional level. Conscious 
of the discordance among the AMSs, the ASEAN organised two conferences, inviting 
competition authorities and government officials from member countries, to discuss 
competition law and policy, in particular the necessity of competition law and policy at 
both regional and national level.
408
 The ASEAN Conference on Fair Trade Competition 
Law and Policy in the AFTA took place in 2003 and the 2
nd
 ASEAN Conference on 
Competition Policy and Law was held in 2006. However, few officials actually engaged in 
the discussion of the necessity of the ASEAN regional competition law and instead took 
the opportunity to introduce their own competition law and policy to other AMSs.
409
 
Regardless of the actual outcome, in reuniting different opinions on various principles 
regarding competition law, the conferences were still considered a “bold first step towards 
an ASEAN [competition policy].”410 Conferences such as these would undeniably promote 
awareness and sound a “wake-up call”411 to all AMSs. 
The first conference concluded that there was no binding conclusion to the reasons for 
competition law. Despite the lack of consensus on what could be considered necessary, 
there was general acknowledgement that competition law was necessary despite a few 
different attitudes among AMSs.
412
 The economic goal of protection and promotion of the 
market economy
413
 were heavily favoured while some officials were concerned about 
social goals: consumer welfare,
414
 promotion of innovation,
415
 and protection of SMEs.
416
 
Only one representative took his country’s economic structure into account through the 
inclusion of the protection of SMEs and the promotion of innovation. The protection of 
SMEs is significant in the context of Southeast Asia since SMEs are the dominant basis for 
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growth in this region. Although the globalisation of competition policy is undeniable, 
competition policy must also resonate at a local level to justify its existence to local 
taxpayers.
417
 The best way to achieve this is to take into consideration the local economic 
and socio-political climate. Competition policy must combine globalism and localism to 
combat international cartels which are facilitated by globalisation itself. An example of 
taking the local context into consideration is responding to citizens’ concerns about 
preserving and securing the benefits of smaller and local firms.
418
 A European survey has 
shown that about 80 percent of the EU citizens thought that small firms needed to be 
protected from large firms’ competition.419 While this survey was conducted on the EU 
citizens, in our globalised world, the EU policies can have an impact on other countries 
and especially other regional organisation’s competition policies. 
In spite of the general acknowledgement, not every AMS shared the same optimism 
regarding the necessity of competition law. The Singaporean representative argued that 
competition policy was only necessary if economic efficiency could not be achieved 
through deregulation policies of trade.
420 
This implies that competition policy is only a 
substitute for trade deregulation policy since “trade policy eliminates governmental 
barriers to international trade and deregulatory reform eliminates domestic regulation that 
restricts entry and exit.”421 In contrast, “competition policy targets business conduct that 
limits market access and reduces actual and potential competition.”422 Even if it was 
decided that competition policy was to be implemented, the Singaporean representative 
advocated that governmental intervention should only occur in a cost-effective way in 
order to improve economic outcomes. Nevertheless, Singapore’s adoption of its 
Competition Act in 2004
423
 suggests that economic efficiency could not be achieved 
through trade deregulation policies alone. 
It was not until the second conference that the AMSs expressed the needs for a regional 
competition law within the ASEAN.
424
 Since only a few representatives engaged in this 
debate, it would seem that the AMSs are less enthusiastic about regional competition law 
compared to national ones. At regional level, competition law could provide an effective 
protection against unfair competition and strengthen economic integration in the 
ASEAN.
425
 With the impending regional economic integration, competition law became 
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necessary in order to ensure that former statutory obstacles to contestability are not 
replaced by anticompetitive practices of firms, thus ensuring true trade liberalisation in the 
process. With an effective regional competition regime in place, the region would project 
an image of economic and legal certainty to economic participants thus attracting interest 
in the ASEAN and more foreign direct investment (FDI). In this regard, regional 
competition law can reinforce the ASEAN investment regime.
426
 Consequently, the 
ASEAN competition law could play a multifunctional role in regional economies: 
encourage the free flow of trade and investment, monitor the behaviour of firms, and 
evaluate the economic role or potential dominance of extra-ASEAN transnational 
corporations in the region.
427
 Moreover, in the case of the ASEAN where most AMSs have 
adopted competition law statutes, having effective and enforceable unified competition 
legislation could help fill the void left by national competition laws.
428
 The establishment 
of a competition regime at a regional level may also reduce the costs of applying national 
competition policies. This would be particularly beneficial for micro-states without 
national competition laws. These states could follow the example of the EU which only has 
jurisdiction over cases with significant effect at regional level or trade between member 
states, leaving the rest under the jurisdiction of their respective nations.
429
 
It was suggested that the AMSs have sufficient knowledge and experience to establish both 
the ASEAN competition law and a central competition authority.
430
 Since the AMSs have 
already acknowledged the necessity of regional competition law, all that remains is the 
political will to follow through on the project.
431
 An AMS should take the initiative 
together with the ASEAN Secretariat to draft the ASEAN regional competition law. 
Indonesia volunteered for this role because of its successful experience in the field.
432
 
What was missing from the discussion table was whether regional competition law was 
suitable for the market structure of the ASEAN. The market size and structure, whether 
regional or national, were never discussed by the officials or the academics. 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the Blueprint
433
 was adopted in 2007 to serve as a master plan 
to facilitate and ensure the coherence of the AEC. According to the Blueprint, each AMS 
was committed to implementing the competition policy by 2015. The Blueprint states that 
its main competition policy objective is to “foster a culture of fair competition”.434 The 
emphasis on advocacy is reflected in its first action plan regarding competition policy 
which is to introduce competition policy in all the AMSs by the implementation of the 
AEC in 2015 with the aid of capacity building programmes and regional guidelines. 
Unfortunately, the role of competition law in the regional economic integration has not 
been emphasised in the Blueprint. 
In 2008, the Best Practices in the Introduction and Implementation of Competition Policy 
and Law in East Asia Summit Countries,
435
 commissioned by the ASEAN Secretariat with 
financial aid from the Australian government, was published in order to “undertake a study 
of best practices in the introduction and implementation of competition policy and law in 
East Asia Summit Countries.”436 The East Asia Summit is a regional leaders’ forum that 
was held for the first time in 2005 as “a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and 
economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, 
stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.”437 The East Asia Summit countries now 
comprise the ten AMSs, Australia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the US and Russia. Despite the title: Best 
Practices in the Introduction and Implementation of Competition Policy and Law in East 
Asia Summit Countries, this document was only intended to aid the AMSs in developing 
their own domestic competition laws. The document is part of the Regional Economic 
Policy Support Facility (REPSF) intended to help the ASEAN Secretariat, its working 
groups and offices promote the ASEAN economic integration through economic policy 
research.
438
 
The Best Practices suggest that the common objective of national competition law and 
policy in the AMSs, citing the World Bank and the OECD,
439
 should be “the maintenance 
of the competitive process, free competition, or effective competition.”440 The language 
used in this document implies that the three objectives could not coexist. Furthermore, the 
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Best Practices distinguish between “the first order objectives”441 of competition law and 
policy and the “second order objectives”.442 According to the Best Practices, the first order 
objectives are economic efficiency, growth and development and consumer welfare. These 
objectives could be achieved through the promotion of competition. However, in certain 
exceptional cases the promotion of competition may be detrimental to national welfare or 
other first order objectives such as natural monopoly. The Best Practices recognise as 
second order objectives the promotion and protection of SMEs, the facilitation of FDI, the 
promotion of technological advancement, the promotion of product and process 
innovation, the promotion of industrial diversification, job creation, gender equity or the 
promotion of welfare of particular consumer groups. These second order objectives cover 
both economic and social objectives and reflect the concerns raised by state officials 
during the ASEAN Conferences on Competition Policy and Law. 
The Best Practices encourage the AMSs to freely decide on its national competition policy 
goals. While it is possible to have multiple, diverse goals, the Best Practices strongly 
advise against this stating that this would generate unnecessary complexities in 
establishing and implementing national competition policy. In addition, conflicting 
multiple goals could damage the first order objectives. Therefore, in order to preserve the 
effectiveness of competition policy goals, the Best Practices recommends that the AMSs 
pursue the second order objectives, particularly social goals, by means of alternative policy 
instruments without restricting competition or sacrificing the first order objectives. The 
Best Practices recommend prioritising the promotion of economic efficiency as the 
exclusive goal of competition law and policy, assuring the AMSs that other economic and 
social goals could be reached even with economic efficiency as the exclusive competition 
policy goal. Alternatively, it proposes adopting the New Zealand model which allows the 
government to require the competition authority to give priority to other competition policy 
over economic efficiency.
443
 While this provision brings about certain flexibility in the 
enforcement of competition policy, it may also disrupt the homogeneity of competition 
policy. Homogeneity is important in this instance since the ASEAN aims to have a 
harmonised competition law within the region. It is possible that, even with a single 
competition goal focusing on economic efficiency, the promotion of competition may 
conflict with economic efficiency. This conflict is generally resolved by applying the net 
benefit test where the restriction of competition may be permitted if it confers net 
efficiency benefits to society and if the restriction of competition is necessary to realise 
such benefits.
444
 
In 2010, the Guidelines I were developed, based on the AMSs’ experiences and 
international best practices, to represent a common reference guide for the AMSs. They 
contain the goals of competition, substantive provisions of competition law, a brief 
mention of institutional building, competition advocacy, as well as national competition 
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authority’s enforcement powers. They reaffirm the common objectives of competition 
policy as “the promotion and protection of competitive process”445 through the 
introduction of a level playing field to all market players. The Guidelines I considers that 
the pursuit of such objectives will lead to fair or effective competition. The language used 
in this case follows the example set by the Best Practices which do not believe in the 
coexistence of fair and effective competition. However, fair or effective competition can 
benefit countries in terms of economic efficiency, economic growth and development, and 
consumer welfare. 
In addition, the Guidelines I persuade the AMSs that competition policy is beneficial to 
developing economies due to the process of globalisation. “[D]eveloping countries need a 
competition policy, in order to monitor and control the growing role of the private sector in 
the economy so as to ensure that public monopolies are not simply replaced by private 
monopolies.”446 It should be noted that the Guidelines I have excluded social goals from 
the objectives of competition law and include them instead in “other policy objectives.”447 
Moreover, the integration goal is absent from the document. Despite its purpose of guiding 
the AMSs towards a common goal, the Guidelines I conclude that each AMS may 
individually decide which objectives to pursue.
448
 This final part confirms the ASEAN’s 
lack of persuasive power over the AMSs. The document urges the AMSs to take into 
account their own national needs when determining the goal or goals of competition law. 
In retrospect, it is highly possible that the Guidelines I have contributed to further 
diversification of national competition policies to the extent that the AMSs may end up 
with varying objectives, making any attempt at regional harmonisation more challenging. 
The Guidelines II were published in 2012 but did not feature any discussion on the goals of 
competition policy instead they focus on the institutional design of competition authority 
as well as an in depth discussion of competition advocacy. It is evident that the Guidelines 
II’s purpose is merely to complement the Guidelines I. 
 The AMSs Level 3.1.2.2.
Different regimes may have different expectations of competition law and their 
expectations may change over time as the economies mature and countries gain more 
experience in the enforcement of competition law. Among the AMSs, opinions on the 
subject are diverse. This section groups the ten AMSs into three categories, depending on 
their experiences with competition law, as follows: countries with some experience of 
competition law, countries with sector regulations, and countries with recently introduced 
competition law. Since most of the AMSs are in the early stages of development of their 
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competition law and only a handful has limited experiences, it is essential that careful 
attention be paid to the specification of the goals underlying the competition legislation.
449
 
Countries with Some Experiences in Competition Law 
The goals of the Indonesian competition law are to improve public welfare and national 
economic effectiveness and efficiency by creating equal business opportunities for small, 
medium and large scale businesses.
450
 Economic efficiency is directed at the firms’ level. 
What stands out in this provision is the emphasis on the protection of business interests 
regardless of the size of the business, a problem for which Indonesia is known.
451
 The 
language of the statute makes it explicitly clear that SMEs are not singled out as a special 
interest group. 
The Singapore Competition Act
452
 was enacted in 2004 with the goal “to protect consumers 
and businesses from anticompetitive practices of private entities.”453 Singapore is the only 
member to state consumer protection as the first order objective of competition law. This 
protection is not limited to any national interest group but seems to be offered to both the 
consumer and businesses of all sizes and of all nationalities. The state’s activities in 
economic sector are explicitly excluded from this statute. 
In the case of Thailand, the principal competition-related legislation is the Trade 
Competition Act of 1999.
454
 What is unique about this statute is that the goals of 
competition law cannot be found in any provisions. Instead, they appear in a nota bene at 
the end of the document. According to the nota bene, the goals of Thailand’s competition 
law are the promotion of free competition and the prevention of unfair competition in 
business sector.
455
 The literature sometimes did not take this nota bene into account and 
concluded that the Act focused on the prohibited practices without explicitly stating the 
goals sought in preventing these practices.
456
 Interestingly, Thailand’s competition-related 
legislations have a habit of camouflaging their objective under the nota bene at the end of 
the statute. The Price Fixing and Anti-Monopolies Act of 1979,
457
 which was replaced by 
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the Act, also featured goals “to control fair price fixing and to prevent monopolies and 
competition restrictions”458 in the nota bene. 
On 3 December 2004 the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam enacted 
the Competition Law No. 27/2004/QH11.
459
 Under article 4 titled, “Right to business 
competition”,460 it would appear that the purpose of the law is the protection of “freedom 
to competition within the legal framework”.461 However, the freedom to competition is 
tempered with “the principles of honesty, non-infringement upon the interests of the state, 
public interests, legitimate rights and interests of enterprises, consumers and compliance 
with the provisions of the law.”462 
Malaysia Competition Act was enacted in 2010 and became effective in January 2012. Its 
stated purpose is “to promote economic development by promoting and protecting the 
process of competition, thereby protecting the interests of consumers.”463 The language of 
the law suggests that there is a hierarchical order of the purposes. The primary objectives 
of the economic goals are the promotion of economic development, and the promotion and 
protection of the process of competition while the secondary objective is the protection of 
consumer welfare. 
With regards to Lao PDR, the Prime Minister’s Decree No. 15 on Trade Competition was 
adopted on 4 February 2004.
464
 It is the only non-comprehensive competition law statute 
since it only applies to monopolies and unfair competition. The Decree aims to “promote 
fair trade competition, protect the rights and legal interests of consumers and to encourage 
business activities in the Lao PDR to function efficiently in the market economy 
mechanism”.465 The Decree has never been enforced because the Trade Competition 
Commission, the authority in charge of its implementation and enforcement,
466
 has never 
been created.
467
 
Countries with Sectoral Competition Law 
Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia do not currently have a comprehensive national 
competition law. However, they have sector-specific regulations pertaining to competition. 
In the case of Brunei Darussalam, there is a sectoral regulation for the telecommunication 
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and info-communication industry.
468
 The Telecommunications Order set up a sectoral 
regulator called the Authority for Info-Communication Technology Industry in 2003 with 
the duty to, inter alia, “promote and maintain fair and efficient market conduct and 
effective competition between persons engaged in commercial activities connected with 
telecommunication technology in Brunei Darussalam”.469 In addition, the Monopolies 
Act,
470
 which came into force in 1932 to regulate the establishment of monopolies, allows 
His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan to grant exclusive rights to designated 
persons or companies for certain activities. They have discretionary power to legally 
designate monopolies. According to the Act, only two types of monopoly rights can be 
granted: the manufacturing, selling, purchasing, and importing of firearms and ammunition 
and all kinds of defence equipment and armaments; and the collecting within and exporting 
from Brunei Darussalam the skins of crocodiles, pythons and monitor lizards. 
Cambodia developed a draft comprehensive competition law and in 2010 the Minister of 
Commerce indicated that the draft competition law was almost finalised.
471
 However, the 
Cambodian government intended to wait until 2011 to consider whether to implement such 
legislation, citing the danger of prejudicing domestic firms. Currently, there is still no 
development on the state of the draft competition law. The draft intended to exclude 
sectors regulated by sectoral laws such as the banking, the energy and the 
telecommunications sectors from its application. An example of Cambodia’s sectoral 
competition provisions is the Electricity Law of 2001
472
 which aims to establish the 
principles for the establishment of competition wherever feasible within the electric power 
sector. The statute also establishes the Electricity Authority of Cambodia as the sole 
regulator of the electricity sector. At this stage, it is unclear whether the sectoral regulator’s 
power includes the regulation of competition in the electricity sector. 
Countries with Recent Competition Law 
Two recent countries to adopt competition law, mere months away from the introduction of 
the AEC at the end of 2015, are Myanmar and the Philippines. On 24 February 2015, 
Myanmar enacted its first comprehensive competition law.
473
 It was believed that 
Myanmar’s pursuance of competition law would pressure the remaining AMSs to follow 
suit.
474
 Only the Philippines responded to this call. The Myanmar competition law aims to 
“prevent the public interests from being harmful,” control unfair competition, prevent 
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abuse of market power, and control agreements and plans that cause limitations on 
competition.
475
 The statute makes no attempt to identify public interests. 
Five months after the enactment of Myanmar’s competition law statute, the Philippines 
finally adopted its first comprehensive competition law.
476
 The statute recognises 
economic efficiency and the promotion of free and fair competition, the prevention of 
economic concentration, the protection of consumer welfare, the advancement of domestic 
and international trade, as well as economic development as the goals of competition 
law.
477
 
In the case of the ASEAN, all the AMSs in possession of comprehensive competition law 
related statutes have set economic goals as the rationale for national competition laws. The 
Myanmar competition law stands out for its omission of economic efficiency among its 
economic goals. It follows that there are some difficulties in obtaining consensus on what 
are economic goals. There are various economic goals included in the AMSs’ statutes, 
ranging from economic efficiency, consumer protection, free and fair competition, and 
economic development. It is noteworthy that Vietnam’s definition of free competition is 
relatively limited.
478
 None of the AMSs have adopted the general goal of the promotion 
and protection of competition suggested in the Guidelines I.
479
 Furthermore, few AMSs’ 
statutes contain the social aspect of the goals of competition law. Only Singapore, Lao 
PDR, Myanmar, and the Philippines include consumer welfare protection in their 
competition law objectives alongside the economic goals. Myanmar competition law is the 
only regime that highlights protection of public interest without defining it. These social 
goals are moved from competition policy objectives to “other policy objectives”480 in the 
Guidelines I. In addition, none of the AMSs have included regional integration in their 
goals of competition law although this is not uncommon. The blatant disregard of the 
common reference guide published by the ASEAN Secretariat meaningfully suggests that 
the AMSs are operating in a separate sphere from the ASEAN. While this is perhaps 
understandable in the case of the AMSs who enacted their national competition laws 
before the announcement of the creation of the AEC in 2003, it does not explain the cases 
of Singapore, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, and the Philippines whose 
competition law was enacted in 2004, 2010, and 2015 respectively. Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia and Lao PDR are reportedly working to enact their respective comprehensive 
competition statutes.
481
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  The Diversity among the AMSs 3.2.
There is considerable diversity among the AMSs relating to their respective economic and 
policy heritage, governance systems, legal institutions, stages of economic development, 
and exposure to or reliance on foreign trade and investments. While diversity among the 
AMSs is also present in other developing economies, what differentiates the AMSs from 
others is the diversified level of disparity exhibited in the region. This deep level of 
diversity contributes to the divergence in the AMSs’ competition law enforcement and 
therefore renders the harmonisation process more difficult to accomplish. Eventually, it has 
the possibility to delay the ASEAN’s development of regional competition policy. This 
section focuses only on the political system and economic development since it is in these 
areas that there is most diversification. It is also recognised that the political system and 
economic development have an impact on the implementation of competition law. 
3.2.1. The Political Regime 
Political characteristics such as the type of political regime, the electoral system and the 
quality of governance have a significance impact on the enactment and enforcement of 
competition law. Parakkal asserted that countries with a democratic political regime and a 
stable rule of law are more inclined to enact national competition law.
482
 His theory aligns 
with that of Williams who has previously claimed that competition law is only effective in 
a “functioning democracy.”483 According to Williams, a functioning democracy primarily 
encompasses a usable legislative instrument, competent and impartial administration of the 
law, and the ability to enforce. His definition goes beyond the inclusion of democracy in a 
country’s Constitution. However, Dabbah maintained that the political constraints 
experienced by a state when enacting and implementing competition law was independent 
of the type of that state’s political regime.484 
There are a wide range of political regimes represented among the AMSs, from democracy 
to monarchy. Cambodia,
485
 Malaysia
486
 and Thailand
487
 pride themselves on their 
constitutional monarchy, while Brunei Darussalam has a system of Malay Islamic 
monarchy.
488
 Singapore is a parliamentary republic.
489
 The Philippines, Indonesia,
490
 and 
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most recently, Myanmar
491
 are presidential republics. The political reform undergone in 
Myanmar seems to indicate the emergence of a liberal democracy but the reform could not 
erase the omnipresence of the military despite the self-abolition of the military junta. 
Regardless, the ASEAN has approved its progress by granting the chairmanship of the 
ASEAN to Myanmar in 2014.
492
 Lao PDR
493
 and Vietnam
494
 are the two remaining 
socialist states in the region. Despite having enshrined the principle of democracy in their 
Constitution, the AMSs’ state of democracy appears illusory and is marred by frequent 
political instability. For example, the legitimacy of the Myanmarian elections of 2010 was 
called into question.
495
 Thailand has continuously suffered from political instability. To 
date, it has enacted 17 constitutions and has intermittently reverted to a military junta – its 
current political state. 
It is not the differences in political regimes that commentators fear the most. The AMSs 
are often criticised for their lack of good governance and rule-based systems.
496
 Corruption 
is widely recognised as attributing to the distortion of market efficiency and preventing the 
market from functioning properly.
497
 The issue of corruption is not limited to developing 
economies, but is also found in developed economies. The EU considers corruption to be a 
serious issue which needs to be addressed at both the EU and the member-state level.
498
 
The political diversity within the Southeast Asian region is aggravated by the issue of 
corruption which in these countries is usually deeply embedded within the administrative 
system and becomes a major obstacle to any change or reform. It is common in Southeast 
Asia to have a strong relationship between the business and government sectors.
499
 This 
system is described as one of patronage where political leaders or the patrons serve the 
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interest of their financial supporters or the clients.
500
 This system is attributed to the 
historical situation whereby many businessmen in this area are of Chinese descent. To 
avoid resentment of their cultural differences in a foreign land that would obstruct their 
business, they turned to indirect political influence to smooth their business endeavours.
501
 
In this climate of cronyism, the government is inevitably implicated in the management of 
its local economy. Unquestionably, it is possible that the government may willingly 
participate in the market without the encouragement of a third-party. Historically, the 
Singaporean government invested through government-linked companies in numerous 
sectors that the private sector was unwilling or unable to enter.
502
 These companies later 
grew considerably and consequently contribute to anti-competition problems in 
Singapore’s economy. It is necessary that the role of the government in the local economy 
be curbed
503
 regardless of how difficult the task may be as many governmental 
interventions have become part of a cultural practice. Governmental interventions can 
impede the emergence of a viable private sector in the local economy which rests on, 
among other things, competition. At the same time, the government may exhibit anti-
competition behaviour by favouring the participation of certain foreign firms in the local 
economy. Furthermore, there could be direct participation of the government in an area 
where privatisation has emerged; thus the government is in direct competition with the 
private sector. 
Transparency International rates countries and territories according to how corrupt their 
public sector is perceived to be, using the Corruption Perceptions Index. Within the 
ASEAN, Singapore ranked at number 7 worldwide and is the best ranked country in the 
region.  Myanmar and Cambodia are among the lowest rated with both ranked at 156.
504
 
The majority of the AMSs are rated low on this list. Conscious of the corruption problem, 
many AMSs adopted an ambitious law and/or enforcement agency in an attempt to tackle 
this issue directly. For instance, Vietnam adopted a comprehensive anti-corruption law in 
2009 which established the Anti-Corruption Agency while Indonesia appointed the 
Indonesian Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi).
505
 Despite 
these efforts, corruption remains a concern,
506
 suggesting that more concrete actions are 
needed in order to obtain the intended effect of the law. 
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3.2.2. Diversity in Economic Conditions 
“As far as market structure and market culture are concerned, ASEAN is ten-tiered, not 
two.”507 The issue of the AMSs’ economic diversity was briefly addressed in Chapter 1. 
The majority of the AMSs are small and developing market economies with GDP per 
capita averages of USD 6,000 – 1,200.508 Applying the IMF classification, Singapore is the 
only advanced economy in the region with a reported GDP per capita of above USD 
40,000. Among these developing economies, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are 
classed as low-income developing countries.
509
 Generally, small economic markets tend to 
limit competition.
510
 This is inherent in their natural condition where monopolies or 
oligopolies can easily emerge. This situation contributes to the need to regulate the conduct 
of players within these economies. Gals was confident that even in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets, competition policy can “significantly improve market performance 
by reducing the opportunities and incentives for firms to abuse their market power.”511 
There are also differences in the economic structures among the AMSs. The nature of the 
economy in Vietnam, as defined by its Constitution, is a socialist-oriented market 
economy.
512
 It is the country’s “attempt to balance its communist heritage of centralised 
planning with increasing private participation.”513 Brunei is a small energy-rich country, 
while most of the AMSs are heavily dependent on imported energy and commodity 
exports.
514
 The economic structure of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines is a mixture 
of agricultural, industrial, and commercial activities. Singapore, with its restriction on 
natural resources, focuses more on its commercial economy. There is more economic 
competition among the AMSs than complementary trade, as geographical and 
technological similarities lead to similar exports of natural resources and labour-intensive 
manufacturing.
515
 The AMSs are in competition for the extra-ASEAN markets. The 
governments of the AMSs are also renowned for interfering in the economy of the country. 
The governments of both Malaysia and Singapore, in particular, play a significant role in 
the management of the economy, whether fully or partially, through state-owned 
enterprises and unofficial government-linked companies.
516
 In Singapore, which is a strong 
free market advocate, it is quite surprising to find its government playing an active role in 
the country’s economic development. In Myanmar, the military government has the 
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majority stakeholder positions in all of the major industrial corporations of the country. An 
oligarchic structure is prominent in countries such as the Philippines
517
 and Thailand
518
 
where the majority of businesses are controlled by conglomerates with strong ties to 
politicians. The oligarchs in these countries seem to be protected and sustained by 
imperfect regulations. 
Because of the governmental intervention in the economy and the lack of effective and 
efficient corruption-free regulatory and juridical infrastructure, Haley predicted that the 
existing competition laws and those being planned in the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) countries are “almost certain to fail.”519 Instead of promoting and 
protecting competition, these competition laws are mere regulatory tools that are more 
likely to be manipulated in favour of politically-favoured firms and industries. 
Consequently, competition laws enacted under these economic circumstances are poised to 
create even more regulatory barriers to the entry to market. Regardless of the diversity in 
the economic conditions of the AMSs, Drexl admitted that the implementation of a 
common competition policy does not require similar levels of economic development in 
the participating states.
520
 The concrete application of the rules to the individual cases is 
more important. 
3.2.3. The ASEAN Way 
The diversity among the AMSs can be resolved through the willingness to commit to the 
ASEAN’s cause. However, the much-needed political will is deflected by the ASEAN’s 
traditional mode of dispute resolution, often termed as the ASEAN Way. This is the 
fundamental principle of the ASEAN and has its origin from when the idea of a loosely 
connected organisation was first conceived. The ASEAN’s origin would explain the 
AMSs’ traditional obsession with sovereignty and a strong predilection for decentralised 
decision-making.
521
 Former ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong explained that 
“the ASEAN founding fathers wanted the ASEAN to be an organisation with minimal 
legal institutionalisation because to them, ASEAN was first and foremost a diplomatic 
instrument for confidence-building in a time when member countries' common concern 
was containing communist China.”522 The fact that the ASEAN Secretariat wasn’t created 
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until 1976 exemplifies the informal ASEAN Way that was deliberately embraced from its 
beginning.
523
 The ASEAN Way is the method employed when dealing with situations of 
conflict within the region. This ideal consists of: 
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations; 
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; 
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
f. Effective cooperation among themselves.
524
 
A recent trend in legalisation has emerged within the ASEAN. The organisation has 
subsequently evolved from a loose political organisation based solely on the ASEAN Way 
to a more legalistic framework based on regulations and a dispute settlement 
mechanism.
525
 This development has continued with the new ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN 
Charter serves as a firm foundation for the ASEAN Community by conferring a legal 
personality to the ASEAN for the first time and providing it with an institutional 
framework. It also codifies the ASEAN norms and values, and at the same time sets clear 
objectives for the organisation. The ASEAN Charter is a legally binding agreement 
between the ten AMSs. The principle of the ASEAN Way has been reaffirmed in the 
ASEAN Charter which now includes reliance on peaceful settlement of disputes, non-
interference in the internal affairs of the AMSs, and enhanced consultation on matters 
seriously affecting the common interest of the ASEAN.
526
 With regard to the language 
used in the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Way resembles the process of regional 
interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus building and 
non-confrontational bargaining styles that contrast with the adversarial posturing, majority 
vote and other legalistic decision-making procedures in other multilateral organisations.
527
 
This low level of legalisation is not a unique attribute of the ASEAN but rather a shared 
feature common in the larger Asia Pacific region.
528
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Economic integration combined with the desire to better attract foreign investment are the 
principal reasons transforming the ASEAN into a more legalised organisation.
529
 
Legalisation has become even more urgent since the ASEAN is aiming at building a single 
market. Nonetheless, some doubts have arisen about whether the current “weak 
legalisation”530 in the ASEAN is the right platform from which to launch a regional 
integration project. Another reason behind the replacement of the traditional ASEAN Way 
with a legalised approach comes from the need for market regulation. The financial crisis 
in 1997 convinced East Asian countries to move away from a relationship-based approach 
to conducting business and creating wealth to one that is more rule-based and market 
oriented.
531
 This is applicable in the context of the current global economic crisis where 
there have been calls for better regulation of the market.
532
 Furthermore, Narine predicted 
that the ASEAN’s future viability depends on how the ASEAN and the AMSs manage the 
economic challenges posed by intra-regional growth and globalisation.
533
 
In the context of competition law, as the ASEAN is not a supranational organisation, there 
is no regional institution or any other mechanism to enforce or resolve potential disputes 
related to transnational competition rules. As affirmed by the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN 
is simply an intergovernmental organisation, founded on the principles of equal 
sovereignty of all the AMSs and non-interference in the AMSs’ internal affairs.534 As 
Ewing-Chow commented, “[w]hile the ASEAN Charter does take the important step of 
conferring legal personality to ASEAN, it does not sufficiently address the legally 
important elements of rule-making, monitoring and enforcement for ASEAN.”535Although 
the ASEAN Charter envisages a committee of permanent representatives based in Jakarta, 
who would be appointed to ASEAN and hold the rank of an Ambassador, this committee 
will not be the primary decision-making body. Instead, the ASEAN Summit continues to 
be the main forum for decision-making. Decisions at all levels within the organisation will 
continue to be made by consultation and consensus,
536
 thus continuing the organisation’s 
adherence to the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Secretary General and the ASEAN 
Secretariat have been given greater responsibility to monitor compliance and facilitate the 
implementation of the AEC.
537
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In such a context where no supranational body or dispute resolution mechanism has been 
established in the region, adopting uniform and central competition rules is not feasible. 
Even if the AMSs were in agreement on a common set of rules, the interpretation and 
application of these rules would still vary according to the AMS. It is not surprising, then, 
that the AMSs prefer a non-binding set of regional guidelines on competition policy to a 
binding agreement. Thus, the ASEAN harmonisation approach can be regarded as an 
appropriate step that takes into account the current stage of the ASEAN integration. As the 
ASEAN moves towards further integration, it is plausible to expect an increasing number 
of binding agreements. As the level of integration grows, the binding character of 
liberalising agreements becomes more important, and as the levels of legal obligation and 
the precision of the rules increase, delegation of rule interpretation and dispute 
adjudication is often observed.
538
 Until that time, the current approach taken by the 
ASEAN towards the harmonisation of competition law and policy is more feasible. 
There have been several calls to replace the traditional ASEAN Way with a more formal 
form of cooperation to better adjust to the new ASEAN goal of economic integration.
539
 
The current ASEAN Way has been criticised for its non-resolution of disputes.
540
 Strong 
partnerships or formal links between national competition agencies through various 
cooperation channels such as the AEGC, the ICN or the OECD were proposed, particularly 
in the area of merger review and transnational cartel investigation
541
 but the ASEAN Way 
has been defended because of its significant past contribution to regional security and 
economic development. It represents a necessary foundation for the ASEAN’s past modus 
operandi due to the strategic, political, economic, and socio-cultural diversity of the 
countries in Southeast Asia.
542
 Admittedly, the ASEAN Way did not achieve such feats 
alone. It was argued that the primary contributing factor was the economic growth and the 
associated performance legitimacy
543
 such growth delivers that represented the key 
foundation to the security of both the region and its governments.
544
 
Some commentators have remained hopeful about the future of the ASEAN Way. “The 
measures taken by the Charter may not go as far as some critics would like. But on the 
whole, the Charter helps ASEAN move from an almost purely political relationship 
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towards relationships in which there are legitimate expectations that arise from repeated 
interactions, shared principles and purposes, and norms, as well as stronger regional 
processes and institutions that will foster compliance by the member countries to their 
promises and obligations.”545 It is believed that, over time, as the ASEAN moves towards 
further legalisation, the ASEAN Way will no longer be a constraint in adopting a binding 
agreement on competition policy in the region.
546
 These optimistic views are in contrast to 
those of Shenoy who was convinced that the creation of a set of uniform rules was not 
feasible and that, given the political, legal and economic diversity in the region, it would be 
too simplistic to assume a common market and common rules will emerge naturally.
547
 
Therefore, further regulations and mechanisms reflecting deeper integration within the 
organisation need to be in place first to ensure their forced emergence. He offered his 
opinion e early in 1987 when the organisation was still a purely political one. However it 
would appear that many things, including the ASEAN Way and the diversity of the AMSs, 
remain unchanged. 
In reality, a transformation of the ASEAN Way is unlikely to occur in the near future since 
the principle is embedded in the ASEAN Charter as early as in Article 2. Its placement 
articulates the importance of the ASEAN Way doctrine to the organisation. In its own way, 
the ASEAN Way is the stumbling block preventing the ASEAN from moving forward with 
fruitful cooperation in order to attain the desired ambition of regional integration. 
 Conclusion 3.3.
The ASEAN ambition of creating a highly competitive region that is fully integrated with 
the global economy is laudable but the task ahead is colossal. The uncertainty in achieving 
this aspiration started from the very beginning when the AMSs communally ignored the 
goals of competition policy advocated by the Guidelines I which are the promotion and 
protection of competition.
548
 The AMSs prefer instead a wide range of economic goals 
such as economic efficiency, consumer protection, free and fair competition, and economic 
development. Moreover, some national statutes contain the social goals of competition law, 
such as consumer welfare protection, when they are relegated to the status of other policy 
objectives by the Guidelines I.
549
 This chapter identifies the discrepancies in the political 
systems and the economic development, along with the deeply rooted ASEAN Way as the 
principal challenges to establishing the ASEAN regional competition policy. Since the 
ASEAN is a collection of contrasts and disparities in many areas, “[t]he immediate 
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implication of this regional diversity is that there is no such thing as a ‘one size fits all’.”550 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the AMSs would seek to implement different 
national competition laws and policies. However, markedly different national competition 
laws could adversely affect the overall progress of ASEAN competition law development. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the ASEAN would achieve its goal of economic 
integration through the ASEAN Way without the fundamental support of a harmonised 
competition law.
551
 An integrated single market cannot be achieved through mere political 
cooperation, let alone without the necessary central institution. 
It is evident that the issues analysed in this chapter need to be addressed in the 
development of the ASEAN competition law for the benefit of the continual pursuit of 
regional economic integration. If they are not overcome or minimised, they possess the 
ability to hinder the establishment of the ASEAN single market since competition policy 
occupies a central place at the foundation of the AEC. 
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 The ASEAN’s Approach to Regulatory Design Chapter 4
The previous chapter identified the objectives of the ASEAN competition policy as well as 
potential challenges that the ASEAN would face while establishing a construct for the 
implementation of the aforementioned policy. This chapter will build upon that discussion 
and further investigate the actual approach the ASEAN has taken regarding its competition 
policy goals. At this stage, it is prudent to question which competition law would be most 
suitable for the ASEAN. There are generally three accepted models.
552
 The first model is 
the formulation of competition law based on its own vision distinct from that of the 
developed economies.
553
 Gal, in particular, was a strong advocate for this model, 
suggesting that developing economies sustain a different market reality from that of 
developed ones because of the smallness of their market which are often plagued with high 
level of concentrations.
554
 It follows that competition rules that flourish in big economies 
would struggle to find enforcement in small market economies. Yet, the proposal of such a 
model usually begins with the examination of current existing competition law regimes, 
especially those belonging to developed economies. This practice suggests that in reality, 
the formulation of developing economies’ competition law model is at best, merely an 
adaptation of competition law from matured regimes. The restriction in resources, both 
financial and technical, within developing economies further exacerbates their chance of 
developing an originally expressed law tailored to the specificities of those economies. It 
appears that no competition law is entirely tailor-made for a developing economy. 
However, it is not impossible properly to adjust existing laws to correspond to the special 
considerations of small market economies.
555
 The challenge to adopting this second model 
would lie in understanding when foreign law is appropriate for the host country. This 
condition is crucial in light of the law’s acceptance of legitimacy by the people. At the 
other end of the spectrum is the adoption of a universal consensus-based competition 
law.
556
 Admittedly, this movement has weakened considerably since the abandonment of 
the Draft International Antitrust Code
557
 and does not seem to have recovered its 
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momentum since.
558
 Fox argued that there is nothing wrong in travelling on a path well-
paved and well-travelled especially since reinventing a new path can prove difficult and 
costly.
559
 This is especially true in the light of developing economies’ lack of resources and 
experience to adequately manage these complex issues. 
This chapter will concentrate on the ASEAN’s efforts to establish a regional framework for 
competition law. There are currently four appropriate documents produced by the ASEAN. 
The Best Practices
560
 was the first to be introduced in 2008. As the name implies, the aim 
of the Best Practices was to study best international practices for introducing and 
implementing competition policy. The authors generally use affirmative words such as 
“recommend” to ensure that the document is suggesting a certain position or direction. The 
Handbook on Competition Policy and Law for Business
561
 illustrates competition law and 
policy and related legislations in each of the AMS and is addressed primarily to interested 
foreign business. Lastly, there are the two Guidelines
562
 written under the auspices of the 
ASEAN Secretariat. These efforts have been mostly warmly welcomed because they are 
expected to assist in the development of the region’s competition law and policy 
framework.
563
 On the other hand, they have been criticised for the absence of well-
established specifications and a lack of clarity.
564
 Both Guidelines contain a double 
message to the AMSs: on the one hand, they are encouraged to introduce or reform an 
efficient competition law based on essential competition law principles and on the other 
hand, to establish clear competition rules. The clarity of the competition law is crucial in 
the case of developing economies which do not have sufficient resources to handle a heavy 
work load in their competition agencies. The Guidelines I is identified as a common 
reference guide without any binding power over the AMSs. The language used in the 
Guidelines I is less persuasive than in the Best Practices and does not demand any form of 
commitment from the AMSs regarding competition law and policy except to introduce 
national competition laws before the unveiling of the AEC in 2015. The words often 
employed are; “may,” “could,” and “can” while “should” is rarely used. Despite its name, 
the Guidelines I simply collate the already available knowledge on general competition law 
practices and institutional building. In this endeavour, at least, the Guidelines I are 
extremely successful since the final product is highly educative. The Guidelines II 
document was introduced two years after the introduction of the Guidelines I and was 
intended to complement the oft-cited Guidelines I. The arrangement of both documents is 
starkly different. While the Guidelines I uses chapters and articles, these traits are absent 
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from the Guidelines II, hinting that they were developed by different participating 
authors.
565
 The purpose of the Guidelines II is to guide the AMSs in building core 
competencies in the field of competition policy with a focus on how best to develop a 
competition law enforcement mechanism. The focal point is on competition authority 
attributes and competencies.  Indubitably, both Guidelines are well researched drawing 
from both the AMSs and existing competition regimes’ experiences. However, building an 
ASEAN-specific legal framework does not appear to be their focal subject matter. 
This chapter will examine the approach taken by the ASEAN to achieve regional economic 
integration with competition law and policy as one of the principal mechanisms. It is 
mainly concerned with the substantive rules; discussion on the institutional aspect will be 
presented in Chapter 5. Many of the substantive rules are covered by Guidelines I; 
Guidelines II does not delve much into this area, preferring instead to focus on institutional 
development. This chapter is organised to reflect the organisation of the Guidelines I. It 
covers the application of competition law, prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements, 
abuse of dominant position and anticompetitive mergers. It will further examine the 
proposed resolution to the challenges in establishing competition law facing the AMSs 
before concluding with an analysis of the regional approach to competition law. 
 The Prevalence of Competition Advocacy 4.1.
Perhaps the area that the ASEAN has had most success and which it readily embraced is 
that of competition advocacy. In the first instance, the Guidelines I consider competition 
advocacy as “an effective means for achieving the objectives of competition policy by 
educating the businesses and hence creating a culture of compliance.”566 This remark is 
later repeated in the Guidelines II which maintain that competition advocacy is “a 
fundamental tool to develop a workable competition law system.”567 Yet, in the same 
document, competition advocacy’s importance is reduced to “a necessary complement to 
[the] enforcement activities.”568 
Both documents are developed to aid the AMSs in how best to utilise advocacy 
programmes to help raise awareness and acceptance, as well as further the effectiveness of 
competition law enforcement. They detail each step an AMS has to take to ensure an 
effective advocacy scheme, starting from identifying the challenges, the objectives, and the 
stakeholders as well as the tools at hand before constructing a strategy. This is followed by 
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an assessment of the results of competition advocacy. Coincidentally, it is only in the area 
of competition advocacy that ASEAN superiority over its AMSs is evident as all the AMSs 
are required to be cognizant of all the ASEAN-specific advocacy programmes.
569
 
While the Guidelines I refrain from defining competition advocacy, the Guidelines II give 
a negative definition, describing it as “the range of non-enforcement activities which 
promote a competitive environment within an AMS.”570 In other words, competition 
advocacy is everything that is not covered under enforcement activities. This definition 
borrows from a commonly accepted definition given by the ICN. The ICN describes 
competition advocacy as “those activities conducted by the competition authority related to 
the promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities by means of non-
enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationships with other governmental entities 
and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition.”571 The formulation of 
this definition encompasses both the goal and the function of competition advocacy. It 
follows that the goal of advocacy is to promote a competitive environment rather than 
promoting the application of competition law. To achieve this goal, competition agency 
will both persuade public authorities not to adopt anticompetitive measures and work to 
increase the public’s awareness of market competition. 
Even though competition authorities from around the world may disagree over substantive 
and procedural issues, competition advocacy remains the one undisputed topic.
572
 This is 
especially true when discussing the benefits of competition advocacy. Success in building 
a competition culture has obvious benefits for enforcement: the business sector may more 
readily comply voluntarily with the competition law; the business sector and the public 
may more willingly cooperate with enforcement actions, especially in the process of fact-
finding; and policy makers may more enthusiastically support the mission of the 
competition agency.
573
 Competition advocacy helps solve the problem of consumers’ 
collective action by acting within the political system to advocate for regulations that do 
not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for 
imposing such costs on citizens.
574
 Furthermore, the Mexican experience shows that 
competition advocacy could generate a crucial political movement in support of major 
reform in competition law.
575
 Admittedly, competition advocacy is more cost-effective 
than enforcement for dismantling state-imposed barriers to competition.
576
 The ASEAN 
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believes that the AMSs could benefit from competition advocacy as it could help them 
achieve the objectives of competition policy.
577
 
If competition advocacy has long been underestimated by developed economies,
578
 such is 
not the case in developing ones.
579
 For instance, in the US, competition advocacy is 
considered to be a mere alternative to the regulation of markets.
580
 It has been argued that 
competition advocacy is an essential precondition for the work of the new competition 
authority.
581
 This is because developing economies tend to lack the necessary competition 
culture.
582
 The economic policies in these countries are undergoing fundamental changes: 
markets are becoming more open; new government and regulatory institutions are being 
formed; trade is assuming greater influence; and state-owned enterprises are being 
privatised. Competition policy should occupy a central role in this transition process, but it 
is difficult for a new competition agency to acquire the influence and the skills needed for 
this purpose. The transition to a market economy is usually marred by difficult structural 
adjustments, significant social dislocation and other transition problems which have 
impeded the realisation of the expected gains from liberalisation.
583
 The new authority’s 
knowledge of internal market structures is usually not strong enough for competition 
enforcement to be implemented from the very beginning.
584
 Lewis predicted that without 
the initial phase of modifying a hostile environment in a country, the competition authority 
will not be successful in its enforcement.
585
 Moreover, competition advocacy could help 
dispel misunderstandings surrounding the concept of competition. This idea is especially 
useful for countries that have recently adopted market economies. Therefore, their focus 
should first be on building a competition culture which is an activity that does not require 
extensive knowledge for preparing to apply actual enforcement. It is noteworthy that some 
authors maintained that some developing economies might more usefully deploy their 
resources to competition advocacy rather than adopting their own competition rules.
586
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The ICN definition of competition advocacy pointed to government bodies as the prime 
authors of anticompetitive conduct. This position is supported by many authors.
587
 
However, Stucke argued that competition is a dynamic interplay among government 
institutions, private individuals, and informal norms.
588
 It follows that advocating for 
competition should not be limited to simply targeting anticompetitive government 
restraints. In contrast to the ICN position, the ASEAN does not single out a particular 
entity, preferring instead to target a wider range of stakeholders including the national 
competition authority, the government, other public authorities, the judiciary, the business 
sector, civil society, academia and the media.
589
 
According to the ICN, advocacy lies exclusively in the hands of the competition authority, 
thus giving the competition authority the dual role of both competition enforcement and 
advocacy.
590
 Botta contested this position and argued that in developing economies where 
the concept of competition has been newly introduced, the activities of competition 
enforcement and advocacy involving other government bodies should be carried out by 
separate institutions. This is because the enforcement function is better performed by a 
fully independent institution while the function of competition advocacy is better 
performed by a government agency.
591
 Nonetheless, the benefits of the competition 
authority assuming the dual role is that it can promote itself and its activities. The 
Guidelines II agree with this and state that advocacy should primarily be entrusted to the 
competition authority since it is best placed to identify and design solutions to competition 
problems.
592
 However, Guidelines II stress that the authority is not the only actor for 
competition advocacy. It can be performed by other institutions in cooperation with or 
independently of the competition authority. 
In the past, it was noted that beyond suggesting an active participation in advisory efforts, 
few recommendations actually provided more substantive guidance.
593
 This omission was 
later corrected, most notably by the ICN. Nowadays, there is no shortage of examples of 
competition advocacy. The publication of relevant documents is the most common 
instrument of competition advocacy with regards to public opinion since transparency is 
always appreciated by civil society. The agency may publish its decisions, the guidelines 
related to the enforcement of the competition act, market studies, the speeches of its senior 
officials and regular press releases and newsletters concerning its enforcement activities. 
The communication may target certain stakeholders. For instance, the US has a tradition of 
communicating letters from the FTC staff or the full Commission to interested 
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regulators.
594
 The communication could also consist of formal comments and amicus 
curiae briefs. An updated website of the national competition agency where relevant 
documents are published could facilitate their easy access by the public. Competition 
advocacy is not restricted to the publication of documents – seminars, conferences and 
workshops may connect competition agency to relevant stakeholders. Stucke
595
 expanded 
the list. He believed competition advocacy can be achieved indirectly through the rule of 
law, an adaptive political system, a vibrant market place, ethical, social and moral norms, 
and informed antitrust enforcement advocacy. In some countries where competition 
authorities hold ministerial status, such as Korea or Thailand, the authorities can directly 
influence the formulation of industrial policies. The UNCTAD concurred and added that, 
especially in the absence of legal compulsion, it is important for authorities to be proactive 
and intervene as much as they can to give insights and views on competition implications 
to government bodies and the public at large.
596
 In the light of the UNCTAD’s own 
practice of peers reviewing members’ competition law, competition advocacy should also 
include regular reviews of both industrial and competition policies. 
The ASEAN have made an explicit list to encourage the AMS to develop an advocacy 
programme that specifically targets each stakeholder:
 
 
- Regular internal training programmes are most adapted to the 
competition authority itself; 
- Advice on regulations that could potentially hamper competition to 
executive, legislature and sectoral regulators, producing market studies, 
cross-government communication and educating public authorities and 
legislature on matters concerning competition policy should be reserved 
to the government and other public authorities; 
- Training activities and support activities such as amicus curiae briefs or 
interventions for the judiciary and public prosecutors; 
- […] Awareness raising campaigns [for the business sector] with focus 
on newly liberalised sectors where the most serious competition 
offences are more likely to occur. The purpose in this scenario is to 
allow each business to continue with the development of its own 
internal compliance programme; 
- Educational campaign is most suitable for the civil society. The ASEAN 
encourages the AMSs to be as creative as possible citing Singapore’s 
animation ad campaign informing consumers of the benefit of a sound 
competition policy. It is equally important that the competition authority 
maintains an up-to-date official website informing the public of its 
activities as well as providing a contacting point to the public to present 
their feedback or file a complaint; 
- Cooperative platforms between the academia and the competition 
authority, design specific university courses on competition law, 
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promoting academic publications on the subject, organising conferences 
and specialised events are examples given regarding the field of 
academia. The ASEAN urges its AMSs to cooperate with the academia 
since it is a privileged channel for building up specialised competition 
law knowledge. The ASEAN set an overtly ambitious aim by suggesting 
that the AMSs consider establishing university departments dedicated to 
competition law and economics; and 
- […] A productive relation[ship] with [the media who the Guidelines II 
recognise as having a crucial role in spreading the competition authority 
advocacy programmes to key targets].
597
 
Despite the varying forms competition advocacy could take, the use of persuasion is a 
shared characteristic of them all. Conscious of this fact, the ASEAN is actively engaged in 
advocacy initiatives in the AMSs through the AEGC which organised conferences and 
workshops destined for the AMSs officials and national competition authorities. The most 
notable event is the yearly organisation of the ASEAN Competition Conference. The 
AMSs also readily embrace the concept of competition advocacy; Singapore developed a 
short internet clip broadcasted in 2012 educating the general public on competition law and 
its necessity. Similarly, Thailand periodically organises seminars for the interested 
business sector and the education sector on its national competition law. 
Regardless of the attractiveness of the competition advocacy campaign, the question 
remains whether effective competition advocacy can exist independently from actual 
enforcement. Clark
598
 claimed that competition advocacy can effectively take place only 
when three prerequisites are satisfied: a significant degree of independence, sufficient 
financial and human resources and credibility as an effective and impartial agency. In 
addition, the credibility of an agency cannot be obtained by advocacy alone, but must be 
enhanced by success in enforcing competition law. It is improbable that emerging 
economies would be able to combine these three conditions. Accordingly, some authors 
argued that during the first years of its existence, the newly established competition 
authority should focus its efforts on projects of competition advocacy rather than the 
enforcement of the legislation.
599
 Nonetheless, it is not enough to simply inform the public 
of the competition authorities’ activities and potential capabilities. The authority has to be 
able to persuade the public that its enforcement activities will bring a direct benefit to the 
final consumers.
600
 The ASEAN understands that “advocacy actions are effective only 
where the [competition authority] has built a reputation through a credible enforcement 
record.”601 Yet, in the same document the ASEAN contradicts its initial position. It admits 
that in some cases, prior successful enforcement is not a prerequisite to successful 
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competition advocacy. The Guidelines II refer to South Africa’s experience of starting its 
advocacy scheme “without significant prior enforcement experience”602. Despite this, it 
still managed to obtain a positive impact resulting in trained procurement officials and 
positive input for the draft legislation. In contrast, Ramburuth,
603
 a South African 
Competition Commissioner, shared that South Africa did not prioritise advocacy in the 
first instance, preferring instead to prioritise enforcement in order to develop the credibility 
of the agency and its legitimacy among governmental institutions and the general public. 
Another questionable area of competition advocacy lies in its assessment. It appears that 
there is no single reliable way to assess the real impact of competition advocacy. Indeed, 
the value of competition advocacy should be measured by the degree to which comments 
altered regulatory outcomes and the value to consumers of those improved outcomes.
604
 
Admittedly, both criteria are impossible to measure with certainty. The most commonly 
used means is in the form of questionnaires. The ASEAN willingly refers to the ICN and 
the OECD for their assessment tools.
605
 
 A Descriptive Regional Framework on Substantive Competition Law 4.2.
In 2010, Dabbah noticed that a proper ASEAN’s competition law and policy framework 
had yet to emerge.
606
 Since then the ASEAN has produced a number of documents and 
both organised and participated in various activities in the hope of creating its own 
competition law framework. Outwardly, the ASEAN gives the impression of adhering to 
all the accepted provisions of competition law. 
4.2.1. Contrasting Narratives of the Scope of Competition Law 
To understand the reach of the competition law application, defining ‘undertaking’ is 
crucial. At first glance, it might appear that the Guidelines I opt for a broad and general 
definition of an ‘undertaking’ claiming that competition law applies to “all businesses 
engaged in commercial economic activities in all economic sectors, including State-owned 
enterprises having effect within the members’ territory, unless exempted by law.”607 The 
Guidelines I further explain that the term includes: 
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[A]ny person, being an individual, a body corporate, an unincorporated 
body of persons or any other entity, capable of carrying on commercial or 
economic activities relating to goods or services. It includes individuals 
operating as sole proprietorships, companies, firms, businesses, 
partnerships, cooperatives, societies, business chambers, trade associations 
and non-profit making organisations, whatever their legal and ownership 
status (foreign or local, government or nongovernment), and the way in 
which they are financed.
608
 
This formulation shifts the focus from the organisation of an entity to its activity. The 
ASEAN seems to be more concerned with the functional approach than the institutional 
approach. It is reminiscent of the EU’s competition law where the term is defined by case 
law as “every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity and the way in which it is financed.”609 
The functional approach relies heavily on the concept of economic activity which the 
Guidelines I refer to as “any activity that could be performed in return for payment and 
normally, but not necessarily, with the objective of making a profit.”610 In contrast, non-
economic activity or public interest activity, that is, is any activity that could not be 
performed for payment and without the objective of making a profit, would escape the 
application of competition law. This definition is precariously narrow since it reduces 
economic activity to pecuniary interest and thus widens the public/private divide.
611
 
Notwithstanding the language used to demonstrate the ASEAN’s fixation on the pecuniary 
aspect of economic activity, the interpretation of the term is borrowed from EU law. In 
comparison, EU law’s definition of economic trade applies regardless of whether or not the 
activity is profit making.
612
 Supplementary indicators include the offering of goods or 
services on the market,
613
 the bearing of the financial risks attached to the performance of 
the economic activities
614
 and where that activity could, at least in principle, be carried on 
by a private undertaking in order to make profits.
615
 
In addition, the Guidelines I later introduced an even broader and non-exhaustive list of 
exemptions and exclusions from the application of competition law. The long list includes: 
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- The Government, statutory bodies or any person acting on their behalf. 
For example, Government officials and statutory bodies exercising 
prerogatives arising from their public powers or acting for the fulfilment 
of public service objectives, or any persons acting on their behalf, may 
be excluded from the prohibitions. These exemptions apply insofar as 
the Government activities are connected with the exercise of sovereign 
power;
616
 
- Certain agreements and conduct which have significant countervailing 
benefits, such as contributing to or improving the production or 
distribution of goods and services, or promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. 
The exemptions may be allowed only to the extent that is appropriate 
and indispensable to reach their intended aims, and should not afford the 
undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the goods or services in question;
617
 
- Specific industries or activities includes strategic and national interest, 
security, public, economic and/or social considerations;
618
  
- Block exemptions granted to research and development cooperation and 
intellectual property rights contracts;
619
 and 
- Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).620 
While most of the list exemplifies the idea of entities performing public interest functions, 
the inclusion of the SMEs is quite peculiar. It is possible that the ASEAN is simply trying 
to protect the SMEs since this was one of the principal concerns expressed by the AMSs, 
as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Eventually, the Guidelines II directly contradicted the Guidelines I and extended the list of 
limitations to state-owned enterprises, while admitting that the inclusion of state-owned 
enterprises in the general application of competition law would be better.
621
 The reason for 
this reversal lies in the historical context of Southeast Asian countries. It is possible that 
the ASEAN changed its tone on this matter in order to address the AMSs’ concern. 
Historically, the AMSs’ government has played a leading role in economic activity through 
the construction of necessary infrastructures because of its public nature and economies of 
scale and scope.
622
 The exclusion of the state as an economic actor to which competition 
law applies is detrimental to the success of the enforcement rate of the law. Not only does 
it greatly diminish the domain of competition law, but it also invites cronyism and 
exploitation in the market. Excluding the state from the domain of competition law will 
inevitably lead to interest groups shifting their anticompetitive conduct through 
government protection. Instead of eliminating it, the anticompetitive behaviour will simply 
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change form. Consequently, competition law may cause inefficiencies that are worse than 
the allocative losses that it was designed to counteract.
623
 This will render the adoption of 
competition law obsolete. 
It remains unclear which vision prevails since both documents are mere guidelines with no 
binding power. The lack of a cohesive understanding of the scope of competition law 
indicates that the ASEAN approach to substantive competition law is heading towards an 
uncertain start. 
4.2.2. The Prohibition of Anticompetitive Agreements 
This prohibition is of particular importance in the light of developing economies’ natural 
market conditions which tend to facilitate collusive agreements.
624
 The ASEAN is 
consciously aware of this necessity. The Guidelines I assert that the “AMSs should 
consider prohibiting horizontal and vertical agreements between undertakings that prevent, 
distort or restrict competition in the AMSs’ territory, unless otherwise exempted.”625 In 
analysing the anticompetitive agreements, it is imperative to first consider the definition of 
the term before progressing to an assessment of the agreement. 
This section will discuss the meaning of the term ‘agreement’ as intended by the 
Guidelines I. Agreements must contain two elements: the willingness to agree and the 
restriction of competition in the market. 
 The Willingness to Agree 4.2.2.1.
The term “agreement” has a broad definition. It is described as: 
Both legally enforceable and non-enforceable agreements, whether written 
or oral; it also includes so-called gentlemen's agreements. An agreement 
may be reached via a physical meeting of the parties or through an 
exchange of letters or telephone calls, or by any other means. All that is 
required is that parties arrive at a consensus on the actions each party will, 
or will not, take.
626
 
The only prerequisite of the term “agreement” is an occurrence of wills between 
undertakings regardless of their form or content. This is a near adaptation of settled EU 
case law.
627
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The concept of agreement is further expanded to encompass concerted practices. In this 
context, concerted practice covers “any form of coordination or implicit understanding or 
arrangement between undertakings, but which do not reach the stage where an agreement 
properly so called has been reached or concluded.”628 Similarly to the EU case law,629 this 
liberal concept is seemingly designed to include all forms of coordination between 
undertakings that might escape the literal interpretation of the term ‘agreements’.  In the 
case of the ASEAN, whose AMSs largely comprise developing economies with relatively 
small market economies, the necessity of a broad definition is even more significant. Not 
only does it need to conform to the hybrid and flexible nature of both global and local 
business, but it needs to compensate for the difficulty in obtaining the evidence of actual 
and tacit collusive agreements. 
 The Restriction to the Competition Test 4.2.2.2.
The mere existence of an agreement is not always indicative of an anticompetitive 
characteristic. Agreements need to be put under the restriction to competition test. The 
Guidelines I explain that: 
The terms ‘prevent,’ ‘distort’ or ‘restrict’ refer, respectively, to the 
elimination of existing or potential competitive activities, the artificial 
alteration of competitive conditions in favour of the parties of the 
agreement, and the reduction of competitive activities. They are meant to 
include all situations where competitive conditions are adversely affected 
by the existence of the anticompetitive agreement.
630
 
Regarding the evaluation of the agreements, the Guidelines I suggest that: 
[The] AMSs should evaluate the agreement by reference to its object and/or 
its effects where possible. [The] AMSs may decide that an agreement 
infringes the law only if it has as its object or effect the appreciable 
prevention, distortion or restriction of competition. [The] AMSs may 
consider identifying specific ‘hardcore restrictions,’ which will always be 
considered as having an appreciable adverse effect on competition (e.g., 
price fixing, bid-rigging, market sharing, limiting or controlling production 
or investment), which need to be treated as per se illegal631 
By indicating that the evaluation made to the agreements should be done with reference to 
their object and/or their effect the appreciable prevention, distortion or restriction of 
competition, the Guidelines I bear a close resemblance to Article 101(1) of the TFEU. 
Generally, the evaluation can be distinguished by two different classifications: the per se 
rule and the rule of reason. 
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First, there is global agreement that cartels are bad.
632
 All competition laws prohibit 
horizontal collaboration outright without allowing any reasonable defences
633
 since it is 
assumed that this type of agreement outweighs the few possible procompetitive 
justifications.
634
 The ASEAN is no stranger to this attitude and hard-core restrictions are 
prohibited as well under the per se rule. The Guidelines I identify price fixing, bid-rigging, 
market sharing, limiting or controlling production or investment as examples in this 
category. They further clarify that: 
‘Price fixing’ involves fixing either the price itself or the components of a 
price such as a discount, establishing the amount or percentage by which 
prices are to be increased, or establishing a range outside of which prices 
are not to move. 
‘Bid-rigging’ includes cover bidding to assist an undertaking in winning the 
tender. An essential feature of the tender system is that tenderers prepare 
and submit bids independently. 
‘Market sharing’ involves agreements to share markets, whether by 
territory, type or size of customer, or in some other ways. 
‘Limiting or controlling production or investment’ involves agreements 
which limit output or control production, by fixing production levels or 
setting quotas, or agreements which deal with structural overcapacity or 
coordinate future investment plans.
635
 
Gal believed that the clear and strict prohibition of hard-core cartels is especially important 
for small economies in which cartelistic behaviour is widespread owing to underlying 
market conditions that are relatively more conducive to collusion.
636
 Her advice was not 
heeded by the ASEAN which excludes vertical agreements from this category and also 
remains silent on the matter of the burden of proof. Vertical agreements commonly contain 
price (e.g. minimum or maximum resale price maintenance) and non-price restraints (e.g. 
exclusive territorial or customer arrangements, exclusive dealings, tie-ins, selective 
distribution, and quantity forcing).
637
 They are generally efficient and thus 
procompetitive.
638
 Therefore, there is some justification for excluding vertical agreements 
from hard-core restrictions. The Best Practices, which form the basis of the Guidelines I, 
seem to concur with this position and warn that refusal to do so would create a 
cumbersome provision and result in welfare reduction.
639
 In addition, it was established 
that setting the burden-of-proof thresholds too high could result in difficulties with 
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prosecuting hard-core cartels.
640
 Limiting the competition authority’s power to prosecuting 
hard-core cartels only in the presence of hard evidence such as written agreements between 
undertakings would render hard-core cartels hard to detect and subsequently prosecute. 
This is due to the fact that tacit collusion in developing economies is easier to establish 
because of the oligopolistic structure of their market.
641
 Moreover, communication 
between undertakings is easier and typically not in written form. For this reason, the Best 
Practices recommend that the standard of proof for collusion in the case of per se 
prohibition should be especially high.
642
 Yet, this specific consideration is not included in 
the Guidelines I. 
Secondly, the rule of reason is often considered the exception to the per se rule. However, 
the rule of reason analysis remains necessary in order to limit too literal an interpretation of 
the broad language used in the law. Such a method of interpretation could cause harm to 
the process of competition by eliminating efficiency. The rule of reason analysis is also 
included in the Guidelines I. They provide that:
 643
 
With the exclusion of the hardcore restrictions which are treated as per se 
illegal, AMSs may decide to analyse the agreements by “rule of reason” 
(e.g., via market share thresholds and efficiency considerations) and safe 
harbour provisions (e.g., appreciability test). For example, the AMSs may 
decide that an agreement by undertakings, which exceeds a certain 
percentage of any relevant market affected by the agreement, will have an 
appreciable effect on competition. 
The inclusion of the market share threshold within the rule of reason test is done without 
any further recommendation on how to determine the aforementioned threshold. The 
efficiency consideration could be included under the rule of reason test as well, especially 
given the constant pressure to allow some exceptions to the general prohibitions for 
agreements with procompetitive effect, such as achieving minimum efficient scale and 
lowering costs to a level that an undertaking acting alone can never achieve. Gal 
considered this exception crucial for small market economies.
644
 The ASEAN is in 
agreement with her view and provides that:  
AMSs may also set up a procedure to consider granting exemptions or 
exclusions to certain agreements and conduct which have significant 
countervailing benefits, such as contributing to or improving the production 
or distribution of goods and services, or promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. The 
exemptions may be allowed only to the extent that is appropriate and 
indispensable to reach their intended aims, and should not afford the 
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undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the goods or services in question.
645
 
Essentially, the Guidelines I illustrate agreements with countervailing benefits, such as 
contributing to or improving the production or distribution of goods and services, or 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit. Nonetheless, there is a limit to this exception. The Guidelines I warn that 
the exemptions should only be allowed to the extent that is appropriate and indispensable 
to reach their intended aims and should not eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the goods or services in question. 
4.2.3. The Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position 
Competition law also prohibits behaviours by a single undertaking. These behaviours are 
sometimes described as unilateral conducts. If competition laws are in agreement regarding 
the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, the same could not be said with regard to 
abuse of dominant position. There are disparities, well documented by the ICN, in how 
abuse of dominance is treated in different jurisdictions.
646
 The report speculated that the 
divergence in competition law practices, in particular between the US and the EU, was due 
to different theoretical economic frameworks. The findings from this report corroborate 
Gal’s findings that the size of the market does not contribute to a divergence in how 
prohibition of abuse of dominant position is practiced.
647
 According to her, both small and 
large economies suffer from abuse of dominance in a similar way but to a more intense 
degree in countries with small economies. The intensity is possibly due to the natural 
condition of a small market economy where the levels of concentration tends to be high in 
both upstream and downstream markets. This naturally erects barriers to market entry. It is 
precisely this natural condition of small market economies that makes erasing the abuse of 
dominant position more challenging for developing economies. If the suffering is identical, 
developing economies find it more difficult to alleviate the pain.  
The Guidelines I confirm that the AMSs should consider prohibiting the abuse of a 
dominant position.
648
 Whether an undertaking holds a dominant position is a crucial 
prerequisite to categorising the abuse. 
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 The Definition of Dominant Position 4.2.3.1.
The Guidelines I clarify that: 
“Dominant position” refers to a situation of market power, where an 
undertaking, either individually or together with other undertakings, is in a 
position to unilaterally affect the competition parameters in the relevant 
market for a good(s) or service(s), e.g., able to profitably sustain prices 
above competitive levels or to restrict output or quality below competitive 
levels.
649
 
The language chosen by the ASEAN signify that dominant position is not exclusively held 
by a single undertaking but can be shared between several undertakings. 
The first step in determining whether an undertaking holds a dominant position is to 
identify the relevant market. Failure to do so could result in the non-enforcement of 
competition law.
650
 Curiously, information about relevant markets do not appear in the 
Guidelines I under the provision of abuse of dominant position, forcing observers and 
interested parties to refer back to the definition of relevant market as it appears under the 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements. The relevant market is described there as “the 
product range and the geographic area where competition takes place between 
undertakings.”651 This formulation covers both the product and the geographical market. 
Relevant market is commonly determined through means of the test of substitutability in 
both large and small economies. 
The second step is to analyse the market power held by the undertaking. In the case of a 
monopoly, it can be challenging to analyse the market power of an undertaking. The 
ASEAN does not suggest ways to assess market dominance assessment; it leaves the 
decision-making power entirely in the hands of its AMSs. The Guidelines I
652
 makes slight 
reference to market share and then only as a mere possibility. The ASEAN’s silence is 
understandable as there is no single formulation to assess market dominance.
653
 However, 
most jurisdictions rely on market share as the main indicator of market power.
654
 While 
this method has often been criticised for its high inaccuracy,
655
 the pragmatic benefits 
gained from it are considerable. The loss of technical accuracy is more than compensated 
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for by the gain in administrative convenience and the reduction of litigation costs,
656
 thus 
reinforcing the appeal of the market share criterion. Incidentally, developing economies 
prefer using the criterion of market share as proof of dominance; assessing evidence from a 
set of complex economic factors requires high capability and experience on the part of the 
national competition authority.
657
 However, because of the questionable accuracy of the 
market share criterion, other indicators should be used in conjunction with market share; 
for example, the ease of access to the market. 
Unsurprisingly, the ASEAN does not provide any guidance relative to the market share 
threshold. Emerging economies were advised to use a lower market share threshold than 
that of developed economies because small economies have higher barriers to entry to the 
market but fewer constraints placed upon undertakings which have gained entry to 
potentially be abusive.
658
 Therefore, the market share necessary to infer dominance in a 
relevant market is lower. Regrettably, the Guidelines I have missed the opportunity to 
encourage a lower threshold of market share to the AMSs. 
 The Classification of Abuse 4.2.3.2.
The possession of dominant position in the relevant market in itself is not a violation of 
competition law unless it is accompanied by abuse. On the definition of “abuse,” the 
Guidelines I describe it as follow: 
“Abuse” of a dominant position occurs where the dominant enterprise, 
either individually or together with other undertakings, exploits its dominant 
position in the relevant market or excludes competitors and harms the 
competition process. It is prudent to consider the actual or potential impact 
of the conduct on competition, instead of treating certain conducts by 
dominant enterprises as automatically abusive.
659
 
According to this description, there are two types of abuse of dominant position: 
exploitative and exclusionary abuses. Exploitative behaviours of an undertaking may cause 
harm to consumer directly while exclusionary conducts affect market structure. In this 
regard, the ASEAN elects the same distinction as that of the CJEU.
660
 
To illustrate the abuse of dominant position, the Guidelines I present a non-exhaustive list 
of abusive conduct encompassing: 
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Exploitative behaviour towards consumers, customers and/or competitors 
(e.g., excessive or unfair purchase or sales prices or other unfair trading 
conditions, tying); 
Exclusionary behaviour towards competitors (e.g., predatory pricing by an 
undertaking which deliberately incurs losses in the short run by setting 
prices so low that it forces one or more undertakings out of the market, so as 
to be able to charge higher prices in the longer run; margin squeeze); 
Discriminatory behaviour (e.g., applying dissimilar pricing or conditions to 
equivalent transactions and vice-versa); 
Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers (e.g., restricting output or illegitimate refusal to supply, 
restricting access to/use of/ development of a new technology).
661
 
The Guidelines II later reduced this list to only exploitative behaviour and exclusionary 
behaviour.
662
 There appears to be no explanation for this reduction. 
The Guidelines I further inform that “it is prudent to consider the actual or potential impact 
of the conduct on competition, instead of treating certain conducts by dominant enterprises 
as automatically abusive.”663 Evidently, the ASEAN is embracing both the form- and the 
effect-based analysis to ensure the effectiveness of competition law. It is not enough to 
confine enforcement of abuse of dominant position only to the actual impacts. The 
competition authority should be able to prevent potential anticompetitive conduct before it 
presents. 
4.2.4. The Merger Control 
The merger control is one of the most important competition rules, as reflected in the 
Guidelines I. A merger occurs when independent undertakings combine into one. There are 
two categories of merger. A horizontal merger involves undertakings that are actual or 
potential competitors, while a vertical merger involves undertakings at different levels of 
the production chain. There are generally two main concerns with mergers.
664
 The first 
concern is that a horizontal merger may result in substantial market power, creating 
unilateral anticompetitive effects. The second is that mergers can reduce the number of 
competitors, resulting in the formation of a cooperative oligopoly. Merger control can then 
be seen as a natural extension of the prohibition of abuse of dominant position and 
anticompetitive agreements. The merger control operates under the assumption that a pre-
emptive review of a merger is both less costly and less complicated than attempting to 
deconcentrate an anticompetitive merger that has already been realised. 
This section will first examine the ASEAN’s definition of mergers before examining the 
organisation of its control. 
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 The Definition of Merger 4.2.4.1.
The ASEAN chooses the term “merger” to encompass the full extent of the concentrations 
of undertakings including: regrouping mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, and joint ventures. 
The Guidelines I explain that: 
“Mergers” refers to situations where two or more undertakings, previously 
independent of one another, join together. This definition includes 
transactions whereby two companies legally merge into one (“mergers”), 
one firm takes sole control of the whole or part of another (“acquisitions” or 
“takeovers”), two or more firms acquire joint control over another firm 
(“joint ventures”) and other transactions, whereby one or more undertakings 
acquire control over one or more undertakings, such as interlocking 
directorates.
665
 
In essence, a merger occurs when previously independent undertakings are transformed 
into a single new entity irrespective of the precise nature and language of the 
concentration. In this regard, the Guidelines I broadly paraphrased Article 3 of the 
EUMR.
666
 For the purpose of this section and to avoid confusion, the term “merger” will be 
used to describe all types of concentrations of undertakings. 
 The Organisation of the Merger Control 4.2.4.2.
The merger control is especially important for developing economies which typically have 
small market economies. As mergers reduce the number of competitors and increase the 
market share of the merged entities, the result will be to increase any concentration already 
present in the market.
667
 However, the increased concentration could also help achieve 
efficiencies that were unattainable pre-merger. 
This section will analyse the assessment of the merger control as well as how the national 
competition authorities exercise their powers regarding the merger control. 
The Appraisal of Merger 
The Guidelines I indicate that mergers should be appraised on their economic effect. The 
“AMSs may consider prohibiting mergers that lead to a substantial lessening of 
competition or would significantly impede effective competition in the relevant market or 
in a substantial part of it, unless otherwise exempted.”668 Accordingly, the analysis of the 
impact of mergers must be examined from three different perspectives: an analysis of the 
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structure of the market before the merger, an analysis of the potential effect of the merger 
on the structure of the market, and an analysis of the impact of the structural changes on 
the functioning of the market. 
Interestingly, the Guidelines I have abandoned the Best Practices’ recommendation of a 
dominance test.
669
 The opinion expressed in Best Practices is that the substantial reduction 
of the competition test is unsuitable for new competition law authorities who might not be 
able to handle the informational and analytical demands crucial to the use of this test. The 
Guidelines I opt instead for a combining of both the US antitrust law which uses the term 
“substantially to lessen competition”670 [hereinafter the SLC test] and the EU competition 
law which prefers the term “significantly impede effective competition”671 [hereinafter the 
SIEC test]. The inclusion of the US term is undoubtedly because the US introduced the 
first merger control in the world.
672
 Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
673
 the appraisal 
criterion is whether a merger will result in a substantial lessening of competition. The 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 1992
674
 later reiterate the SLC test and emphasise that the 
SLC test takes into consideration the competitive effect of merger and the resulting 
changes in the competitive equilibrium. The other party is the EU law which has shifted 
the focus of its merger control to the SIEC test. In this respect, the scope of application of 
the test is no longer limited to a consideration of dominant position. The focal point is now 
on the potential effect of the merger. In this respect, the merger control could be extended 
to oligopolistic markets. While observers agreed that the SIEC and the SLC tests have 
some striking similarities,
675
 this is unsurprising. The adoption of the new EU test was 
considered to be a mere reorganisation of the original test of market dominance
676
 partly to 
more resemble the SLC test.
677
 It would appear that the change in the wording of the test 
does not completely alter the appraisal criteria in the merger control law
678
 and the 
similarities between the SIEC and the SLC test remain, rendering the ASEAN’s repetition 
of both tests redundant. 
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It is impossible for the appraisal of mergers not to include an efficiency defence since 
mergers may improve efficiency or other socio-political goals. Such a defence would 
exempt mergers that substantially reduce the competition or significantly impede effective 
competition in the relevant market as this could result in economies of scale. Put another 
way, competition authorities need to do a trade-off between strict regulations and 
efficiency. The latter is of more importance since it offers greater social gains in term of 
economic growth and eventual consumer welfare. In practice, however, this balancing 
approach is harder to execute. The difficulties have to do with the analysis of the potential 
efficiency that mergers could bring. Moreover, the balancing approach of the efficiency 
defence is not without flaws. It is inherently vague, giving competition authorities a large 
margin of flexibility and discretion in their analysis of mergers.
679
 This flexibility would 
inevitably threaten legal certainty. The efficiency test can also be burdensome for the 
competition authorities of newly developed competition law regimes who often lack the 
necessary experience and resources to prove efficiency.
680
 
The balancing approach figured in the Guidelines I which disclose that: 
 AMSs may also set up a procedure to consider granting exemptions or 
exclusions to certain agreements and conduct which have significant 
countervailing benefits, such as contributing to or improving the production 
or distribution of goods and services, or promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. The 
exemptions may be allowed only to the extent that is appropriate and 
indispensable to reach their intended aims, and should not afford the 
undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the goods or services in question.
681
 
It is unclear whether the ASEAN has taken into consideration the difficulties of analysing 
efficiency gains with the crippling lack of resources within the AMSs when including the 
efficiency defence. Excluding the efficiency test from the merger control provisions is not 
unheard off. In fact, the Baltic countries, recognising the insurmountable difficulty this 
task would pose for their inexperienced authorities, decided to exclude the balancing 
approach from their competition laws.
682
 Gal, however, was in favour of the inclusion of 
the balancing approach, stating that by adopting a rigid merger policy, developing 
economies may hamper the international competitiveness of domestic undertakings.
683
 In 
other words, she supported overlooking the possibility of an increase of concentration in 
small market economy if this would eventually help firms at the international level. It is all 
a matter of policy choice in the hands of the national competition authorities and, by 
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extension, the national government. Gal’s suggestion seems to add another cumbersome 
criterion to the consideration of the efficiency defence. 
The Control Exercised by the National Competition Authority 
The ASEAN cannot support the existence of a central mechanism in charge of handling 
mergers with a regional dimension. Therefore, the task is exclusively under the discretion 
of each AMS’s national competition authority. The merger control relies largely on 
structural metrics to establish a presumption of anticompetitive pricing emerging.
684
 The 
control can be either structural or behavioural. Structural control is a one-time measure that 
seeks to restore or maintain the competitive structure of the market.
685
  Since by nature, 
mergers affect the structure of the relevant market, it has been widely acknowledged that 
the control should also be structural, such as divestiture of a stand-alone business.
686
 It is 
no coincidence that the most common form of structural remedy is divestiture.
687
 On the 
other hand, behavioural control is an ongoing measure that seeks to regulate or contain the 
behaviours of the concerned undertaking.
688
 It may include promises by the parties to 
abstain from certain commercial behaviour.
689
 It has been suggested that structural control 
might be of limited effectiveness in small market economies and behavioural commitments 
should be used instead as a more viable alternative.
690
 Nonetheless, behavioural control 
must be exercised cautiously by new competition authorities, since their unpreparedness or 
lack of expertise in the implementation of a behavioural remedy could jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the chosen remedy.
691
 
The Guidelines I advise the AMSs to equip their national competition authorities with the 
power to decide, notwithstanding the power to authorise the merger, “to stop the merger or, 
as part of the clearance, impose conditions on or require commitments from the merging 
enterprises to address any competition concerns arising from the merger.”692 In this way, 
the national competition authorities exercise three distinctive powers: the power of pure 
and simple authorisation; the power of conditional authorisation; and the power of refusal. 
These contain both structural and behavioural remedies. The three powers are a 
straightforward reiteration of Articles 8 (1), (2) and (3) of the EUMR. It would seem that 
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the ASEAN readily applies the pre-merger control regimes, following the examples of 
most competition law jurisdictions in the world.
693
 There is no mention of the possibility of 
post-merger control whereby the competition authority controls a merger transaction after 
its conclusion in the Guidelines I. Only a few regimes use this method because of 
significant legal uncertainty for the undertakings concerned and the high cost of untangling 
merged undertaking should the transaction reveals to be anticompetitive.
694
 
The pre-merger notification process has been identified as a crucial component of the pre-
merger control exercised by the national competition authorities.
695
 It is important to 
include a pre-merger notification system into a jurisdiction, not least because the majority 
of merger control regimes have it
696
 but also because obtaining the competition authority 
clearance to proceed with the merger before its realisation could lessen the business cost. 
The pre-merger notification system can be divided into two categories: mandatory and 
voluntary notifications. The mandatory notification system is the most commonly used. In 
this instance, undertakings concerned must notify the competition authority prior to the 
completion of the merger in question when certain criteria are met. The criteria often 
constitute worldwide or national turnover threshold. In a voluntary notification system, 
undertakings are not obliged to notify the competition authority of their merger plan. 
However, they face the risk of post-merger investigation by the competition authority. This 
method can be difficult and costly to implement since it involves undoing the already 
merged undertaking. 
With regard to the ASEAN approach, the Guidelines I do not decide between voluntary or 
mandatory notification, leaving the choice instead to respective AMSs. 
A specific procedure may be established by which the competition 
regulatory body is tasked to assess mergers, following a (voluntary or 
mandatory) notification by the merging undertakings, or otherwise 
following a complaint or by their own motion. [For this purpose], 
“Mandatory notification” prevents the undertakings from implementing the 
transaction until they have received merger clearance from the competition 
regulatory body. This helps to avoid a situation where anti-competitive 
mergers have to subsequently be subject to difficult and costly de-
concentration measures imposed by the competition regulatory body. 
“Voluntary notification” allows businesses to do their own merger self-
assessment, to decide if they should notify the competition regulatory body 
to clear the merger. It helps to reduce business costs while not impeding 
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competition regulatory body's authority to investigate any merger which 
raises competition concerns.
697
 
Before deciding on this important matter, the AMSs should first take into consideration the 
high cost of imposing mandatory notification as well as their competition authority’s 
ability to process notified merger plans within the legal time limit. Nonetheless, the 
Australian experience has proven that the outcomes of both mandatory and voluntary 
notifications do not substantially differ since most notified merger cases do not raise 
competition concerns.
698
 On the other hand, voluntary notification leads to substantial 
lessening of the cost for both the competition authority and the undertakings concerned.
699
 
It was further suggested that since most mergers do not raise any competition concerns, it 
would be more cost effective, especially for small market economies, to favour the 
voluntary notification system provided that it is accompanied by the proper design of the 
deterrent mechanisms and enforcement measures.
700
 
The mandatory merger notification is usually triggered by the size of the sale or assets of 
the firms involved in transaction, the size of the combined market shares of the merger 
participants, or the size of the pre-acquisition market share of any on party.
701
 Authorities 
do not need to be notified of any mergers that fall below the level of the threshold. 
Generally, because the calculation of an undertaking’s market share is subject to more 
manipulation than that of the transaction size and thus prone to more mistakes, most 
competition regimes resort to the transaction size threshold.
702
 When adopting a merger 
threshold, new competition law regimes need to be aware of the resources available to their 
competition authorities. If the threshold is set too low, there is the chance that the agency 
would be inundated with reviewable cases, including those with no conceivable 
competition significance, without the means to properly enforce the merger assessment. In 
contrast, establishing an excessively high threshold is deemed to be the only appropriate 
measure for newly installed competition agencies on which to focus their limited 
resources.
703
 
In the case of the ASEAN,  
[The] AMSs may establish that only mergers above a given threshold shall 
(or may) be notified to – and approved by – the competition regulatory 
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body. Thresholds may refer, for instance, to the (national and/or worldwide) 
turnover of the merging parties in the last completed financial year, market 
shares of the parties or a combination of both criteria. Thresholds may be 
adjusted when necessary to take account, for example, of increases in the 
GDP deflator index. AMSs may also consider introducing a standstill 
provision by which mergers, which are subject to the competition regulatory 
body evaluation, cannot be implemented before they are approved.
704
 
Accordingly, the thresholds may be fixed according to national and/or worldwide turnover 
of the merging parties in the last completed financial year, and the market shares of the 
parties or a combination of both criteria. Inexplicably, the more reliable criterion of 
transaction size is not included in this case. However, the Guidelines I admit that the 
threshold may also be adjusted when necessary; for example, in order to take into account, 
but not limited to, the increase in the GDP deflator index. 
 The Resolution of Previously Identified Challenges 4.3.
Chapter 3 has identified the vast differences, notably in economic development and 
structure, politics and degrees of development, between the AMSs and the ASEAN Way as 
the main challenges faced by the ASEAN in its pursuit of regional economic integration 
with competition law and policy as one of the principal mechanisms. This section aims to 
examine the recognition of these challenges by the ASEAN as well as its proposals to 
overcome them. Throughout the document, The Guidelines I recognises a number of 
challenges such as the different stages of competition policy development among the 
AMSs,
705
 and the problematic access to necessary resources, notably financial and human 
resources.
706
 The Guidelines II recognise the challenges faced by the ASEAN in a 
dedicated section: 
- Perceived conflicts with other policy objectives (e.g. employment, 
promotion of “national champions”) and resistance from “vested 
interests”; 
- Lack of good governance, in particular due to the strong links between 
the worlds of politics and business. Such actual or perceived contact 
gives the public and the business community little faith that the law will 
be applied free of corruption and in accordance with the rule of law; 
- Tension with sector-specific regulators; 
- Resources and capacity constraints and limited indigenous expertise in 
CPL. The [competition authority's] staff and the judiciary have very 
limited training in competition law and economics (in particular, few 
staff and fewer judges have any competition-specific university 
training). Also the [competition authority’s] staff and the judiciary have 
a rigid, literal approach to interpreting and applying the law, divorced 
from the law’s goals. Investigators, managers, commissioners with no 
legal training or inexperienced lawyers lack a sense of the dynamic 
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nature of the law. Judges avoid the substantive issues and stick to the 
procedural issues only; 
- Lack of political will and independence; 
- An under-developed judicial system.707 
While the ASEAN Way is never explicitly mentioned in any documents formulated by the 
ASEAN, its presence is unavoidable especially in light of the reluctance to properly guide 
or dictate the path to the AMSs. Indeed both the Guidelines I and the Guidelines II have 
repeatedly reminded the AMSs of their non-binding character.
  708
 In contrast, the concern 
over the SMEs which have previously been identified as an important part of the AMSs’ 
economy is curiously missing from these texts. 
This section will focus on the three primary challenges: the difficulties in designing a 
competition law and policy framework for the AMSs with deeply rooted varying 
characteristics; resource restrictions; and foreign influences. 
4.3.1. Accommodating the Differences within the ASEAN 
In Chapter 3, details were given about the considerable diversity among AMSs in terms of 
their respective economic and political heritage, governance systems, legal institutions, 
stages of economic development, and exposure to or reliance on foreign trade and 
investments. As it has been recognised that political and economic regimes have a crucial 
impact on the implementation of competition law, it is understandable that both Guidelines 
have taken them into account. The Guidelines II, in particular, have exhibited a remarkable 
understanding of the economic, social and political situation within the region. For 
instance, they acknowledge the existence of an informal economy and an oligarchy and 
emphasise that the AMSs should take these factors into consideration when drafting a 
realistic national competition law.
709
 They also refer to the small economies of many 
AMSs. The Guidelines II question whether this issue has an effect on competition law in 
general before concluding that the size of the economy does not affect the economic 
analysis of competition law.
710
 However, this analysis does not take into account other 
characteristics of small economies, such as the concentration of business actors and the 
difficulty in accessing the market, which would have an impact on the economic analysis 
of competition law. Most importantly, however, the different stages of competition policy 
development in the region are included in the Guidelines I.
711
 
In this respect, the ASEAN has exhibited an unequivocal awareness of the imbalance in the 
development of different areas and respect the differing capabilities of each member. 
Indeed, the ASEAN affirms that the AMSs “should consider and choose what best suits 
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their particular characteristics and needs.”712 It denies the one-size-fits-all approach and 
favours a tailor-made competition law in accordance with specific situations. There is a 
legitimate concern about whether the ASEAN’s approach to competition law and policy 
would, rather than harmonising existing and in-development competition regimes, actually 
increase the differences among the AMSs. Nevertheless, when considering the differences 
among the AMSs and their ability to adopt competition law, it is almost impossible to 
formulate a central model appropriate for all the AMSs. By encouraging the AMSs’ liberty 
in adopting their own vision of competition law, the ASEAN has opted for the most 
prudent and realistic approach. In this context, the broad and often ambiguous terminology 
in both Guidelines is necessary to accommodate the differences. Accordingly, the only 
expectation is the adherence to international standards of competition law. It is worth 
reiterating that the expectation is not absolute because all AMSs have the freedom to adopt 
their own vision of competition law and policy. 
4.3.2. Overcoming Resource Restriction 
There is no shortage of issues related to resource restrictions in this region. The issues, 
recorded in both Guidelines, include financial restrictions and qualified human 
resources.
713
 The financial issue, being the most pressing, requires resolution as soon as the 
competition authority is established.
714
 The budget for the authority usually derives from 
the state’s government which can lead to doubts about the competition authority’s 
independence. However, reliance on the ministerial budget could significantly alleviate 
financial concerns
715
 and can be a justifiable temporary compromise. In addition, the 
ASEAN proposes that: 
[…] The [competition authority] also draws from an independent source of 
financing. It can be done, for example, by introducing procedural fees, such 
as filing fees for notifications (e.g. for merger clearance or exemptions). 
Fees should be set at a level corresponding to the average costs of the 
authority handling a particular category of matter, in order to minimise the 
risks of distorting effects on the [competition authority’s] priorities. 
Additionally, the [competition authority] could be granted a share of the 
fines imposed.
716
 
The Guidelines II publish an extensive list of recommendations to the AMSs to overcome 
the challenge of the shortage of qualified human resources.
717
 The Guidelines I also stress 
the importance of optimising available resources. For this purpose, the competition 
authority should be allowed to: 
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Introduce “prioritisation criteria” to determine in an objective and consistent 
manner which investigations are to be pursued with priority. The priorities 
may remain confidential to the competition regulatory body or made public 
through annual plans or the annual report of the competition regulatory 
body, specifying industries or sectors, as well as types of conduct that are of 
particular interest.
718
 
These criteria should reflect the time and resources at the national competition authority 
disposal.
719
 Therefore, the work requirement must be proportionate to these resources. For 
instance, per se infringement cases with serious impact on relevant market should be made 
a priority. While complex cases that require cross-border investigation and international 
cooperation might present too big a hurdle. Similarly, a case that can be brought through 
private enforcement might not be worth pursuing by national competition authority with 
resource restriction issue. Most importantly, prioritisation criteria should not lead to de 
facto exemptions which would unnecessarily restrict the scope of enforcement of the 
authority. 
4.3.3. Optimising Foreign Influences 
It is noteworthy that the ASEAN readily embraced the concept of foreign help when 
drafting national competition law.
720
 Moreover, it has admitted to borrowing from the 
AMSs’ experiences and international best practices.721 Although both Guidelines liberally 
reference the experiences of its AMSs by name, the Guidelines I are more reluctant to cite 
their international sources. Foreign origins have never been explicitly identified, perhaps in 
an attempt to further establish an authentic ASEAN vision of competition law and policy. 
In contrast, the Guidelines II acknowledge foreign influences and their role in introducing 
competition law and advising decision makers in matters regarding competition law. They 
give ample examples of foreign practices in the field of competition law, ranging from 
mature regimes such as the EU and the US to newer regimes like India, Jamaica and 
Armenia. 
The ASEAN’s action of importing foreign rules is not unique. Competition law is often 
based on the experience of other countries.
722
 Dabbah noted that this has not always been 
the case since most mature competition law regimes have had a chance to enact and adapt 
their own competition rules before adapting these in light of international agreements.
723
 
The same pattern has not applied to many of new competition law jurisdictions. Fox and 
Padilla named this trend “the follower phenomenon.” This phenomenon includes 
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transplanting a foreign rule to imitating a foreign law’s interpretation. The transplantation 
may be partial or complete. The follower phenomenon is not recent. Gal confirmed that 
“transplants were and still are, a major form of legal development.”724 
The motivation behind the adoption of competition law based on foreign experiences 
varies and there is no shortage of incentives for introducing foreign ideas. Generally, the 
motivation is the desire to save costs, both financial and institutional. Developing new 
competition law jurisdiction entirely internally will be a lengthy and costly process. In a 
resource-restricted jurisdiction, this would be simply impossible. Further, importing a 
successful concept could help ease the acceptance of the law in the host country,
725
 thus 
alleviating the burden on the competition advocacy programme. Nonetheless, the 
successful implementation of competition law abroad does not guarantee it would also be 
beneficial to the follower jurisdiction. Commentators warn that the latter needs to proceed 
with caution in order to obtain successful transplantation.
726
 In this context, success is 
presumed when the recently transplanted competition law receives optimal implementation 
locally. The newly enacted law may not be applicable unless the special characteristics of 
the host state, such as the socioeconomic conditions, are effectively addressed. 
Furthermore, even if all the conditions for the successful transplant of the law are met, 
there is still the possibility that the law may be misapplied or applied differently from its 
foreign version. While this scenario is not desirable, especially in light of the process of the 
harmonisation of competition law, it can be justified when considering the special 
characteristics of the state in question. 
Pitfalls when foreign laws are transplanted are more likely to occur if there has been much 
foreign pressure to adopt the laws. There is no evidence to indicate that this scenario 
applies to the ASEAN. It is likely that the choice to adopt foreign experiences is made 
voluntarily, thus implying that the ASEAN is aware of the potential benefits and pitfalls 
that could transpire. This awareness would explain why the ASEAN limits itself to simply 
following the universal consensus-based competition law and repeatedly suggests that 
AMSs take their special characteristics into consideration when designing national 
competition laws, even when its ultimate goal is to support regional economic integration. 
Notwithstanding the study of foreign experiences, the ASEAN accepts two forms of 
foreign help: intellectual and financial resources. 
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 Technical Assistance 4.3.3.1.
Fox argued that developed economies have a duty of cooperation to aid developing 
economies in their efforts to combat international anticompetitive practices since 
developing economies lack the necessary resources and enforcement reach to treat them.
727
 
This duty of cooperation is due to the anticompetitive conduct being concocted in 
developed economies but taking place in developing economies since developing 
economies’ tools to combat international anticompetitive conduct are often inadequate. 
However, Fox’s proposed solution is to extend developed economies’ jurisdiction so as to 
make hard-core export cartels illegal. Her suggestion of extra-territoriality of established 
competition jurisdiction is not necessarily the best. Dabbah supported the concept of duty 
of cooperation on the part of developed economies.
728
 He admitted that the lack of support 
from international organisations could be detrimental to the success of competition law 
enforcement in new jurisdictions. In this respect at least, the ASEAN does not appear to be 
lacking. 
Lee divided technical assistance given to countries into two categories: the OECD model 
and the UNCTAD model.
729
 The difference between the OECD and the UNCTAD lies 
firstly in their membership. The UNCTAD has broad and universal membership and 
includes most of the member states of the UN, while the OECD is usually considered the 
“club of rich nations”730 because of its inclusion of thirty-four of the most industrialised 
economies of the world. Despite its best efforts in adding more diversity to its composition, 
the OECD is still heavily criticised limiting its membership to developed economies 
only.
731
 Despite this difference, both organisations pursue the same activity – the 
convergence of competition law standards. 
In the area of competition law and policy, the OECD is best known for its 
Recommendations and Best Practices.
732
 Many competition authorities, even from non-
OECD members, use these works as highly authoritative sources in the field of competition 
law. Among the different OECD publications in the field of competition law, the most 
influential is the Recommendation Concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, 
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published in 1998.
733
 Using this Recommendation, the OECD is working on obtaining 
substantive soft harmonisation in the field of hard-core cartels. The OECD’s emphasis on 
fighting hard-core cartels is because the conduct of cartels is unambiguously harmful and 
countries unanimously condemn them. The OECD activities are not limited to hard-core 
cartels. It also deals with a variety of issues of competition law and policy including 
mergers, cooperation between competition authorities and member states and fighting bid-
rigging.
734
 Equally important to the Recommendations and Best Practices is the OECD 
work on cooperation between the competition authorities of its member states. The OECD 
has created an important competition forum as part of its Competition Committee called 
the Global Forum on Competition (GFC). This forum allows the OECD to further widen 
its policy dialogue to include non-OECD members. Today the GFC unites more than 100 
competition authorities around the world.
735
 It is intended to be a forum where the OECD 
members’ convergence experience can be shared with non-members and at the same time, 
non- members' concerns can be heard. Another key function of the OECD in the field of 
competition law is to conduct peer reviews of national competition laws and policies. 
Through the peer reviews, the OECD can evaluate competition law regimes around the 
world and recommend how best to increase each one’s effectiveness. In practice, this 
means that countries are free to submit their competition law regimes to OECD scrutiny 
but are under no obligation to implement the recommendations made in the review. 
Nonetheless, countries are encouraged to make legitimate domestic changes. The reviews 
are a useful convergence mechanism; newly established authorities can use them to lobby 
the government of its country to amend the competition law.
736
 In other words, what the 
peer review lacks in binding obligation is compensated for by peer pressure.  
The UNCTAD entered the field of competition law and policy in 1973 when it began its 
negotiation on the control of restrictive business practices. Since the nature of the 
UNCTAD’s work already centred on trade policy, its expansion to the field of competition 
law should not be regarded as surprising but rather a natural progression as the Conference 
develops. It aims to facilitate a more efficient and equitable globalised economy through 
enhancing competitiveness and economic growth in developing economies by spreading a 
competition-based culture and elevating consumer welfare. The UNCTAD has produced 
some notable contributions to the field of global competition law over the years. Perhaps 
its best known work is the The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition,
737
 more commonly known as the UNCTAD Code or the UNCTAD Set. 
Notwithstanding its nature as a multilateral agreement, the UNCTAD Code is generally 
regarded as a code of conduct on competition policy that aims to provide developing 
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countries with equitable rules to protect them from anticompetitive harm.
738
 It also 
recognizes the development dimension of competition law and policy and provides a 
framework for international operation and exchange of best practices.
739
 When examining 
the text, it is evident that the UNCTAD Code is a compromise of different interests. The 
UNCTAD Code’s substantive provisions contain basic competition law principles generally 
consistent with the western concept of anticompetitive conduct. The UNCTAD Code has a 
two-tiered structure of rules and principles addressed both to countries and firms and 
contains classic competition law provisions. Nevertheless, the effects of the UNCTAD 
Code are extremely limited for two main reasons. Firstly, in the eyes of developed 
economies, in particular the US, the UNCTAD Code represents a populist conception of 
competition law which contrasts with the prevailing economic efficiency rationale.
740
 As a 
consequence, developed economies tend to disregard the UNCTAD Code although the part 
of the UNCTAD Code that overlaps with their conception of efficient competition law 
continues to be cited approvingly. Secondly, the absence of a clear and legally binding 
effect reduces the political importance of the UNCTAD Code. Beside the UNCTAD Code, 
the UNCTAD has contributed to the globalisation of competition law through other 
measures such as the Model Law on Competition
741
 which is based on the UNCTAD Code. 
This was adopted to give member states a source of reference when drafting or amending 
domestic competition laws. 
The UNCTAD also provides capacity building and technical assistance to developing 
economies and economies in transition which seek to implement competition law and 
policy in their jurisdictions. In this, the UNCTAD works closely with national competition 
authorities, competition experts and development partners such as the OECD and the ICN.  
Finally, the UNCTAD also has a peer review system similar to that of the OECD. The peer 
reviews are voluntary which means that countries are free to submit their competition law 
regimes for review; the recommendations made are not mandatory. The peer reviews are 
conducted by different competition experts to provide an objective assessment of the 
competition law regime for the purpose of identifying its shortcomings and proposing 
suggestions as well as technical assistance when needed. The UNCTAD peer review 
exercise is unique in terms of its development perspective and rich experience in working 
with developing economies. 
Although there is no supporting evidence attesting to direct involvement of the OECD and 
the UNCTAD in capacity building and technical assistance within ASEAN, the Best 
Practices cite the OECD recommendations and the Guidelines II mention both the OECD 
and the UNCTAD body of work, in particular the UNCTAD Model Law, as their sources of 
competition law recommendations and best practices. Moreover, the ASEAN has received 
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direct aid from some foreign nations; for instance, the Guidelines I was produced by 
InWent Capacity Building International while the Guidelines II was produced with the 
support of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) for its 
capacity building for the ASEAN Secretariat project. Both projects were funded by the 
Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to the direct help, the 
ASEAN also receives technical assistance from the ASEAN-Australia Development 
Cooperation Programme Phase II and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (AANZFTA). Both programmes have offered ample technical assistance as 
evidenced by the frequent organisation of capacity-building workshops and conferences in 
the region.
742
 
 Financial Assistance 4.3.3.2.
The financial assistance provided to the ASEAN is essential for its initiative in developing 
its competition law and policy framework since the AMSs’ contribution is minimal. In 
2013, the member states’ contribution only accounted for USD 16.2 million.743 This 
covered little more than the ASEAN Secretariat’s operational costs. Consequently, the 
ASEAN is currently not financially self-reliant and foreign financial contributions are 
more-or-less imperative. For example, the ASEAN–Australia Development Cooperation 
Programme Phase II, which was launched in 2009 and is expected to last until 2019, has 
offered a budget of AUD57 million (roughly USD 44.7 million).
744
 Given the lack of 
public transparency regarding financial expenditure within the ASEAN structure, it is 
impossible to determine how much has been distributed to the development of the ASEAN 
competition law and policy projects. 
  Conclusion 4.4.
This chapter has examined the ASEAN’s approach to substantive competition law. It has 
revealed that most of the work has concentrated on supporting the installation of national 
competition laws. To this effect, the ASEAN’s contribution is in the form of various 
conferences and publications aimed at connecting the AMSs with global attitudes to 
competition law. It has always been mindful of both its own limitations, in particular the 
absence of a centralised organ with allocated power necessary to impose a model, as well 
as differing AMSs’ specificities. This was translated into an offering of collections of 
traditional and globally accepted competition rules that could be adapted according to each 
AMS’s needs. The ASEAN seems more preoccupied with gaining acceptance and inviting 
more participation from its own AMSs. It is now an opportune time to question whether 
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the approach taken will lead the ASEAN to its ambitious goal of harmonising competition 
law to complement imminent regional economic integration. 
In this respect, the process of soft harmonisation as a non-binding multilateralism which 
relies on the power of persuasion, as described in Chapter 2, most resembles the ASEAN’s 
effort in competition law and policy thus far. It responds well to the ASEAN’s inherent 
limitations and ambition. The ASEAN has never proposed a framework unique to its 
vision; it is instead content with gathering accepted up-to-date best practices in the field of 
competition law and policy accompanied by a large margin of discretion that the AMSs’ 
competition authorities could enjoy. At the same time, it inherits all the shortcomings of 
soft harmonisation. The AMSs are free, and to a certain degree encouraged, to neglect the 
ASEAN’s approach as assembled in the Guidelines in favour of their own particular 
necessities or situations. In the end, one is left to wonder whether the path of soft 
harmonisation chosen by the ASEAN does not further widen the divergence between 
members instead of bridging it. 
By electing the soft harmonisation approach with respect to the competition regulatory 
design to pursue its economic integration goal, the ASEAN has retained its uniqueness in 
comparison with other regional experiences. It is the only regional organisation with an 
integration goal not to undertake a unified and centralised approach to substantive design. 
Conversely, it more resembles the NAFTA’s free trade approach. 
 
 The ASEAN’s Approach to Institutional Building Chapter 5
“Jurisdictions need sound and thoughtful institutional design that will best help advance 
their competition law and policy.”745 Yet, the subject of institutional design is often 
relegated to “a relatively obscure corner”746 with more attention paid to substantive policy 
development. Kovacic argued that “if theory is not grounded in the engineering of effective 
institutions, it will not work in practice.”747 Put differently, if the construction of an 
institutional structure for competition is not appropriate to house substantive interiors, the 
entire policy could collapse. In his influential work, North defined “institutions” as “the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interactions.”748 In the competition law context, however, institutional design 
often covers the systems, structures, processes and procedures of competition law 
enforcement and application and competition policy advocacy.
749
 This chapter elects to 
follow this description. 
Chapter 4 explained the ASEAN’s approach to substantive competition law through the 
process of soft harmonisation. This chapter now turns to the analysis of the ASEAN 
institutional framework in which is housed the process of regional harmonisation. The 
ASEAN guidance in the field of institutional building appears more developed than that of 
the substantive law. Indeed, the Guidelines I introduce the concept of institutional building 
that is impressively expanded in the Guidelines II, including suggestions on institutional 
design, attributes and competencies, core values and organisational structure. If the 
ASEAN refrains from entering into details regarding substantive law, such restraint is not 
present in its institutional building recommendations. It is evident that the issue of 
substantive law and institutional design do not receive equal treatment. Such a cautious 
approach regarding substantive law is inexplicable since both the area of substantive law 
and institutional construction involve a high degree of national choice placed under the 
discretion of the AMSs. 
Bakhoum and Molestina identified five factors that influence the design of regional 
competition structures: “the number of states and the level of integration of the regional 
market; the fluidity of trade between member states; the respective institutional capacities 
of the member states and the Union; the existence or lack of a competition culture in the 
member states; and the time dimension.”750 As discussed in Chapter 1, the ASEAN is a 
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regional organisation composed of ten neighbouring states in Southeast Asia with the 
ambitious goal of economic integration. The current level of trade between the AMSs is 
not high but it is believed that market integration could help its fluidity. The competition 
culture of the AMSs is not firmly established with only seven AMSs having a competition 
law regime, with varying degrees of efficacy in its enforcement. Furthermore, the 
institutional capacities of the ASEAN are fragile due to the principle of non-interference 
between the AMSs, which lies at the heart of the organisation, and the lack of a centralised 
mechanism. Since the ASEAN cannot support the existence of a central mechanism in 
charge of handling regional competition law issues, the task is therefore exclusively under 
the discretion of each AMS’s competition authority. Facing its limitations, the ASEAN 
endeavours instead to support each AMS in its establishment and modernisation of a 
national competition institution. The only regional competition structure available to the 
ASEAN is the AEGC which, as the name would suggest, is merely a network of national 
competition authorities. Despite having an ambitious goal of introducing a single market 
that fully integrates all the AMSs, the ASEAN is deprived of centralised decision-making 
ability. Consequently, in its current state it is legally impossible to have a regional 
authority in charge of competition law. In relation to the inevitable regional issues of 
competition law that are bound to emerge during the regional economic integration, the 
ASEAN resorts to extra-territoriality and regional cooperation. 
 The ASEAN’s Model for National Competition Authority 5.1.
Fox compared the design of a competition institution to that of a house. She reflected that: 
Good institutional design is a critical component of good competition policy 
and competition law enforcement. The design of the institutions is like the 
design of a house: it must facilitate life within the house. Good institutional 
design takes account of the family’s values and empowers life within its 
walls. Designs cannot be conjured in the abstract; they must fit the family 
that lives in the house, its aspirations, possibilities, and practical limits. 
Therefore, the good architect lives with the family before conceptualizing 
the design.
751
 
It follows that the design of a competition structure must not be undertaken in the abstract 
and must take into consideration the specificities, the goals, the capacities and the 
restrictions of the country or the region. In other words, it is the context that shapes the 
design of the institution. Consequently, the perfect internationally agreed template for 
competition institutional design does not exist. The ASEAN demonstrates its awareness of 
this aspect when it declares that “[…] there is no one-size-fits-all answer and the optimal 
solution must be coherent with the country’s general legal framework and regulatory 
history. The solution can vary from country to country and even across industries within 
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the same country.”752 Furthermore, many new competition jurisdictions faced daunting 
challenges in building the institutional foundations for successful implementation.
753
 The 
challenges are fuelled principally by resource restrictions, namely the financial investment 
by the state, limited knowledge, lack of personnel and lack of experience. In this regard, 
the ASEAN faces similar challenges to many developing economies in their construction 
of a regional framework on substantive competition law. 
This section will begin with an analysis of the necessary considerations for the adoption of 
an institutional framework since the choices made at this stage would unequivocally 
influence the outcome of the institutional model. 
5.1.1. Necessary Considerations for an Effective Institutional 
Framework 
It is important to reflect first on what are the qualities and attributes that a competition 
authority should possess before proceeding to the appropriate design of institution as 
envisioned by the ASEAN. Generally, the values include independence, accountability, 
expertise, transparency, due regard for confidentiality, efficiency, due process, and 
predictability.
754
 The Guidelines I state that the responsibilities of the competition agency 
are: to implement and enforce national competition law; to interpret and elaborate; to 
advocate; to provide advice; and to act as the representative of the country in international 
competition matters.
755
 The Guidelines II further state that in order to carry out these 
responsibilities, it is fundamental for a competition agency to possess the following 
attributes and competencies: independence; accountability; fairness; transparency; 
confidentiality; effective powers; influence; resources; and cooperation skills.
756
 Among 
these, independence is given an apparent priority. What is noteworthy in this institutional 
building section is the ASEAN’s adoption of a firmer language. The term “should” is used 
deliberately when discussing the attributes of national competition authorities. 
 The Prevalence of Independence 5.1.1.1.
There is widespread agreement that the principle of independence is at the core of 
competition authorities.
757
 However, jurisdictions often differ in their formulation of 
independence. Khemani and Dutz suggested that competition agencies should be insulated 
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from “political and budgetary interference.”758 A competition authority is therefore 
independent when it can exercise its decision making power free from the influences of 
elected and non-elected officials or subjects under their competition law enforcement. It is 
believed that there is a direct correlation between an agency’s independence and its 
improvement in enforcement.
759
 It follows that independence merely serves to ensure 
objective functionality and effectiveness of a competition authority. Objectivity in this 
context could lead in turn to legal certainty in the competition enforcement of the agency. 
The principle of independence in a competition agency is highly regarded by the ASEAN 
as evidenced by the fact that it is the most developed consideration in both Guidelines. The 
ASEAN categorises independence in two interlinked forms: financial and administrative 
independence. The Guidelines I suggest that the AMSs’ competition regulatory body 
should be equipped with the necessary resources and legal powers to carry out their 
responsibilities.
760
 In addition, the determination of the budget of the competition 
regulatory body should be free from political interference. The proposed method in 
achieving financial independence is to separate the competition authority's budget from 
other governmental functions and make it transparent to the public.
761
 In practice, however, 
financial independence is but an illusion. Even with the separation, the competition 
agency’s budget is still generally controlled by the legislature which possesses the power 
to alter it if it is dissatisfied with the performance of the agency. The competition agency 
could resort to self-generated income, for example through the fees for merger notification, 
but it is susceptible to economic growth (“[a]mid a recession, the filings and the funding 
diminish dramatically”).762 Hence, this method of assuring income might not be 
sufficiently reliable to sustain the agency. The other form of independence is 
administrative. The Guidelines I suggest that the AMSs accord the competition authority as 
much administrative independence as necessary and as possible in order to avoid the 
political influence.
763
 In order to achieve this aim, the Guidelines I recommend the 
appointment of independent commission members in charge of the competition regulatory 
body with a fixed term of reasonable duration without the possibility of being dismissed. 
How the appointment is made is left to the discretion of the AMSs. In contrast, the World 
Bank has a more restrictive view of autonomy since it delimits the notion to independence 
in regards to the government.
764
 This means that members of the competition agency 
should be appointed by a committee or the parliament instead of the head of state. Until 
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then, it seemed that the ASEAN broadly followed agreement by consensus on the principle 
of independence. 
Two years later the Guidelines II adopted a sterner position than the Guidelines I. The 
Guidelines II boldly announced that “[t]o be effective, a [competition authority] should be 
independent. Especially it should be free from both political and business influence.”765 In 
this regard, they developed a check-list as follows: 
The [competition authority] should be a distinct statutory authority, free 
from day-to-day ministerial control; 
There should be an appointment according to well-defined professional 
criteria and with the involvement of both the executive and the legislative 
branches of the government; 
Any Head (or equivalent) and members of the adjudicating body should be 
appointed for a fixed-term, with a prohibition on their removal except for 
clearly pre-defined due cause with the appropriate judicial review; 
The term periods of the members of the (collegiate) adjudicating body 
should be staggered (i.e. arranged in alternating or overlapping time 
periods); 
The [competition authority] should have an adequate and reliable source of 
funding; 
There should be adequate salary levels (e.g. through an exemption from 
civil service salary limits); 
The executive should be prevented from overturning the [competition 
agency’s] decisions, or limiting the [competition authority’s] power, unless 
as set out in clearly pre-defined exceptional instances.
766
 
On the other hand, the case for independence is not as straightforward for developing 
economies with a newly adopted competition law culture. Botta contested that in a country 
where competition law has been transplanted into an environment where the concept of 
competition was previously unknown, a competition authority without any link to other 
ministerial bodies is in danger of becoming an isolated institution, incapable of enforcing 
the competition statutes.
767
 Being part of an influential Ministry can help boost the agency 
authority and aid in its actual enforcement against both private entities and other 
governmental bodies. The temporary inclusion of a competition authority within an 
influential Ministry is therefore a more attractive option for most of the AMSs during the 
early stages of competition enforcement. 
Ideally, the competition authority should be independent of both political and financial 
pressure, but remain accountable for the exercise of its powers and expenditure of public 
resources.
768
 Accountability can be achieved in various ways. It can be exhibited through 
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judicial review, the public control of financial resources, direct nomination to the agency 
by executive branch or legislature or through the transparency of the agency. The choices 
made regarding accountability will inevitably affect the degree of independence of the 
authority. 
According to the ASEAN, a competition authority should be accountable to the 
government and/or the legislator, the public and the business community.
769
 In this regard, 
an agency is held accountable for its decisions by every stakeholder. The Guidelines II 
give a comprehensive list describing measures that a competition authority could undertake 
in order to ensure its accountability: 
The competition law and [competition agency’s] statutes should be 
published, clearly specifying the [agency’s] duties, responsibilities, rights 
and obligations; 
Judicial review of the [competition authority’s] decisions should be ensured 
[…]; 
The [competition authority] should be requested to publish annual reports 
on its activities and establish a formal review of its performance by 
independent auditors, and/or an oversight committee of the legislature; 
Rules should be established for the removal of board members if they show 
evidence of misconduct or incompetence; 
All interested parties should be allowed to make submissions to the 
[competition authority] on matters under review; 
The [competition authority] should be mandated to publish its reasoned 
decisions.
770
 
The viability of the judicial review as a means to increase a competition authority’s 
accountability merits closer analysis. “It is widely held that independent judicial review of 
the decisions of competition authorities, whether through the regular courts or through 
administrative tribunals, is desirable for the sake of the fairness and integrity of the 
decision-making process.”771 Its importance is reflected in the inclusion of the right to 
appeal the competition agency’s actions to the nation’s judiciary by every competition law, 
at least as prescribed within its procedures.
772
 
The Guidelines I recognise the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of competition law. 
The document proposes that the AMSs include both direct access to the judicial authority 
and the judicial review of administrative decisions in the enforcement process.
773
 
Regarding the judicial review, the Guidelines I give the AMSs two possible models: either 
an administrative appeal independent of the competition regulatory body or a common 
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judicial authority.
774
 The AMSs could choose to put the entire set of the competition 
authority’s decisions under judicial review, or reserve it for substantive law or procedural 
law.
775
 The Guidelines II later contradicted this suggestion. They insist that it is crucial to 
introduce some limits to the judicial review to allow some degree of deference to the 
competition authority’s decisions.776 It is suggested that the appeal be confined to a 
consideration of the law, including a review of the procedures. The judicial review is 
intended to prevent the court from substituting the competition authority’s decisions or 
undermining them. The role of the judiciary is simply to ascertain whether the competition 
authority has abused its discretionary power. In this context, the judge must accept the 
facts as found by the authority. 
There are some lingering doubts about whether the judiciary in developing economies is 
capable of employing proper economic analyses of the underlying competition principles 
or an understanding of the business practices that may have arisen in the case.
777
 The 
complexity of business practices challenged by the competition authority in the practice of 
competition law demands considerable experience as well as some sophistication in- and 
knowledge of economics. Moreover, in newly developed competition regimes with few 
enforcement decisions, it is impossible for the judiciary to refer to past case law and 
therefore a challenge for the judiciary to pass a precise and accurate competition law-
related judgement. Rodriguez and Menon proposed overcoming the lack of expertise by 
relying on the adversarial court procedure where independent competition law experts are 
invited to give testimony.
778
 The testimony is especially useful when experts disagree, thus 
providing the judiciary with well-rounded information. 
 Other Considerations 5.1.1.2.
The Guidelines I also recognise fairness, equality, transparency, consistency, non-
discriminatory treatment under the law,
779
 confidentiality of commercially sensitive 
information and details of an individual's private affairs,
780
 and due process
781
 among the 
second-tiered values. With the exception of equality, the Guidelines II repeat all 
considerations given in the previous list.
782
 Among the secondary considerations, 
transparency is prominent. Kovacic underlined the importance of maintenance and public 
disclosure of a comprehensive and informative database on competition law 
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enforcement.
783
 Transparency encompasses enforcement standards and procedures and the 
broader issue of the decision-making framework of the agency on various substantive 
antitrust issues.
784
 This type of transparency could help inform the public of on-going 
investigation, leading to better participation by the public and interested parties in the 
enforcement. By communicating detailed and useful information about the enforcement 
system, the competition authority could ensure better legal certainty. Nonetheless, limiting 
administrative discretion might be more feasible in a culture that has rules promoting 
transparency, fairness and suppression of corruption in public administration.
785
 Many new 
and developing jurisdictions might not have such rules. Furthermore, an attempt at 
increased transparency could negatively impact on already scarce financial resources of the 
agency. However, the potential benefits of increased transparency, including greater 
predictability and accountability, for the agency should outweigh its cost.
786
 
Transparency in the administration of competition law enforcement will always be in 
tension with confidentiality. Transparency includes the release of confidential information 
used by the competition agency in its case analysis, even if the analysis does not result in a 
decision.
787
 Much of the information provided by involved parties, competitors, suppliers 
and customers to the competition authority is of the sensitive nature. Making this type of 
information publicly available might damage their legitimate commercial interest affect the 
parties’ cooperation in future cases. 
It appears that each consideration interacts and sometimes contradicts the other. The trade-
off of values is unavoidable. The balance of values is “a quintessential polycentric and 
highly contestable exercise”788 in which there is not a singular model combination. 
Jurisdictions can simply make their choices dependent on the context surrounding their 
competition policy at the time. In this regard, the AMSs must proceed cautiously with their 
balancing of considerations relevant to the adoption of a national competition institution by 
taking into consideration the local political and economic context upon which the 
competition institution is to be constructed. Only then will the likelihood of achieving an 
effective institutional framework for the AMSs be possible. 
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5.1.2. Institutional Models 
From the outset it is essential to understand that the perfect model of competition law 
institution does not exist. Although there is a striking diversity in the design of competition 
institutions,
789
 there are three accepted referential models: the bifurcated judicial model, 
the bifurcated agency model and the integrated agency model.
790
 These models are based 
on how the three principal functions of competition enforcement (investigation, 
enforcement and adjudication) are arranged. However, the differences in experience do not 
necessarily imply significant differences in practical outcomes. The ASEAN readily adopts 
the three models
791
 but exhibits its preference for the integrated agency model. 
 The Bifurcated Judicial Model 5.1.2.1.
Under the bifurcated judicial model, the investigative and enforcement authorities are 
separated.
792
 In addition, they must bring formal complaints before the court for remedial 
relief. The recourse to the judiciary helps elevate the accountability of this model while at 
the same time draws attention to its lack of expertise in the field of competition law. The 
model relies heavily on an effective judicial system. Thus, it would not be suitable for 
countries whose court is perceived to be “corrupt and undependable.” 793 The bifurcated 
judicial model is particularly suitable for criminal offences since it ensures adequate 
standards of due process.While this model could strike a reasonable balance between 
transparency and respect of confidentiality, it will result in a higher cost of administrative 
process which might ultimately affect its efficiency. This model existed in Canada until the 
competition law reform in 1976 but continued with criminal matters under the Canada 
Competition Act
794
 as the Bureau of Competition Policy.
795
 It is currently the model 
followed by the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ). When initiating 
enforcement proceedings, the DOJ relies on federal courts to substantiate its views of the 
US antitrust policy.
796
 While the Antitrust division can bring both criminal and civil cases 
before the court, only civil cases can be subjected to judicial appeal. It is noteworthy that in 
the US the bifurcated judicial model is accompanied by an integrated agency model in the 
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form of the US Federal Trade Commission and is complemented by an established system 
of private enforcement.
797
 
Intriguingly, the ASEAN refers to the bifurcated judicial model as the adversarial judicial 
model. It is possible that the notion “adversarial” conveys the separation of organs and 
powers. According to the ASEAN, “[t]he adversarial judicial model requires the separation 
of the investigative and enforcement functions (entrusted to a specialised agency) and the 
adjudicating powers (entrusted to the law courts).”798 The Guidelines II subsequently 
discarded this model attesting that it was not suitable for the AMSs whose limited 
resources are better allocated to a united institution.
799
 (Thailand is the only member 
adopting this model) 
 The Bifurcated Agency Model 5.1.2.2.
The bifurcated agency model separates investigative and enforcement functions from the 
adjudicating function.
800
 Separated specialised investigative and enforcement agencies 
bring competition complaint before separate specialised adjudicative agencies. This model 
relies on the division of agencies. On the surface, this model is designed to achieve a 
reasonable balance of the numerous values identified earlier in this chapter.
801
 It ensures a 
high level of independence in the performance of the adjudicative function while ensuring 
some degree of accountability through the judicial appeal process. The proceedings are 
transparent with a reasonable degree of respect of confidentiality. However, as seen from 
the Canadian experience, the bifurcated agency model has failed to meet expectations.
802
 
First, a disappointing number of cases have been brought to the Competition Tribunal 
partly because of the preference for compliance over the enforcement approach by both the 
firms and the competition agencies.
803
 It is possible this is to avoid high enforcement costs, 
both temporal and monetary, and the legal uncertainty compared with the compliance 
approach. Second, it would seem that the Competition Tribunal is dominated by judicial 
members, thus undermining its own motive of a specialized adjudicative agency.
804
  
As in the case of the bifurcated judicial model, the ASEAN elects to use the term 
“adversarial agency model”. However, the Guidelines II do not recommend the adversarial 
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agency model.
805
 The bifurcated models are not the preferred alternatives by competition 
law experts and Fox confirmed that “wise designers would not design such a two-headed 
system from scratch.”806 (Vietnam follows this model with the Vietnam Competition 
Authority undertaking the investigation role and the Vietnam Competition Council 
undertaking the enforcement task) 
 The Integrated Agency Model 5.1.2.3.
With the integrated agency model, a single agency incorporates all the functions of 
investigation, enforcement and adjudication.
807
 This model offers a higher level of 
expertise since agency officials and commissioners are involved in all aspects of 
competition law on a daily basis. Naturally, this leads to more consistency throughout the 
process of competition proceedings. The agency undertakes the policy-making function 
through the adoption of guidelines and referential notices. The integrated agency model 
also yields a high level of accountability through its multi-member composition. 
Nonetheless, the integrated agency model has the potential to show partiality since all the 
competition law-related functions are concentrated in a single agency. This concern can 
easily be mitigated through the judicial review. The best known examples of this model are 
the US FTC
808
 and the EU Competition Commission.
809
 
The Guidelines II evidently favour this model, referring to it as the “inquisitorial 
model.”810 The document draws attention to the fact that for competition law to be 
effective within a reasonable time, the AMSs need to efficiently allocate their limited 
resources to a single integrated organ.
811
 Furthermore, since this is the model selected by 
more experienced competition regimes, the ASEAN felt reassured in travelling this path.
812
 
(Most member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Singapore, 
adopt this model) 
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 The ASEAN Expert Group on Competition (AEGC) 5.2.
The ASEAN leaders endorsed the idea of a platform in 2014 which the Blueprint later 
established. This platform was intended to be a network of authorities or agencies to serve 
on a forum to discuss and coordinate competition policies
813
 as at the time there was no 
official ASEAN body for cooperative work on competition policy. Thus, the AEGC was 
established and serves as a network for authorities to exchange experience and institutional 
norms on relevant competition subjects. With the establishment of the AEGC, the ASEAN 
gained its first and only regional competition institution. 
A foreign observer regarded the AEGC as a cooperation channel similar to the ICN and the 
OECD.
814
 The similarity with competition networks like the ICN is easily observed since 
the AEGC shares the same composition consisting of competition authorities and the same 
mission of harmonisation of competition laws with the network forum. What is striking in 
this case is the omission of other forms of regional organisation, especially those with an 
economic integration structure, suggesting that the structure and role of the AEGC is not 
regarded as being regional cooperation. Furthermore, the OECD has been strongly 
criticised for its restrictive membership; membership is reserved for developed 
economies
815
 and its design does not include the intention to cooperate in the field of 
international competition law.
816
 A comparison of the AEGC with the OECD is thus 
inappropriate. This section will instead draw a comparison with other regional cooperation 
organisations and the network dynamic. 
5.2.1. Other Regional Cooperation Organisations 
Small and developing economies stand to benefit the most from regional cooperation, in 
particular with regard to the convergence of competition law.
817
 They tend to have scarce 
resources and little experience in competition law enforcement. Therefore, they are rarely 
in a position to make credible threats to deter anticompetitive conduct, especially from 
foreign companies. Pooling resources at a regional level could help to resolve this issue. In 
addition, regional cooperation could enlarge the scope of competence in the enforcement 
of competition law since restraints on competition would no longer be restricted to one 
nation but would tend to expand across borders. Lastly, regional cooperation could give 
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developing economies an appropriate forum to analyse and consider successful regimes’ 
experiences of competition law enforcement. Considering its many benefits, there has been 
no shortage of regionalisation efforts amongst small and developing jurisdictions.
818
 
The organisation and the function of regional competition law at the global level were 
discussed in Chapter 2 and do not merit repeating in this chapter. What should be retained 
here is the need for regional economic integration and for organisations to establish a 
centralised organ and either a unified or harmonised body of competition rules. For 
instance, the WAEMU and the COMESA both employ the centralised approach with 
provisions for substantive competition law and a centralised organ capable of monitoring 
and investigating intra-regional competition-related cases. The MERCOSUR, on the other 
hand, prefers the harmonisation approach of substantive competition law with two regional 
competition institutions composed of national representatives and national competition 
authorities. The Andean Community adopts a unique downloading approach based on the 
possible transfer of the regional substantive competition rules to national norms. This 
model also has a centralised organ capable of competition law enforcement when the 
regional dimension is present. 
5.2.2. Networks in Competition Law 
The term “network” is often understood as “informal institutions linking actors across 
national boundaries and carrying on various aspects of global governance in new and 
informal ways.”819 Networking can cover various areas including administrative networks 
and judicial networks.
820
 In its trans-governmental form, networking allows national 
officials to interact directly with their foreign counterparts without the supervision or 
mandate of the state. They are not representative of the state and therefore would not 
engage in formal negotiation. The general trait of a network is to create a platform for 
discussion and the exchange of experiences between members. Examining network forums 
of competition law, such as the ICN and the ECN, at this stage is crucial to better 
understand the AEGC in both its architecture and its function. 
 The International Competition Network (ICN) 5.2.2.1.
The most notable form of networking in relation to competition law is the ICN. This was 
founded in 2001 by 16 competition authorities from 14 jurisdictions who believed in the 
potential of a global forum where competition authorities from different jurisdictions could 
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develop and promote methods to address common competition issues.
821
 The ICN 
membership has grown to over 100 competition authorities from numerous jurisdictions.
822
 
Its membership is not exclusively reserved to competition authorities but also includes 
non-governmental advisors who play an essential part, especially within the working group 
whose works includes recommendations and guidelines.
823
 If the ICN has no secretariat, its 
policy and agenda-setting are conducted by a steering group which makes 
recommendations to the ICN, to be adopted on members’ votes.824 
The ICN was established to fill the void left by the WTO when it failed to include 
competition issues in its agenda.
825
 The competition authorities sought a global forum that 
would unite developed and developing economies to discuss practical solutions to their 
common issues. Their wish was granted in 2000 when the US International Competition 
Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) issued a report recommending, amongst other 
suggestions, the creation of a Global Competition Initiative (GCI).
826
 The GCI was meant 
to be a voluntary forum, without the power to make binding obligations or the power of 
adjudication, where competition authorities could discuss and explore their competition 
law experiences and competition issues in the hope of creating close cooperation that could 
eventually lead to harmonisation.
827
 The proposal came unexpectedly since at the time the 
US was pursuing aggressive extra-territoriality doctrine.
828
 The ICPAC Report received a 
warm welcome especially from its European counterpart.
829
 Arguably, it was the joint 
support from the US and the EU that made the concept of the GCI possible. Eventually, the 
term “global” was dropped to avoid offending the anti-globalisation movement and 
replaced with the “International Competition Network” as it has come to be known.830 The 
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term “network” was chosen to underline the importance of close and regular cooperation 
between different competition authorities, organisations and related non-governmental 
advisors. 
The aim of the ICN is to create a worldwide information platform for all competition 
authorities and is built around inclusive participation and transparency.
831
 It provides 
competition authorities with an informal venue to specialise in competition law for 
maintaining regular contact and addressing practical competition concerns. The members 
learn from other competition jurisdictions’ experiences as well as offering their own 
experience on competition issues. The informal dialogue between authorities could serve in 
establishing general consensus and convergence in the global competition community. An 
exchange of information with respect to specific cases does not take place and only non-
confidential information is shared. The ICN functions through working groups 
concentrating on offering practical solutions to specific global competition issues. It has 
studied a variety of competition issues including advocacy, agency effectiveness, cartels, 
mergers and unilateral conduct. The recommendations of the working groups are then 
presented at the annual conference where they are debated and usually adopted by the 
members. While the ICN recommendations are not legally binding on its members’ 
jurisdictions they have a certain persuasive power to convince competition authorities to 
implement them in their national competition laws. Fox deduced that the ICN’s 
recommendations are highly regarded as “soft obligations” since they are the product of 
experts in the focused issues.
832
 
The ICN is an undoubted success.
833
 Despite its restrictive characteristics, the ICN has, 
impressively, succeeded in providing a blueprint or a reference to different national 
competition authorities to adopt or adapt their domestic laws. Its success is in part due to 
the composition of the working groups which consist of experts in relevant areas who work 
on challenges and propose feasible solutions. The wide adoption of the Guiding 
Principles
834
 and Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures
835
 bears 
testimony to the ICN’s success. Motta corroborated the ICN involvement with the 
development of competition policy in developing economies.
836
 Nations’ implementation 
and use of the ICN’s work have harmonised the global merger process, reduced costs, 
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facilitated the merger process and eliminated eventual conflicts.
837
 In essence, the 
existence of the ICN “strengthens incentives for jurisdictions to seek convergence because 
convergence allows for deeper and broader cooperation.”838 Accordingly, the ICN 
participates in the harmonisation process of competition law. 
The ICN’s strength is also its weakness. Participation depends solely on the willingness of 
the competition authorities. The level of participation from non-core members, especially 
those from developing competition regimes, is predictably limited by the lack of funds, 
time, expertise and sometimes language restrictions.
839
 Resource-restricted countries can 
rarely participate in the discussion and the development of recommendations. 
Consequently, even with the inclusive agenda of the ICN, underrepresentation from 
developing economies is still in effect. The ICN is aware of this situation and encourages 
better involvement from non-active members.
840
 Another disadvantage of the ICN is the 
absence of a reliable method of assessment on the influence of the ICN on the 
implementation or adaptation of domestic competition law or enforcement. The most 
common method of assessment is the questionnaires completed by participating members. 
 The European Competition Network (ECN) 5.2.2.2.
It is impossible to examine network of competition authorities without mentioning the 
ECN since it is renowned within the regional integration structure. The ECN is credited 
with offering a direct response to the changing realities of the EU, particularly in terms of 
the increasing diversity among member states. A renewed approach is needed to address 
the variety of local contexts.
841
 Regulation 1/2003 abolished the centralised individual 
exemption regime in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU and decentralised the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by granting national courts and national 
competition authorities, alongside with the European Commission, the power to apply 
these provisions. It also formed a network, named the ECN, of national competition 
authorities and the Commission.
842
 Even before its conception, the ECN was destined to be 
“a network of authorities operating on common principles and in close collaboration.”843 
                                                 
837
 Fingleton, John, The International Competition Network: Building on Success, 6 Competition L. Int’l 5 
(2010). 
838
 Raustiala, Kal, The Architect of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future 
of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int. Law 92 (2002). 
839
 Fox, Eleanor M., Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 Int’l Law 151 (2009). 
840
 ICN, The Welcome Track: Getting New and Non-Active ICN Members Engaged 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1026.pdf>. 
841
 Gerard, Damien M. B., ‘The ECN - Network Antitrust Enforcement in the European Union’ in Ioannis, 
Lianos and Gerard, Damien M. B. (eds), Handbook On European Competition Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2013). 
842
 Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementations of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 101 and 
102 of the Treaty [2003]. 
843
 Commission White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Article 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU [1999]. 
125 
 
The ECN exercises its cooperation mechanism through an informal case allocation and 
extensive information exchange between competition authorities.
844
 
In contrast to the ICN, the conception of the ECN was not without its sceptics. Most 
notable were concerns about the ECN’s ability to achieve its objectives and the issues of 
legal certainty and due process.
845
 Moreover, the composition of the ECN is unbalanced. It 
has been accused of granting greater hierarchical importance to the Commission.
846
 It 
follows that the ECN “could best be described as an informal jurisdiction allocation regime 
surrounded with information exchange mechanisms, rather than a multi-level policy 
network.”847 The ECN’s origin diverges from the understanding of a network mentioned in 
the previous section since it is a formal institution born out of a centralised plan whose 
principal endeavour is to facilitate better coordination amidst greater diversity among 
member states. Even if the national competition authorities were to achieve individual 
connection through opportunities provided by the ECN, this is in no way the intended 
principal purpose of this network. 
5.2.3. The AEGC as a Distinctive Regional Competition Organisation 
The AEGC membership encompasses the AMSs’ national competition authorities or 
agencies associated with competition policy enforcement. The use of “expert” is a false 
denomination since it exclusively includes national competition authorities or related 
governmental officials. In this regard, private entities with knowledge and experience in 
the area are deliberately excluded. The AEGC is organised into five working groups that 
concentrate on pressing issues of competition law within the region: the establishment of 
the ASEAN regional guidelines; the handbook of competition policy; capacity building; 
and regional competition advocacy. Each working group is supported by different AMSs 
on a rotating basis. The rotating chairmanship of each working group reflects the 
chairmanship of the ASEAN Secretariat. It is possible that this is to factor in the ASEAN’s 
operational financing challenge and to encourage better participation from the host 
members. 
The AEGC reaffirmed its objectives as follow: 
Strengthening competition-related policy capabilities and best practices 
among AMSs, developing the “ASEAN Regional Guidelines on 
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Competition Policy” and compiling a “Handbook on Competition Policy 
and Law in ASEAN for Business.” […] 
For advocacy and outreach purposes, the launch of the Regional Guidelines 
and Handbook was followed by region-wide socialisation workshops in 
several AMSs with government officials and the private sectors as the target 
beneficiaries. These two publications and the subsequent workshops were 
intended to help foster a level playing field, raise awareness concerning fair 
business competition among the regional enterprises and trans-national 
businesses, and ultimately enhance the economic performance and 
competitiveness of the ASEAN region. 
Capacity building and intra- and extra-regional networking is another focus 
of the AEGC. Other focal activities for completion in the medium-term are 
the development of Strategy and Tools for Regional Advocacy on CPL, 
strengthening the Core Competencies in competition policy and law as well 
as the finalization of AEGC Capacity Building Roadmap. 
A multi-year programme is currently being implemented to improve and 
enhance competition-related institutional building, legal frameworks, and 
advocacy capabilities at the regional and national level.
848
 
In its own words, the AEGC is a network of competition authorities concentrating on 
competition advocacy, aiding the AMSs with their construction of national competition 
law, and providing a networking forum among the AMSs as well as with external entities. 
The use of the word “socialisation” is certainly cogent in this instance since it demonstrates 
a deviation from the purpose of coordination as appeared in the Blueprint.
849
 It is 
essentially a networking organ concentrating on assisting the AMSs in their development 
of competition laws. This is echoed in the activities which strongly recommend 
conferences and workshops with foreign partners in a bid to provide foreign technical 
assistance. 
Most noteworthy in the functioning of the AEGC is the absence of the peer review system. 
In the voluntary peer review process, countries are free to submit their competition law 
regimes to the scrutiny of their peers without any obligation to implement the 
recommendations given during the review process. Scrutiny of any nation’s competition 
enforcement regime should be undertaken regularly. “Every jurisdiction at regular intervals 
should undertake a basic evaluation of the effectiveness of its competition policy 
institutions.”850 Conducting peer reviews of national competition laws and policies is 
regarded as the key function for both the OECD and the UNCTAD. Through the peer 
reviews, multilateral organisations evaluate competition law regimes and recommend how 
best to increase their effectiveness. The reviews are usually thorough and deal with both 
regulatory and structural issues. In the OECD, the review prepared by its internal staff is 
presented to the OECD members or the Global Forum on Competition. During the 
presentation, participating countries are encouraged to comment and the target country is 
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welcome to answer questions and explain its policy. While there is no legal obligation to 
implement the recommendations, there is encouragement for countries to make legitimate 
domestic change. The reviews are taken seriously and are the object of national public 
debates. A negative peer review from the OECD members would imply a need for 
domestic change or risk losing face.
851
 It follows that peer reviews can be used to broker 
domestic changes to the law. While the peer review lacks binding obligations, peer 
pressure compensates for this and acts as a strong motivation to change. The UNCTAD has 
a peer review system similar to that of the OECD. In this case, peer reviews are conducted 
by different competition experts who provide an objective assessment of a competition law 
regime to identify its shortcomings. They propose suggestions and offer technical 
assistance when needed. The UNCTAD peer review exercise is unique in its development 
perspective and its rich experience in working with developing economies. The AEGC’s 
omission of such a beneficial function would eventually reduce its importance to a mere 
“talking-shop”852 focusing more on discussion than productive work. However, the 
absence of the peer review exercise is not the only difference separating the AEGC from 
the UNCTAD and the OECD. Notwithstanding the composition which focuses on 
geographic proximity in Southeast Asia, the AEGC is distinctively dissimilar to the OECD 
and the UNCTAD due to its integration mission whereas both the OECD and the 
UNCTAD aim to promote policies that will improve social and economic well-being. 
As a communication forum exclusively related to competition policy within the regional 
integration structure, it is difficult to compare the AEGC with other institutions. In contrast 
to other regional organisations, the AEGC as the ASEAN’s sole regional organ relating to 
competition policy is not equipped with the power to enforce or monitor the AMSs’ 
enforcement of the law. Yet, the AEGC is expected to act as the harbinger of the 
harmonisation of the AMSs’ competition laws. It is possible that the AEGC shares 
similarities with the network forum, in particular, the ICN. Both are networks comprising 
competition authorities (although in the case of the ICN not exclusively so) who are not 
representatives of their states. They share the same objective of better harmonisation of 
competition laws between members through discussion. It is within the membership 
requirement where they diverge since the AEGC is exclusively reserved for the AMSs and 
therefore has to serve the regional integration aim of the ASEAN. There have been 
concerns that the function of the AEGC and the ICN may overlap. However, the AEGC 
could act as a complementary institution by providing a more comfortable socialisation 
platform for the AMSs with reference to the fact that there is under participation from 
developing economies in the ICN. Regardless of its potential, the AEGC does not officially 
count the ICN among its external partners, although some AMSs do.
853
 The AEGC is also 
different from the ECN, another networking group within the regional integration 
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structure. The only similarity shared with the ECN is that it is a network platform for 
competition authorities in the construction of regional economic integration. Both 
organisations differ greatly in their objectives. The AEGC is not constructed to aid better 
relations with the central competition enforcement organ since the ASEAN simply does 
not have one. 
In conclusion, the AEGC is a distinctive regional competition institution in its organisation 
and role. It is the sole competition policy organ for regional economic integration without 
the ability to either enforce or monitor law enforcement by the member states. In this 
regard, it is unlike other regional competition-related organs and more resembles a 
competition law network at international level. Nonetheless, it is not without its virtue. One 
of the main factors explaining the failure cooperation between competition law authorities 
is their mistrust of each other.
854
 Thus, a forum reuniting different national competition 
authorities may be the only occasion when they can meet each other to facilitate future 
day-to-day cooperation.
855
 Though the effect of such a forum is not immediate, general 
benefits derived from it should not be easily discarded. While the AEGC may lack the 
common attributes of other regional competition organs and have questionable measures to 
realise regional harmonisation, its communication forum service is unquestionably useful 
for the AMSs in their first endeavour to regional integration. 
 Resolving Regional Competition Issues with Extraterritoriality and 5.3.
Cooperation 
The internationalisation of markets gave rise to global competition problems such as the 
disconnection between antidumping laws and predatory pricing, jurisdictional gaps 
allowing export cartels, parochial use of measures that immunise private action, and the 
lack of a coherent view of world competition and trade and competition problems.
856
 
Having an effective competition law regime is important to address the issue of cross-
border competition dispute, in particular, since international cartels are more likely to have 
significant economic effect to trade in developing economies.
857
 Yet, developing 
economies rarely apply their laws to such conduct.
858
 The importance is intensified in the 
context of a regional integrated market where cross-border disputes are unavoidable. In its 
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pursuit of a regional economic integration, the ASEAN needs a mechanism to address 
foreign or national conduct with anticompetitive consequences for the region. 
If the ASEAN had set its sight on the creation of regional economic integration, it failed, 
however, to foresee the necessity for a mechanism to deal with the inevitable competition 
issues at regional level as became evident in 2013, when it was noted that the ASEAN did 
not have an appropriate mechanism to deal with competition-related cross-border 
disputes.
859
 That assessment is still applicable today. The Guidelines I suggest resolving 
regional competition infringements through the extraterritorial application of national 
competition law
860
 or through regional cooperation,
861
 while the Guidelines II remain silent 
in this matter, preferring instead to concentrate solely on national institutional building. 
The ASEAN’s choice to make extraterritoriality and regional cooperation equal 
alternatives to compensate for its lack of a central mechanism is peculiar considering that 
cooperation is usually regarded as the measure to curb the effects of the unilateral assertion 
of national law presented in the principle of extraterritoriality.
862
 Nonetheless, on the scale 
of global competition law, the use of extraterritoriality in combination with cooperation are 
regarded as the most visible and effective answer to international anticompetitive 
practice.
863
 
5.3.1. Extraterritoriality 
Historically, the foremost solution to solving the problem of global anticompetitive 
practice has been to extend the scope of national law by applying it extraterritorially. The 
ASEAN advised the AMSs to include a provision on the extraterritorial application of 
national competition law in the Guidelines I.
864
 This particular recommendation 
subsequently disappeared from the Guidelines II, ostensibly because of the focus on 
competition institutional building. There are implications of this simple suggestion, 
although appearing only once, for the regional economic integration ambitions of the 
ASEAN. By definition, there is a discernible conflict between extraterritoriality as an 
expression of the unilateral approach of competition law and the regional approach of the 
ASEAN. It is difficult to understand how promoting this unilateral approach could help the 
ASEAN achieve its regional integration goal. 
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As a result of globalisation, physical conduct in one country could have harmful economic 
effects in another. Certain countries believe that it is imperative to address all forms of 
harmful economic conduct whether it originates from within or outside their territories.
865
 
For this reason, they extend the reach of competition law beyond their territories. The term 
“extraterritoriality” generally refers to “the power to secure the enforcement of the law 
outside the jurisdiction in which the law was made.”866 This idea expands the traditional 
jurisdiction principle that authorises a state to regulate conduct in its territory, by 
authorising a state to regulate conduct that occurs outside its territory when that conduct 
has particular effects within its territory.
867
 
On the basis of the traditional territorial principle, a country is able to enact law and 
enforce it only within its national borders. As ensconced in the Lotus case: “[…] all that 
can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law 
places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its 
sovereignty.”868 In this regard, “jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty”869 and is thus 
limited to the latter. However, when globalisation began reducing the importance of 
national borders, the principle of territoriality began to be incompatible with world 
progress.
870
 The traditional approach, applying the principle of territoriality, would prevent 
countries from protecting their legitimate interests from conduct or behaviour occurring 
outside their national borders. This disparity presents companies with an opportunity to 
engage in harmful conduct abroad without facing punishment back in their home state. 
Moreover, certain countries could transform into competition law “havens”871 by attracting 
private firms wishing to avoid competition regulations in their home countries. 
Accordingly, an exception to the principle of territoriality was necessary and inevitable.
872
 
The Lotus case recognised this problem and in the judgment it was stated that “[f]ar from 
laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application 
of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their 
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited 
in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable […]”873 Admitting an 
extension of national law makes it possible for countries to extend their jurisdiction beyond 
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their national boundaries in certain situations. In this age of globalisation, it has become 
increasingly difficult to disagree with the principle of extraterritoriality. 
It is essential to commence with an examination of other jurisdictions’ experience with 
extraterritoriality before questioning the AMSs’ ability to handle extraterritorial 
applications of national competition law. 
 Leading Jurisdictions’ Experiences 5.3.1.1.
The Extraterritorial Application of the US Antitrust Law 
The US is one of the first to adopt the principle of extraterritoriality in competition law.
874
 
The antitrust policy in the US has been shaped largely by a triad of early legislations: the 
Sherman Act,
875
 the Clayton Act
876
 and the Robinson-Patman Act
877
 each plays a 
significant role in local and foreign business. The Sherman Act imposes criminal penalties 
on antitrust violation by both interstate and foreign commerce.
878
 Criminal prosecution 
under this Act is usually confined to traditional violations of the law including price-fixing, 
bid-rigging and other cartel-like conduct considered unlawful in most countries.
879
 The 
Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act by including prohibitions against interlocking 
directorates, exclusive dealing, tying of deals and acquisitions with the potential to 
substantially decrease competition or create monopolies. Similar to the Sherman Act, the 
Clayton Act’s non-criminal penalties also apply to commerce “among the several states and 
to foreign nations.”880 Finally, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits large retailers from 
selling goods at discriminatorily low prices that could disadvantage small retailers.
881
 
Although the Robinson-Patman Act only prohibits price discrimination within the US, the 
Anti-Dumping Act
882
 applies similar prohibitions to foreign commerce. Extraterritorial 
concern was one of the factors in each of these Acts. Each provides an important measure 
to attain the two principal goals of US antitrust law – to preserve competition and 
economic efficiency in the market.
883
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The US courts’ interpretation of the antitrust statutes has been important in developing the 
doctrine of extraterritoriality over the years. The US effects doctrine dated back to Sisal
884
 
which ruled that jurisdiction under the US antitrust law may be asserted in relation to 
conduct taking place both within and outside the US national borders. Sisal marked an 
important departure from the traditional territorial approach whereby the court admitted 
that the US competition law did not apply to activities occurring outside the US’s national 
boundaries
885
 and paved the way for the development of the US effects doctrine. 
Subsequently, Alcoa
886
 heralded the effects principle in which the US courts have 
jurisdiction and the Sherman Act applies if foreigners acting abroad with the intent to affect 
the US commerce caused a direct effect as intended. By focusing solely on the US 
interests, the court failed to take into consideration legitimate foreign interests that created 
friction between the US and other countries who claimed it was a clear violation of 
international law.
887
 In response to criticisms and threats of retaliation by foreign 
governments, the US courts
888
 made an attempt to apply restrictions to the US 
extraterritorial doctrine. They decided that they may not require foreign firms acting in 
their home territory to do what their home governments forbid or to abstain from doing 
what the home government requires.
889
 Such an order would undoubtedly intrude on other 
nations’ sovereignty. The balancing principle states that the courts either lack jurisdiction 
or should refrain from exercising jurisdiction if foreign nations’ and foreign nationals’ 
interests in the non-application of the US law outweigh US interests.
890
 In Timberlane II, 
the Circuit Court held that in asserting national jurisdiction, a court should examine “(1) 
the effect or intended effect on the foreign commerce of the United States; (2) the type and 
magnitude of the alleged illegal behaviour; and (3) the appropriateness of exercising 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considerations of international comity or fairness.”891 
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the Timberlane factor is called into question in Laker 
when the Court held that it is incommensurable to balance foreign interests with domestic 
interests.
892
 
Hartford Fire
893
 announced an important shift from the balancing test in the 
extraterritoriality doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act applies to 
“foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect 
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in the United States.”894 Consequently, “passing the effects test is virtually as easy as 
showing that a particular transaction or business practice falls within the rubric of interstate 
commerce […]. Effects can almost always be found.”895 After Hartford Fire, the District 
Courts remained divided. Some Courts held that Hartford Fire did not overrule 
Timberlane
896
 and merely added another principle to the doctrine of extraterritoriality, 
while others followed Hartford Fire.
897
 
Afterward, Empagran
898
 tried to refine the decision in Hartford Fire. The Court looked 
into the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA)
899
 and found that it was 
designed to limit “but not to expand in any significant way the Sherman Act’s scope as 
applied to foreign commerce.”900 It steered the extraterritoriality doctrine back to its 
original track by ending the Hartford Fire’s trend of excessive expansion of the US 
antitrust law. The Court admitted that interference with foreign sovereignty is admissible 
in so far that there is domestic injury involved. In order to further clarify the exception of 
domestic injury, the Court distinguished between dependent and independent effect to US 
commerce. If the domestic injury is independent from the foreign harm, foreign plaintiffs 
could not bring their claim before the US courts. Regrettably, the Court did not give 
sufficient indication as to what it considered dependent effect to the US commerce and 
therefore even after Empagran, the courts remain divided on the question of 
extraterritoriality.
901
 It appears that Empagran has left more judicial uncertainty on the 
question of extraterritoriality.
902
 
The US experience has reflected the unpredictable nature of the doctrine of 
extraterritoriality. It seems that extraterritoriality will continue being used differently by 
different courts. Some courts might favour a more restrictive application while others may 
be in favour of a more expansive application of extraterritoriality. Waller predicted that 
“years of additional litigation or statutory change will be necessary to resolve this critical 
question.”903 
                                                 
894
 Ibid, para 2909. 
895
 Brockbank, Dean, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law 
Continues to Expand, 2 J. Int'l Legal Stud. 1 (1996). 
896
 See, e.g., Metro Indus. Inc. V. Sammi Corp. [1996] 82 F.3d 839, 846; Filetech SARL v. France Telecom 
[1997] 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Trugman-Nash Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Board [1997] 945 F. 
Supp. 733, 736. 
897
 See, for example, United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd. [1997] 109 F.3d 1; Caribbean Broad 
Sys. V. Cable and Wireless Plc. [1998] 148 F.3d 1080. 
898
 Hoffman - La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran [2004] S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359. 
899
 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a [1982]. 
900
 Empagran, para. 159. 
901
 See, for instance, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [2004] 124 S. Ct. 2466. (Rejected the 
narrow view in Empagran in favour of a broader one despite strong objection from the European 
Competition Commission). 
902
 Mehrar, Salil K., More is Less: A Law-and-Economics Approach to the International Scope of Private 
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 47 (2004). 
903
 Waller, Spencer Weber, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 343 (2002). 
134 
 
The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Competition Law 
The EU competition law shares some similarities with the US antitrust, yet still differs in 
many fundamental respects. Even though the European doctrine of extraterritoriality is 
younger and the pursuit of extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction is less vigorous than that 
of the US, it should not be underestimated.
904
 Dissimilarly from the US experience, the 
EU’s doctrine of extraterritoriality does not find its foundation within the Treaties; instead 
the doctrine has been established by the Commission and the judiciary. Articles 101 and 
102 of TFEU prohibit certain conduct that affects trade between member states and has an 
anticompetitive effect within the Common Market. The Commission later clarified that the 
effect must be “appreciable” which means more than “de minimis” but less than 
“substantial.”905 Similarly to the US experience, however, are the historical changes the 
doctrine has undergone throughout the years. Generally, there are three accepted doctrines 
in the EU regarding extraterritoriality: the single economic entity; the implementation; and 
the effects doctrine. 
It was in Grosfillex
906
 that the Commission first considered the effects doctrine. The 
Commission reasoned that the EU competition law regime was compatible with the 
“effects” doctrine since the territorial scope of the EU competition law was determined 
neither by the domicile of the firm nor by where the agreement was concluded or carried 
out. The decisive criterion here is whether an agreement affects competition within the 
Common Market. Grosfillex made it clear that the Commission fully embraced the US 
extraterritorial doctrine. 
The Dyestuffs
907
 judgment marked the first occasion when the CJEU was invited to express 
its view on the doctrine of extraterritoriality. However, the CJEU avoided the question of 
extraterritoriality, preferring instead to rely on the doctrine of economic entity. The Court 
held that jurisdiction should be asserted on the basis of the principle of territoriality by 
relying on the existence of a single economic entity. In this case, the CJEU ruled that the 
parent company, which was non-EU-based, exercised control over the strategic business 
behaviour of its EU-based subsidiary. Therefore, the participation of the subsidiary in 
illegal conduct could be attributed to the parent company even though the latter was non-
EU-based. On this basis, Article 101 TFEU could be applied to the foreign-based company 
without having to resort to the doctrine of extraterritoriality. The group economic unit 
doctrine is considered “the most established basis in EC competition law for asserting 
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jurisdiction over foreign companies.”908 Historically, the CJEU’s position reflected that of 
the EU’s politics which at that time fervently criticised the use of extraterritoriality by the 
US.
909
 
The CJEU would later establish a different doctrine called the “implementation” doctrine 
in the Wood Pulp case.
910
 It held that the EU competition law could only apply 
extraterritorially when the price-fixing agreement was implemented within the EU. The 
decisive factor was the location where the conduct occurred. If the conduct was 
implemented within the EU, then its competition law would apply. In this case, the price-
fixing agreement was established within the Internal Market, thus the CJEU was entitled to 
apply the EU competition law to non-EU-based undertakings. It is irrelevant whether 
foreign undertakings implemented the conduct through subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents or 
branches within the EU. Under this doctrine, foreign conduct or behaviour would be in 
violation of the EU competition law, not on the ground of its effects within the Internal 
Market but because it had the effect of implementing the infringement. 
In 2004, the Commission adopted the Guidelines on Effects on Trade between Member 
States
911
 as part of the Commission’s modernisation package. The Guidelines demonstrate 
the Commission’s desire to fully embrace the extraterritoriality doctrine by providing that 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU “apply to agreements and practices that are capable of 
affecting trade between Member States even if one or more of the parties are located 
outside the Community.”912 Moreover, the EU competition law applies regardless of the 
location of the undertakings or the location where the agreement has been concluded 
provided that the agreement or practice is either implemented or produces effects inside the 
Union.
913
 In the end, the Commission chose to compromise by combining the CJEU 
implementation doctrine with the US effects principle. 
The principle of extraterritoriality also has significance in the case of mergers, especially 
with the pre-merger notification requirement that gives competition authorities an 
opportunity to assert jurisdiction over non-EU companies. The most notable instrument 
was the Regulation 139/2004.
914
 The EUMR gives the Commission the power to assert 
jurisdiction over mergers, takeovers, certain joint ventures and the purchase of minority 
controlling interests provided that the concentration has a Community dimension.
915
 The 
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Commission became the central authority with regard to concentration operations. The 
EUMR’s “Community dimension” is a broad concept implying that it is not indispensable 
for merger operations to have an effect in the EU provided that the financial threshold is 
met. Therefore, the Commission could assert control over non-EU-based parties even 
though the merger operation only produces minimal or no effect within the Community. 
The Commission’s pursuit of the extraterritoriality doctrine, as demonstrated in 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
916
 when the Commission based its analysis on the possible 
effect on the market after the merger operation, was categorised as an aggressive form of 
the effects doctrine.
917
 
At this stage, a question has been raised about the possible incompatibility of the 
Commission’s application of the effects doctrine with the CJEU’s implementation 
doctrine. On the surface, the two doctrines seem incompatible since the EUMR could only 
be applied with the effects doctrine. Gencor
918
 provided that the EUMR does not require 
the company concerned to be incorporated or established in the EU. The GCEU ruled that 
the EUMR is compatible with public international law if the merger operation’s effects 
within the EU are immediate, substantial and foreseeable.
919
 It further concluded that the 
concept of the Community dimension in the EUMR is consistent with the implementation 
doctrine as established in Wood Pulp by the CJEU. Another notable merger case is 
GE/Honeywell.
920
 This case marks the first time that US antitrust authorities approved a 
merger between US-based multinational companies only to be stopped by the European 
Commission.
921
 On appeal, the GCEU confirmed the Commission’s decision and 
dismissed GE’s action for annulment.922 This case provoked heavy criticism from the US. 
In particular, the Commission was accused of protecting competitors and not the 
competition process.
923
 
The seeds of divergence between the positions of the US and the EU rested primarily on 
the different tests used at the time. The US used the “substantial lessening of the 
competition” test924 in which a merger will be prohibited if it leads to substantial lessening 
of the competition. On the other hand, the EU employed the “dominance” test925 in which a 
merger will not be approved if it creates or strengthens a dominant position which will 
significantly or substantially impede competition in the Common Market. This test would 
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later be modified in the EUMR by relegating the question of dominance from the sole 
consideration to the main consideration. Fox claimed the change was provoked by US 
influence.
926
 While the EU clearly asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Commission is 
more constrained in its use of unilateral application of the EU competition law because of 
the attitude of the member states who have expressed an aversion to the doctrine of 
extraterritoriality.
927
 
 Retaliation to Extraterritoriality 5.3.1.2.
While the principle of extraterritoriality has been validated, it remains a natural source of 
conflict. Foreign governments have objected vehemently to the aggressive use of the 
doctrine. These reactions are not surprising since the question of jurisdiction is related to 
sovereignty.
928
 In this regard, excessive pursuit of extraterritoriality can be interpreted as 
an act of aggression towards a country's sovereignty. The foreign sovereigns’ reactions 
range from soft diplomatic protests to strong retaliation statutes. 
Diplomatic protest by foreign governments against extraterritorial assertion of domestic 
competition laws is the most common and immediate reaction.
929
 Foreign governments 
usually protest that such assertion adversely affects the legitimate interests of the countries 
concerned and constitutes an intrusion into their domestic affairs.
930
 Nonetheless, it is by 
far the least efficient reaction since few diplomatic protests have led to fruitful solutions.
931
 
The unproductiveness of diplomatic protests has forced countries to take unilateral steps in 
retaliation to extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction. Countries started introducing the 
same effects doctrine in their territory,
932
 thus aiding in the generalisation of 
extraterritoriality. Another retaliatory option is to enact blocking statutes. These blocking 
statutes aim at prohibiting nationals, who are the subject of competition law investigations 
by foreign authorities, from complying with requests or orders issued by the latter.
933
 The 
scope of these blocking laws can be broad, ranging from impeding discovery outside of the 
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territory of the enacting country
934
 to rendering certain types of foreign competition law 
judgment unenforceable in domestic courts.
935
 In light of these blocking laws, an attempt 
by foreign authorities to apply their competition laws extraterritorially would be difficult. 
Nonetheless, the proportionality of the blocking statutes in response to extraterritoriality 
has been called into question. These blocking measures are regarded as too drastic
936
 and 
could trigger more conflicts between countries. However, resorting to such drastic 
measures shows meaningful desperation on behalf of the blocking country in the face of 
what it perceives as a highly intrusive extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction on its 
sovereignty. 
Countries have also enacted legislation seeking to recover damages paid in satisfaction of 
foreign antitrust judgments. The UK was one of the first countries to enact such a statute. It 
adopted the Protection of Trade Interests Act
937
 in response to a perceived increase in 
aggressiveness in the extraterritorial enforcement of the US antitrust and trade law.
938
 This 
type of legislation is commonly known as the clawback statute.
939
 It makes it possible for 
defendants who have paid multiple damage judgment in a foreign country to recover the 
multiple portions of that judgment from the successful plaintiff.
 
It is obvious that the 
language used in the clawback statute, such as “multiple damage judgment,” is aimed at 
the treble damages available under the US antitrust law.
940
 Nonetheless, this legislation 
lacks international law support and is based solely on the desire to protect British nationals 
and businesses from what the UK perceives as the American’s excessive assertion of 
jurisdiction.
941
 Similar clawback laws have been enacted in other countries such as 
Canada
942
 and Australia.
943
 
The doctrine of extraterritoriality is essentially unilateral. It is designed to protect nations’ 
legitimate interests outside their territories in the absence of a multilateral framework, 
bilateral cooperation, or regional convergence. The validity of the doctrine is not contested 
since it is a natural advancement under globalisation but extraterritoriality needs to be 
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tamed in order to avoid the limitlessness of the manner in which it is used. Its aggressive 
application tends to create more foes than friends and harms international relations 
between countries. Animosity at regional level would injure any attempt at cooperation 
thus further hamper efforts to establish harmonised competition law within the ASEAN. In 
recent years, the tension created by extraterritoriality seems to be on the decline. This is 
principally a result of the proliferation of competition laws around the world
944
 and more 
understanding and acceptance of other countries’ extraterritoriality even when it affects 
their own territoriality.
945
 After Gencor, the South African government did not call into 
question the EU’s jurisdiction, and merely expressed its preference for intervention in 
specific cases of collusion when they arose rather than the outright prohibition of the 
transaction.
946
 It is not uncommon for small jurisdictions to “free ride”947 on the 
enforcement efforts of more developed jurisdictions. Other authors have recognised the 
possibility that the effective extraterritorial application of foreign competition law to 
conduct committed by an international cartel may protect a developing economy with 
either a weaker or no competition regime.
948
 In addition, the promotion of bilateral and 
regional cooperation seems to have considerably reduced the friction caused by 
extraterritoriality. 
 Extraterritoriality and the AMSs 5.3.1.3.
There are some lingering doubts about whether the AMSs are capable of extraterritorially 
and whether they are able to enforce their national laws to regional problems within the 
region. First, the principle of extraterritoriality as a whole relies heavily on a country's 
ability to exert its political and economic power.
949
 Furthermore, “[e]xtraterritoriality is an 
efficient tool for large jurisdictions that possess sufficient power over foreign firms to 
command obedience. Small ones often lack the requisite power to discipline foreign 
entities that harm them. It is thus not surprising that most do not have developed doctrines 
of extraterritoriality […].”950 Countries with strong economic and political persuasive 
power coupled with a more established system of competition law possess the necessary 
tools to extend their competition laws to extend their reach. They can also do so in a more 
aggressive manner than others. This is not surprising since only stronger states are able to 
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extend their jurisdiction to where their interests lie in order to control, what they perceived 
to be, conduct harmful to their interests. On the other hand, weaker states do not have the 
capacity to extend their reach of domestic laws to undertakings originating from stronger 
states and may fear of economic and political retaliation. Their inability to effectively 
enforce competition law could lead to a legal vacuum where the behaviour is never 
enforced under any competition law regime. This is particularly true when the harm is 
confined only to the national territory or when such conduct produces positive effects 
elsewhere. Moreover, an attempt to enforce competition law by a perceived weaker 
jurisdiction could potentially result in negative welfare effect.
951
 For instance, external 
constituencies could exit the national market, leaving the market more vulnerable than 
before the competition law enforcement. At the same time,  the limited resources made 
available to new and developing competition law authorities prevent them from extending 
their enforcement reach.
952
 The limited resources, both financial and human, can be more 
severely felt in the field of extraterritoriality since the proof of anticompetitive conduct by 
foreign firms, especially in the case of international cartels, is costly in both time and 
money.
953
 
Currently, only two AMSs’ competition laws contain extraterritoriality provisions. The 
Malaysia Competition Act applies to behaviours outside Malaysia having an effect on 
competition in any market in Malaysia.
954
 The language used hints at the effect doctrine. In 
addition, Singapore’s competition law is explicitly applicable to conduct and agreements 
outside Singapore insofar as there is appreciable object or affect competition within 
Singapore
955
 or in the case of abuse of dominant position, in so far as there is a negative 
effect on competition within Singapore.
956
 This reach is more extensive than that of the EU 
legislation.
957
 Ong explained that this wide-ranging measure is necessary for Singapore 
because of its small and open economy that is highly reliant on imported commerce, 
although he expressed his concerns over practical enforcement limitations.
958
 
There are some examples of AMSs use of extraterritoriality. One such example is the case 
involving Singapore, in Ball Bearings,
959
 which involved the violation of Section 34 of the 
Singapore Competition Act (SCA) on the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements by the 
Japanese parent companies and Singaporean subsidiaries. The Commission decided that 
the jurisdiction should be asserted on the basis of the principle of the territoriality by 
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relying on the existence of a single economic entity. In this case, the Japanese parent 
companies exerted a decisive influence over the behaviour of the Singaporean subsidiaries 
and were therefore jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed by the 
subsidiaries.
960
 On this basis, the SCA could be applied to the foreign-based company 
without having to resort to the doctrine of extraterritoriality enshrined in Section 33(1) 
SCA. This decision is reminiscent of the CJEU Dyestuffs doctrine of economic entity which 
was also cited in Ball Bearings. The same analysis continued in Freight Forwarders
961
 but 
with the addition of the application of Section 33(1) read in light of Section 34 SCA. The 
Commission found that the subsidiaries’ violation could be attributable to foreign parent 
companies in accordance with the doctrine of single economic unity. It ruled that Section 
34 SCA was applicable to the parent companies’ anticompetitive agreements carried out 
outside Singapore’s territory in accordance with the doctrine of extraterritoriality in 
Section 33(1) SCA.
962
 In the case of Indonesia, it was reported
963
 that the Supreme Court 
applied the CJEU Dyestuffs doctrine of economic entity and attributed the subsidiary 
anticompetitive agreement to the foreign parent firm.
964
 More recently, the Indonesian 
Competition Commission (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha or the KPPU) also 
employed the doctrine of economic entity.
965
 This is an interesting case since Indonesia’s 
competition law does not have an explicit extraterritorial provision. The Commission 
creatively used this doctrine to expand the interpretation of the definition of “undertaking” 
in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 Year 1999 which provides that 
“[e]ntrepreneur is an individual person or a company, in the form of a legal or non-legal 
entity established and domiciled or engaged in activities within the legal territory of the 
Republic of Indonesia, conducting various kinds of business activities in the economic 
sector through contracts, both individually or collectively” 966 to cover foreign parent firms. 
In this regard, the Commission managed to overcome the territorial limitation by 
interpreting the criterion of engagement in activities within the territory in a broad manner. 
The KPPU decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.
967
 
These examples demonstrate that the AMSs possess the capability and willingness to 
extend their national laws to competition issues with regional and international dimensions. 
The AMSs are not reluctant to abandon the principle of the ASEAN Way which focuses on 
the non-interference of other AMSs’ internal affairs and non-conflictual conflict resolution 
if their vested interests are in jeopardy. In addition, the use of extraterritoriality signifies 
the AMSs’ preparedness to withstand the potential political and legal conflicts and 
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retaliation from concerned AMSs. This stands in stark contrast to commentators’ 
assumptions that the countries are more likely to favour the avoidance of conflicts 
engendered by the extraterritorial application of national competition law.
968
 Moreover, the 
conflict of jurisdictions regarding competition issues might become a reality for which the 
ASEAN has not developed a mechanism for the resulting jurisdictional dispute. The 
implementation of the concept of extraterritoriality directly affects cross-border commerce 
within the region. Kovacic identified two principal consequences: an increase in the cost of 
complying with requirements for report mergers, and the assessing of the same behaviour 
according to divergent standards.
969
 The second scenario was demonstrated in 
Boing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell. 
Conscious of their own institutional limitations and in the absence of a relevant mechanism 
at regional level, it is possible that the Guidelines I suggested including a provision for 
extraterritoriality to deal with intra-regional competition. It is doubtful whether 
extraterritoriality in national law is an appropriate answer to problems of regional 
competition, especially in the light of past experiences encountered by more developed 
jurisdictions. In the interim, the suggestion of extraterritoriality, even without 
implementation, could further widen the AMSs’ disparity. Correspondingly, an AMS with 
weaker competition jurisdiction will appear less attractive to foreign investment compared 
with other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, it is inconclusive whether there is a correlation 
between a decrease in the FDI and a weak competition law regime. 
5.3.2. Cooperation Agreements between Competition Authorities 
within the ASEAN 
Cooperation is generally the preferred method for dealing with trans-border competition 
problems.
970
 It is seen as a solution to palliate the conflicts generated by extraterritoriality. 
Defining cooperation is difficult, not least because it can have various meanings at 
different levels. Cooperative activities can be formal or informal. The formality in this 
context is not due to the nature of participating actors but that of the activities involved. 
Informal cooperation encompasses networking efforts and can take place at the bilateral, 
regional and multilateral level. Zanettin categorised cooperation into two groups: hard 
cooperation and soft cooperation.
971
 In hard cooperation, an authority is requested by its 
foreign counterpart to take action it might not otherwise have taken, such as positive 
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comity and exchange of confidential information. In contrast, soft cooperation refers to a 
coordination of competition investigations. Most noteworthy is the absence of network 
cooperation from this classification. It is plausible that the absence is based on the 
assumption that only competition authorities can participate in the cooperation. However, 
cooperation has exceeded cooperative procedures between national competition authorities 
and could include private entities, as attested to by the existence of the ICN. Incidentally, 
the informal form of cooperation is one that has enjoyed the most success.
972
 Terhechte 
made an attempt to broadly define cooperation as institutionalised collaboration.
973
 
Regardless of the variety of forms and levels, the uniting characteristic of cooperation lies 
in its voluntary approach. Countries are free to choose with whom to cooperate and reserve 
the right to decide the level of cooperation commitment on a case-by-case basis. 
Developed economies prefer to enter into a cooperation agreement with partners with the 
same level of competition law advancement. They fear that by agreeing to cooperate with 
developing competition law regimes, they might be exposed to an abundance of requests 
for assistance with little chance of reciprocity. They also fear a negative effect on their 
trade and/or competition interests. Developing economies without effective competition 
regimes are also reluctant to enter into such an agreement; they fear unilateral extension of 
participating countries’ competition rules. It follows that voluntary cooperative agreements 
are more common among developed economies than among developing economies.
974
 
The rise of cooperation agreements is attributed to the globalisation of competition 
restrictions, the internationalisation of competition policies and the non-viability of united 
global competition rules.
975
 In particular, cooperation is seen as a method to curb 
aggressive extraterritorial application of national law. Jenny found another explanation in 
the pooling of resources among countries to address common challenges in competition 
enforcement.
976
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 Various Designs of Cooperation 5.3.2.1.
Bilateral Cooperation 
Bilateral cooperation is considered to be the most common form of cooperation and 
revolves around cooperation between two national competition authorities.
977
 The key 
advantage of bilateral cooperation is that it eliminates conflicts between countries and 
facilitates convergence and harmonization between different competition law regimes.
978
 
In most cases, bilateral cooperation agreements are concluded between two developed 
economies.
979
 This is because the efficiency of such an agreement relies heavily on the 
principle of reciprocity. Arrangements made between two nations with similar competition 
laws and converging views on the substantive and procedural competition regulations have 
a better chance at succeeding in effective enforcement.
980
 
Bilateral cooperation is an evolving concept with the degree of cooperation being affected 
by the level of trust shared by the two parties. Bilateral agreement centres on technical and 
enforcement assistance, in particular the exchange of information between jurisdictions. 
The exchange of information between authorities is essential in order to detect 
anticompetitive conduct with a trans-border reach. In this regard the exchange is crucial 
since the actions of countries overlap.
981
 This measure is particularly useful in merger 
cases as it helps authorities discern the market definition.
982
 However, the information 
exchanged remains limited. Countries are not allowed to exchange information if it might 
violate domestic law of privacy or confidentiality, including professional privilege.
983
 
Therefore, the information shared between competition authorities must be non-
confidential. Technical assistance is often included in the rare cases of bilateral agreements 
between developed and developing economies such as the EU-Chile Association 
Agreement.
984
 The purpose of this type of cooperation agreement has shifted slightly from 
agreements between developed economies since the two parties are not equal. The goal of 
this agreement is to help strengthen effective competition law enforcement in the “weaker” 
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competition law regime.
985
 It also aims to provide the transfer of skills and techniques in 
detecting and deterring anticompetitive behaviour. 
Generally, bilateral agreements between competition authorities contain six principal 
components: notification, exchange of information, cooperation, consultation, and 
comity.
986
 This section will focus on comity to highlight its important role in advancing 
regional cooperation. Comity can exist in both a negative and a positive form. 
Negative comity, which seeks to prevent jurisdictional conflicts, was included in the first 
generation of bilateral cooperation agreements in 1976 when the US signed the Antitrust 
Accord with Germany.
987
 In practice negative comity means that one party will notify the 
other party when its enforcement of competition law could affect the interests of the 
latter.
988
 This suggests that only one party in the agreement would engage in the 
enforcement of the competition law while the other party is forced to not engage in any 
action; hence the term “negative” comity. It is fairly difficult to assess the success of such 
comity since it is not binding. Countries are not compelled to decline their jurisdiction in 
favour of another. Moreover, the language used in the agreement is too vague to assess 
whether it could really prevent conflict of jurisdiction.
989
 
Positive comity centres on the idea that one jurisdiction will refer a matter to another with 
the expectation that the receiving jurisdiction will investigate the claim.
990
 This method 
implies that the referred jurisdiction is better equipped to deal with the competition law 
issue than the referring country. In contrast to negative comity, positive comity, as 
indicated by its name, requires positive action. It marks an important development in 
bilateral agreements in the field of competition law since it requires a high level of trust 
and confidence on the part of the referring competition authority that the referred 
competition authority will undertake a serious investigation. However, the referral will not 
interfere with domestic competition law. This means that if the recipient of the referral is a 
weak competition authority with an inefficient competition law regime, that authority will 
not be empowered by virtue of the referral. The referring competition authority will not 
engage in the investigation. Positive comity appears to work best when countries share 
similar values in procedural and substantive competition law. The object of positive comity 
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is to allocate the investigation and prosecution of anticompetitive conduct to the country in 
the best position to carry out functions.
991
 
Positive comity has increasingly become more common than negative comity. The 
exemplar of such an agreement is the agreement between the US and the EU. The 
cooperation between them is interesting since the two regimes are regarded as the most 
well developed. In 1991 the EU and the US signed their first bilateral cooperation 
agreement
992
 which contained obligations of reciprocal notification, exchange of 
information, assistance, positive comity and negative comity. Unfortunately, the positive 
comity provision was not sufficiently used. Petrovsky claimed the issue was due to the 
US’s tendency to favour the extraterritorial approach.993 In 1998, the US and the EU 
concluded their second cooperation agreement.
994
 This agreement confirmed the efforts of 
the two parties to continue applying the principle of positive comity. Most importantly, the 
agreement includes a presumption that the referring country will defer or suspend its own 
enforcement activities over a period not exceeding six months when the anticompetitive 
behaviour occurred principally in or was directed principally to the referred country. It 
could be said that positive comity provides a tangible commitment to the notion of 
cooperation.
995
 
However, the advancement of deeper cooperation between the two authorities was 
hindered by GE/Honeywell. Admittedly, the occurrence of cases like GE/Honeywell is rare 
and thus is more likely to be the exception to the rule. Despite certain drawbacks, the EU-
US bilateral cooperation agreement was used as the model for several agreements of the 
same nature.
996
 
Multilateral Cooperation 
The failure to form a global competition law within the WTO reveals the reluctance of 
many countries to commit to a legally binding multilateral agreement in the field of 
competition law. Despite this unwillingness, countries still wish to cooperate in a 
meaningful way. The attention has thus shifted to an alternative form at the multilateral 
level, namely non-binding multilateralism which utilises soft harmonisation methods 
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through recommendations, best practices and guidelines. The benefit of multilateralism 
over bilateralism is its cover of a broader range of countries. The best known form of 
multilateral cooperation is the OECD and the UNCTAD. An examination of both 
organisations was offered in Chapter 4. It revealed a comparable approach in multilateral 
cooperation regarding the technical assistance provided to countries. 
Both organisations publish documents pertaining to the framework of substantive and 
institutional competition law. Despite the absence of a binding ability, multilateral 
cooperation has a high level of influence that transcends its membership. Many 
competition authorities, even non-OECD members, use these works as highly authoritative 
sources in the field of competition law. The most influential document from the OECD is 
indubitably the Recommendation concerning Effective Action against Hard Core 
Cartels.
997
 Beyond the area of hard core cartels, the OECD also deals with a variety of 
different issues of competition law and policy including mergers and cooperation between 
competition authorities and member states.
998
 The UNCTAD has also contributed to 
multilateral cooperation relative to competition law. Its best known work is the UNCTAD 
Code
999
 which was adopted unanimously at the UN General Assembly.
1000
 It contains basic 
competition law principles generally consistent with the global concept of anticompetitive 
conduct.
1001
 Beside the UNCTAD Code, the UNCTAD has made other contributions to the 
field of competition law such as the Model Law on Competition
1002
 which is based on the 
UNCTAD Code to aid members in the adoption of the UNCTAD Code into their national 
legislations. The most efficient mechanism is the peer review system in both the OECD 
and the UNCTAD. In this system, countries voluntarily submit their competition law 
regime to be evaluated and recommendations from other regimes as well as from 
competition law experts are made. Conforming to the nature of multilateral cooperation, 
the recommendations that emerge from the peer review are not binding; countries are 
under no obligation to implement the recommendations given in the peer review. While 
domestic regimes are not required to accept the recommendations, peer reviews succeed in 
encouraging changes to domestic regimes purely due to peer pressure. The UNCTAD peer 
review system can be distinguished from that of the OECD by its perspective on 
development and experience in cooperating with developing economies. 
Since the adoption of the UNCTAD Code, the UNCTAD has become the primary 
representative of the interests of lesser developed and transition economies in the area of 
competition policy as a counterweight to the influence of developed economies in the 
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global setting.
1003
 The UNCTAD, contrary to the OECD, is truly global considering its 
composition of countries around the world with different degrees of political and economic 
progress and its involvement in development issues. By integrating the development 
factors with the field of competition law, the UNCTAD is preserving the UN’s long-
standing tradition of advocating for developing and the least developed economies.  
 The ASEAN’s Form of Cooperation 5.3.2.2.
Early  on, Ong observed that “[t]he nature and extent of the cooperation arrangements 
contemplated under the Blueprint have not been made publicly known, and any progress 
on this front will depend very much on the prevailing political climate in each of these 
member states.”1004 Once again, the emphasis is on the political connection of the AMSs, 
reflecting the predominance of the ASEAN way. The Guidelines I would later come to 
define the nature and the extent of cooperation within the ASEAN. According to them, 
“[t]he overarching or long-term objectives of a cooperative competition policy for the 
AMSs are the promotion of market integration in the lead up to the establishment of a 
common market, and the promotion of economic efficiency and growth at a regional 
level.”1005 The Guidelines I are highly educative on how to use regional cooperation to 
promote a common framework for competition policy to achieve the long-term objective of 
market integration in 2015. The Guidelines I affirm that cooperation can bring about a high 
degree of consistency in the implementation of competition policy in the ASEAN. Such 
cooperation can create a dynamic dialogue that serves to build consensus and convergence 
towards sound competition policy and improve the effectiveness of a national competition 
enforcement body through the exchange of non-confidential knowledge between the 
AMSs.
1006
 The latter two benefits have already been realised by the formation of the 
AEGC which was established explicitly to secure these benefits. It appears that the 
Guidelines I support the idea that regional cooperation can bring about actual convergence 
in regional competition law. 
However, the Guidelines I’s suggestion is limited to formal cooperation between the 
AMSs’ national competition authorities. It envisions cooperation among these authorities 
that is centred on discussion and exchange of non-confidential information as a secondary 
activity, with the aim of achieving convergence.
1007
 Competition agencies generally collect 
a broad range of information, from industry and market statistics to opinions and analyses 
done by the agency, involved parties or third parties to the case.
1008
 Some of this 
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information is confidential and therefore generally requires authorisation from the parties 
involved before it can be shared.
1009
 Confidentiality in the context of competition law 
investigation has to be protected since the information could contain sensitive market or 
industry information. Private parties have expressed concern that benefits to private parties 
arising from information sharing and other forms of cooperation often are not substantial 
or assured and may be outweighed by a variety of perceived disadvantages. These potential 
disadvantages include exposure to additional legal risks, particularly when substantive 
laws diverge; significant potential sanctions or private rights of action in the jurisdiction to 
which the information is disclosed; differences in investigation timetables; the 
overburdening of competition authorities with so much information that the investigations 
would be slowed down rather than hastened; and possible misinterpretation when one 
authority reviews information that has been prepared to address issues under a different 
legal regime.
1010
 In response to these concerns, competition authorities have to ensure that 
any cooperation is within the limit of the confidentiality rules so as to achieve consistent 
remedies.
1011
 Moreover, it is in the interest of national competition authorities to preserve 
anonymity of the source of such information when guaranteed confidentially is often the 
sole incentive of the acquirement. Waiver of confidentiality is not uncommon especially in 
merger cases where parties have strong incentives to agree to such exchange.
1012
 
Nonetheless, it is believed that this is not an example of progressive cooperation but 
merely an expression of the power of a leniency programme.
1013
 It is thus realistic for the 
ASEAN to concentrate on a more restricted and informal approach to the exchange of 
information. 
Provisions relating to discussion and exchange of non-confidential information are usually 
found in bilateral cooperation agreements. In this regard, the ASEAN is narrating a form of 
regional cooperation which exhibits the characteristics of a bilateral cooperation 
agreement. Most worrisome is perhaps the Guidelines I’s apparent support of the creation 
of a new platform or agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, between the AMSs or to 
build upon the existing mechanism of the AEGC.
1014
 This provision is later reinforced by a 
requirement presented in the Guidelines I that the AMSs develop a regional platform, or 
understanding, or arrangement, or otherwise build on the AEGC to facilitate cooperation 
between competition regulatory bodies.
1015
 The aim of this regional platform is to allow 
competition regulatory bodies to exchange their experiences, identify best practices, and 
endeavour to implement co-operative competition policy and competition regulatory body 
arrangements that provide for harmonization.
1016
 Within this framework, working groups 
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may be created to discuss general or specific issues related to the establishment and 
enforcement of competition policy.
1017
 However, the regional platform shall not exercise 
any rule-making function, and no voting rules should be in place within the working 
groups, as the cooperation is based on consensus-building.
1018
 If the AMSs were to create a 
regional platform distinct from the AEGC, it is plausible that there would be an 
overlapping area of competence, rendering the AEGC vulnerable. Another concern resides 
in the potential of wider disparity in competition cooperation. Only the AMSs that have 
made similar progress in competition law enforcement would be able to enter into such an 
agreement, thus inevitably creating, at the very least, a two-tiered level of cooperation 
within the region. This could ultimately hamper the ASEAN’s efforts to harmonise 
competition law in all the AMSs. At the same time, the suggestion is made in the interest 
of facilitating better cooperation among similar competition regimes. There is the potential 
for faster region-wide cooperation in the future by engaging with those who currently have 
the capability. 
 The Inadequacies of Cooperation 5.3.2.3.
Cooperation, despite its various forms, is limited by its most obvious advantage – its 
voluntary approach. The AMSs have the freedom to cooperate but are not obliged to do so. 
The ASEAN reiterates this position: 
The regional platform shall not exercise any rule-making function and no 
voting rules should be in place within the working groups, as the 
cooperation is based on consensus building. Where the platform reaches 
consensus on recommendations or "best practices", arising from the 
projects, each competition regulatory body may decide whether and how to 
implement the recommendations, through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements, where appropriate.
1019
 
It is evident that the continuous reiteration of the voluntary nature of the regional organ is 
for the benefit of reassuring the AMSs that the platform will not impinge on their 
sovereignty. Although they will be encouraged to participate, this is entirely dependent on 
their willingness to do so. 
The success of cooperation agreements, particularly bilateral agreements, is indeed 
impressive and certainly contributes to proving the usefulness of voluntary cooperation 
agreements between competition authorities.
1020
 Notwithstanding the progress made in 
improving relationships between countries in the matter of competition enforcement, the 
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correlation between cooperation and greater harmonisation remains dubious.
1021
 Simple 
similarities in competition analysis do not equate to substantive convergence promoted by 
cooperative activities. Different competition authorities can arrive at the same conclusion 
regardless of the method used. This is especially true in the case of mergers with no 
anticompetitive concern where competition authorities would usually approve. 
Furthermore, it is also difficult to ascertain whether a national competition authority would 
be able to uncover or investigate anticompetitive behaviour without cooperation. The 
problem here lies not in the potential benefit of cooperation but in its measurability.  
Jenny admitted that cooperation agreements are not able, in themselves, to address the 
issue of the interface between trade and competition at the global level.
1022
 He raised three 
arguments in support of his theory. First, cooperation agreements do little to convince 
countries which do not have competition law that they should adopt one. Secondly, 
cooperation only unites countries with the same level of advancement regarding 
competition law regime. Lastly, cooperation is only undertaken when such cooperation is 
in the mutual interest of the parties to the agreement. In the final analysis, countries that 
already have similar competition law regimes would be more likely to cooperate with each 
other. Therefore cooperation agreements contribute to greater asymmetric disparity in the 
global scheme. Even among similar competition regimes, the participation of involved 
countries is still limited by differences in the considerations of competition procedure, 
fundamental standards and requirement of transparency. The overreliance on the voluntary 
approach could make the benefits of cooperation illusory as evidenced by 
Boing/McDonnell Douglass and GE/Honeywell. There is certainly a possibility that these 
cases are simply exceptions rather than the rule of ineffectiveness in cooperation. 
Perhaps Fox’s astute remark made in 2003 remains valid today. She proclaimed that: 
For inbound problems, the combination of extraterritoriality and 
cooperation works well for nations with well-resourced agencies of large 
countries addressing matters not encumbered by conflicting national 
policies. In that set of cases, gaps and illegitimacies are relatively few. For 
outbound problems, gaps and illegitimacies are significant. For world 
problems, we are doing remarkably well working with the tools we have, 
but the tools, alas, are pre-globalisation. In important ways they are not 
legitimate, and they are not sufficient.
1023
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Jenny corroborated Fox’s position and claimed that there is a “growing need to elaborate a 
multilateral framework.”1024 It follows that the tools of extraterritoriality and cooperation 
handpicked by the ASEAN to assist in its market integration will not be sufficient to 
resolve the ASEAN regional competition issues. 
 Conclusion 5.4.
This chapter has demonstrated that in its pursuit of regional economic integration, the 
ASEAN has concentrated on supporting the national institutional framework of 
competition enforcement. It created the AEGC as the sole regional organ dealing with 
competition policy within ASEAN with similar traits to a voluntary cooperation 
agreement, and resolving regional competition issues through national solutions and 
bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation. In addition, the support of extraterritoriality helps 
explain the ASEAN’s fixation with national competition institution structures since it 
chiefly relies on it to resolve its regional issues. 
In comparison with other regional economic integration efforts, the ASEAN is unique by 
being the only regional organisation without a central competition law-related institution 
capable of monitoring the AMSs’ competition law regimes and the enforcement of 
competition law. It neither has a centralised institution similar to the WAEMU or the 
COMESA nor a national representative institution comparable to the MERCOSUR’s 
practice. What the ASEAN established is a simple institution capable of providing a 
platform of discussion to interested AMSs through the AEGC. 
Through the Guidelines I and II, the ASEAN has, remarkably, equipped the AMSs with 
necessary information and choices to help their construction of a national competition 
institution. Unfortunately, that is the limit of the ASEAN’s efforts regarding institutional 
building. Simultaneously, the AEGC has revealed its weakness as a regional competition 
organ without the capabilities to monitor the enforcement of competition policy by the 
AMSs and to resolve competition issues raised at the ASEAN level. Its deficiency is 
principally caused by the principle of non-interference between the AMSs resulting in the 
absence of a centralised organ. Since this principle is the cherished core value of the 
organisation, the ASEAN has no choice but to abide by it and work around it. What it has 
proposed, no matter how fragile, is undoubtedly the best it can offer. 
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 The Approaches of ASEAN and AMSs to Competition Chapter 6
Policy 
Previous chapters have analysed the substantive and institutional approaches taken by the 
ASEAN in its pursuit of regional competition law suitable for regional economic 
integration. It is now opportune to focus on the approach taken by the AMSs regarding 
national competition laws to ascertain whether soft harmonisation at a regional level 
(which was the aspiration of the ASEAN in establishing the AEC) is possible. This chapter 
will examine whether the AMSs’ competition laws share sufficient commonalities, other 
than merely a superficial appearance that they do, to enable soft harmonisation at a 
regional level.  
Indeed, “[d]esigns cannot be conjured in the abstract; they must fit the family that lives in 
the house, its aspirations, possibilities, and practical limits.”1025 As the architect of the 
Southeast Asian regional competition policy framework, the ASEAN must take into 
consideration all of the AMSs’ aspirations, capabilities, and limitations regarding the 
enactment and the implementation of competition law. It is crucial that the ASEAN’s 
framework is suitable and compatible with the AMSs’ local contexts to avoid 
disintegration or departure from the regional design. Both situations would be detrimental 
to the ASEAN’s economic integration aspiration. The ASEAN presents a peculiar case in 
that many members of the family have enacted and enforced competition laws. It is thus 
necessary for the ASEAN’s design to accommodate existing competition law-related 
constructions while encouraging individual nations to align their laws with the ASEAN’s 
framework. Equally, encouraging the enactment of new competition law regimes should 
also figure among the ASEAN’s priorities. 
Indonesia
1026
 and Thailand
1027
 were the first AMSs to introduce competition law statutes in 
1999 followed by Vietnam
1028
 and Singapore
1029
 in 2004. Generally, these enactments 
were spurred on by a shift in national policy towards a market economy, notably trade 
liberalisation, the deregulation of the economy, and the privatisation of states’ assets, as 
well as international pressures.
1030
 Indonesia and Thailand, in their state of “economic and 
financial distress”1031 both adopted their first comprehensive competition law in the wake 
of the Asian Financial Crisis. Indonesia enacted its competition law statute in light of the 
conditional terms laid down by the IMF in exchange of the latter’s financial assistance,1032 
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while Thailand’s competition law was introduced as a part of financial sector reforms.1033 
The enactment of Vietnam’s competition law was fuelled by the introduction of the doi 
moi policy and was centred around the development of a socialist-oriented market 
economy. It was reported that a bilateral trade agreement with the US, as well Thailand’s 
aspirations to join the WTO were the catalyst for its competition legislation.
1034
 Both 
internal and external factors contributed to Singapore’s comprehensive competition law. 
The enactment followed its transition to a market economy and the conclusion of a 
bilateral agreement with the US.
1035
 
Following the ASEAN’s announcement of regional economic integration with competition 
policy as its pillar, Malaysia,
1036
 Myanmar,
1037
 and the Philippines
1038
 passed their 
competition law bills. It is easy to assume that the AEC motivated their enactments in light 
of the timing. This is especially evident in the case of Myanmar and the Philippines whose 
laws were introduced mere months before the introduction of the AEC at the end of 2015 
although the ASEAN’s contribution was never publicly acknowledged by these AMSs. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, regional economic integration is not among the goals of their 
competition law statutes, although this is not an uncommon practice in member states of a 
regional organisation. Currently, there are still three AMSs without comprehensive 
national competition statutes: Brunei, Cambodia and Lao PDR. Examining the AMSs’ 
competition law regimes reveals superficial commonalities, chiefly in the core areas of 
competition law. All AMSs have established at least one dedicated regulatory body in 
charge of enforcing competition law. Following the Indonesian competition statute
1039
 and 
the presidential decree,
1040
 the Indonesian Competition Commission (KPPU) was 
established as an independent competition regulatory agency to regulate competition, 
enforce competition law, and provide recommendations to the government regarding 
competition-related policies. The KPPU is accountable to only the President and the House 
Representatives. In the same year, Thailand established its Trade Competition Commission 
based on provisions of the Thai Trade Competition Act (TCA).
1041
 In the following years, 
other AMSs each created a single national competition authority: namely, the Competition 
Commission of Singapore,
1042
 the Malaysian Competition Commission,
1043
 the 
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Competition Commission of Myanmar
1044
 and the Philippines Competition 
Commission.
1045
 Vietnam is the only AMS with two institutional arrangements – The 
Vietnam Competition–Administration Department established in 2004 under the Ministry 
of Trade, and the Vietnam Competition Council, established in 2006 as an independent 
agency. Both organs were established on the basis of the same competition statute.
1046
 In 
addition, most AMSs’ competition regimes include all the core substantive components of 
competition law, namely, provisions for the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements,
1047
 
abuse of dominant position,
1048
 and merger control.
1049
 Among these regimes, the 
Malaysia’s competition law is unique due to the absence of merger control in the law. This 
absence is inexplicable and deprives the Malaysian Competition Commission of 
considerable power and influence in exercising its functions and duties.
1050
 
Despite the seeming similarities in the broad principles of competition law across 
jurisdictions, competition laws are not necessarily identical across all AMSs. This chapter 
will examine whether the AMSs’ competition laws share sufficient commonalities beyond 
superficial appearance to enable soft harmonisation at a regional level. This question is of 
particular importance in the context of the ASEAN because of the ASEAN’s reliance on 
the willingness to harmonise on behalf of the AMSs without the aid of a regional 
centralised institution. Singapore and Thailand are chosen for this comparison since fall at 
opposite ends of the efficacy spectrum. The literature is unanimous in its condemnation of 
the efficacy of Thailand’s competition law1051 despite Thailand having one of the oldest 
competition law regimes in the region. In spite of its 16 years of existence, Thailand’s 
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competition regime has yet to produce an enforcement decision. In contrast, Singapore’s 
competition law is substantially enhanced by secondary regulations and actual enforcement 
decisions. Its enforcement has been lauded for its “remarkable haste.”1052 Indeed, the first 
decisions were made as early as 2006,
1053
 merely two years after the enactment of the 
statute. Moreover, the two AMSs’ local contexts best reflect the deeply rooted issues of 
diversity experienced in Southeast Asia. As explained in Chapter 1, Singapore supports the 
democratic political system while Thailand remains indefinitely under the military junta. 
Singapore’s economic development has resulted in its classification as an advanced 
economy while Thailand, as with most AMSs, is a developing economy. Their competition 
statues were implemented under different circumstances and sufficient time has passed to 
allow both competition regimes to grow. It would be inappropriate to evaluate a 
competition regime in this context without giving it the benefit of maturing and earning 
experience and expertise from actual enforcement over time.  
 The Origins of Competition Laws in Thailand and Singapore 6.1.
The differences between the competition law in Thailand and Singapore go back to the 
very foundation of the laws. 
6.1.1. Thailand 
The TCA replaced the Price Fixing and Antimonopoly Act
1054
 whose primary goals were 
price control of goods and services, and monopoly control. It is unfortunate that the TCA 
was originally connected to a package of measures introduced to deal with the 
consequences of the Asian financial crisis;
1055
 competition itself was not a priority in the 
reforms since most of these reforms were related to financial sector reconstruction. The 
TCA has been controversial since its conception and the motivation behind its enactment is 
still being debated. It is neither a product of international commitments made to the 
IMF
1056
 following the 1997 Financial Crisis, nor a term of conditional accession to the 
WTO as Thailand had gained membership in 1995.
1057
 Further, there are no obligations 
resulting from free trade agreements as Thailand’s earliest free trade agreement was only 
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concluded in 2005.
1058
 Hence, contrary to popular belief,
1059
 the TCA was not a result of 
international pressures. It was also not designed to address any emerging national 
economic issues, unlike South Korea’s restraint of chaebols1060 or the US’s control of 
trusts. The evidence points to a self-made law devoid of external intervention, despite 
rumours of US self-interested intervention.
1061
 The Thai authorities decided autonomously 
that they needed a law adjusted to the rapid economic growth and drastic changes in 
Thailand’s economic structure from 1987–1992.1062 Moreover, the promulgation of the 
TCA was necessary to fulfil the mandate established by the Constitution of Thailand 
1997,
1063
 in particular Article 50 which states that “a person shall enjoy the liberties to 
engage in an enterprise or an occupation and to undertake a fair and free competition”1064 
and Article 87 which encourages a free economic system through market forces, fair 
competition, protection of consumers, and prevention of monopolies.
1065
 The discordance 
regarding the origin of Thailand’s competition law continues. Despite relying on 
international best practice and experiences, there are contrasting theories about its source 
of inspiration. On one hand, Thanitcul asserted that the TCA was modelled after the South 
Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and the Taiwan Fair Trade Law
1066
 
because of the similarities in economic structure – a few national market dominant firms 
and many SMEs.
1067
 On the other hand, Supanit, one of the drafters of the TCA, maintained 
that it was not based on any existing model; rather, it was designed specifically to suit the 
unique reality of the Thai economy.
1068
 
On the surface, the TCA contains all the substantive competition provisions found in most 
competition law statutes, namely, abuse of dominant position,
1069
 merger control,
1070
 and 
restrictive agreements.
1071
 It also contains a provision for unfair competition
1072
 as well as 
a unique trade policy provision prohibiting restrictions on international trade for personal 
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consumption.
1073
 It was speculated that the inclusion of the latter was to prevent consumers 
from purchasing luxurious cars directly from foreign manufacturers, thus bypassing local 
retail agents.
1074
 The TCA is ambiguous and secondary regulations clarifying its 
enforcement were unjustly delayed. The TCA explicitly states that to be enforceable, 
provisions for the abuse of dominant position and mergers first need secondary regulations 
defining dominant position in a relevant market
1075
 and transaction-size thresholds for 
merger control.
1076
 The definition of dominant position would not be established until 
2007,
1077
 eight years after the TCA’s enactment, while the definition of mergers and 
acquisitions was only introduced in 2013.
1078
 Prior to their arrival, it was impossible to 
enforce provisions on abuse of dominant position and merger control. Moreover, the 
merger control is the only area without official guidelines. 
The TCA establishes the primary competition law enforcement authority called the Trade 
Competition Commission [hereinafter TCC]
1079
 and the Office of Trade Competition 
Commission [hereinafter the Office] acting as its secretariat body.
1080
 The TCC has 
investigated and considered ninety-five cases over its 16-year run,
1081
 based primarily on 
complaints received. None were adjudicated. In 2012, the TCC promised to make its first 
enforcement case.
1082
 To this date, the fate of this case remains unknown. 
It was reported that a new draft competition bill gained the approval of the National 
Reform Council, an organ formulated by the National Council for Peace and Order
1083
 to 
implement its reform agenda, on 21 July 2015
1084
 on the heels of a civil society group 
campaign against one of the country’s largest monopolistic conglomerations.1085 However, 
the reform had already been made part of the “reform agenda No.12 on monopoly and fair 
competition” planned by the military junta which assumed power.1086 It is rumoured that 
                                                 
1073
 Ibid, sec. 28. 
1074
 Thanitcul, Sakda, Competition Law in Thailand: A Preliminary Analysis, 1 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. 
Rev. 171 (2002). 
1075
 TCA, sec. 8. 
1076
 Ibid, sec. 26. 
1077
 Office of Thailand Trade Competition Commission, Notifications of Trade Competition Commission on 
Criteria for Business Operator with Market Domination (2007). 
1078
 Office of Thailand Trade Competition Commission, Resolutions of Trade Competition Commission on 
Criteria for Business Combination [in Thai] (2013). 
1079
 TCA, sec. 6. 
1080
 Ibid, sec. 18. 
1081
 Office of Thailand Trade Competition Commission, Data on Complaints Received [in Thai] 
<http://otcc.dit.go.th/?page_id=61>.  (most notably is the absence of any complaints lodged in 2014 which 
the TCC reported the cause was the political turmoil in Bangkok, Thailand) 
1082
 Samadi, Faaez, New Thai Trade Enforcer Promises Action Global Competition Review (2012). 
1083
 Following Thailand’s 2014 coup d’état, the National Council for Peace and Order was formed by the 
military junta after its deposal of the elected government to govern Thailand. 
1084
 National Reform Council, Record of Meeting No. 58/2558 (21 July 2015). 
1085
 Prachathai, Civil Society Groups Campaign for Boycott of 7/11 
<http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/5032>. 
1086
 National Reform Council, Reform Agenda No.12 on Monopoly and Fair Competition (The Secretariat of 
the House of Representative, August 2015). 
159 
 
the new draft will introduce many changes to the law,
1087
 the most notable of which would 
be the inclusion of state-owned enterprises within the scope of competition law and a shift 
towards more genuine independence for the TCC’s structure. It is essentially a 
modernisation of Thailand’s competition law. It was promised that the draft bill would be 
introduced to the parliament at the end of 2015 to coincide with the institution of the AEC 
but currently there is no new development. Given the lack of development in Thailand’s 
competition law, the scope of discussion on this subject may appear limited when 
compared with the discussion of Singapore’s competition law. 
6.1.2. Singapore 
The enactment of Singapore’s comprehensive competition law was due to both internal and 
external factors. Its introduction coincided with the emergence of the market economy 
movement and it established a competition law regime that could be applied to all sectors, 
except those explicitly regulated by sectoral regulations such as the Telecom Competition 
Code
1088
 and the Media Market Conduct Code.
1089
 These were a part of the liberalisation of 
industry sectors which have traditionally been monopolised by State enterprises.
1090
  
Sector-specific competition regulations are necessary to ensure the relevant industry’s 
competitiveness after liberalisation. The impetus for the market economy movement can be 
traced back to the government’s conscious decision to expose domestic firms to greater 
levels of competition, thus making them more resilient and better-equipped to compete in a 
globalised market while at the same time creating a more attractive legal environment for 
foreign investors upon whom Singapore is heavily reliant.
1091
 This decision marked “an 
important shift in Singapore’s hitherto relatively laissez-faire commercial environment in 
which undertakings have been free to compete, or not to compete, in whatever manner that 
suited their commercial objectives.”1092 Another significant factor was the bilateral trade 
agreement concluded with the US in 2003 under the terms of which Singapore is required 
to “enact general competition legislation by January 2005, and shall not exclude 
enterprises from that legislation on the basis of their status as government enterprises.”1093 
It is evident that the government-linked companies [hereinafter GLC] are of significant 
concern to the US and its enterprises. “GLCs are wholly or partly government-owned 
companies that are held by two principal state holding companies – the Government of 
Singapore Investment Co. and Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd. These two unlisted companies 
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are wholly owned by Singapore’s government.”1094 Through the GLCs, the government 
has ownership and involvement in many industries in Singapore and overseas.
1095
 
However, the lingering public suspicion of preferential treatment accorded to the GLCs 
was deemed to be unfounded.
1096
 
The Singapore Competition Act (SCA)
1097
 was enacted in 2004. It was largely modelled on 
the UK Competition Act of 1998, which was in turn premised on European Union 
competition law before the reforms of 2004.
1098
 The most obvious example of the 
inspiration drawn in this case is the SCA’s prohibition of abuse of dominant position which 
is a direct transplant of Article 102 TFEU.
1099
 The choice of inspiration is unsurprising 
given the country’s British colonial past. It seems that Singapore is employing the 
contextualised approach in which it borrowed ideas and principles from foreign 
competition laws and adapted them to its own context.
1100
 The SCA was implemented 
cautiously in three phases. During the first phase, starting from 1 January 2005, only 
provisions pertaining to the creation of the Competition Commission of Singapore 
[hereinafter CCS], Singapore’s competition authority, were in force. A year later, the 
second phase saw the enforcement of provisions relating to anticompetitive agreements, 
abuse of dominant position, and the CCS’s enforcement power. The last phase in 2007 
commenced the enforcement of merger control. Unlike the case of Thailand, the CCS did 
not wait long to start exercising its enforcement power. As soon as the second phase was 
implemented with the establishment of major competition law-related provisions, the CCS 
issued its first decisions.
1101
 Despite this, the CCS was still criticised for its cautious 
approach with few case laws and decisions issued.
1102
 
 Substantive Provisions 6.2.
On the surface, both the TCA and the SCA contain all major provisions, namely prohibition 
of anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant position, and provisions on the 
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control of concentrations of undertakings but differ slightly with regard to the scope of 
their respective laws. 
6.2.1. The Scope of Competition Law 
The TCA broadly applies to undertakings in “agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, 
insurance, and services and shall include other undertakings prescribed by Ministerial 
Regulations.”1103 It takes an institutional approach focusing on a determined set of 
commercial activities, namely, distributor, producer, or importer, in the domain of 
agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, insurance, and services, as well as other 
undertakings prescribed by ministerial regulations.
1104
 The language used in this statute is 
highly detailed and specific, demonstrating its intent to clearly communicate the scope of 
the law. State administrations, state-owned enterprises, farmers’ groups, and business 
under a specific regulatory authority are excluded from its application.
1105
 The exclusion of 
state-owned enterprises is particularly worrisome in the case of Thailand where this type of 
enterprises ventures into the structural area, notably in the field of electricity, gas and 
petroleum, and railways.
1106
 This choice is attributed to the Ministry of Finance’s fear that 
competition law would obstruct state-owned businesses or state-owned utility businesses 
which do not seek profit.
1107
 The fear is misplaced and misguided since state-owned 
enterprises enter into competition with private businesses and also gain profit from selling 
their concessions to other business operators. Finally, the TCA does not cover foreign 
enterprises. 
In contrast, the scope of the SCA is defined in a more generalised and positive manner. It 
applies to all undertakings, defined here as “any person, being an individual, a body 
corporate, an uncorporated body of persons or any other entity, capable of carrying on 
commercial or economic activities relating to goods or services.”1108 The language chosen 
in this statute is thus more inclusive compared to the TCA. Exempted from the law are the 
acts or agreements entered into by the government, any statutory body, or any person 
acting on behalf of the government or that statutory body.
1109
 It follows that the SCA does 
not regard the government and its statutory bodies as market players. In addition, the 
statute does not apply to sector-specific activities that are already under sectoral authority 
regulations.
1110
 Services of general economic interest or other public policy are exempted 
from this provision.
1111
 The most notable absence from the exclusion list are the GLCs. 
This is evidently the influence of the aforementioned US–Singapore Free Trade 
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Agreement. Regardless of how extensive it appears to be, Williams deemed the scope of 
the SCA to be narrow and riddled with generous exemptions, and stated that it would be 
unlikely to bring about significant change to the Singapore’s domestic economy.1112 
6.2.2. The Prohibition of Anticompetitive Agreements 
 The Definition of Agreement 6.2.2.1.
Section 27 of the TCA and Section 34 of the SCA both prohibit anticompetitive 
agreements. Neither defines what constitutes an agreement. In the absence of a definition 
for the term “agreement”, the TCA restricts the scope of the term to actions on each part to 
“do any act.”1113 It follows that a consensus not to act would not fall within the scope of 
the TCA. The statute is silent on decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted 
practices, and block exemptions. It, however, accepts both form of the concept of 
agreement: horizontal and vertical agreements may be subject to the application of the 
TCA.
1114
 
In the case of Singapore, the CSS Guidelines on the Section 34 Prohibition clarify that an 
agreement occurs when there is a “consensus on the actions each party [to the agreement] 
will, or will not, take.”1115 According to the SCA, the concept of agreements between 
undertakings can be expanded to include decisions by associations of undertakings or 
concerted practices.
1116
 The language of the SCA suggests that agreement can take any 
form including an informal one. It covers even mere participation in a meeting with an 
anticompetitive purpose. The participant does not need to manifest opposition or publicly 
distance him/herself.
1117
 However, Section 34 of the SCA does not apply to undertakings 
which form a single economic unity.
1118
 Therefore, an agreement between a parent and its 
subsidiary units or between two firms under the control of a third firm does not constitute 
an agreement under Section 34 of the SCA. Services of general economic interest or other 
public policy as well as agreements within the block exemption order are exempted from 
this provision.
1119
 To date, there has been only one block exemption issued for liner 
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shipping agreements.
1120
 In addition, Section 34 shall not apply to vertical agreements, 
unless specifically specified by the Minister of Trade and Industry.
1121
 In this context, a 
vertical agreement refers to any agreement entered into between two or more undertakings 
each of which operates, for the purpose of the agreement, at a different level of the 
production or distribution chain.
1122
 The gravity of this exception is considerable 
considering vertical agreements usually manifest under price (e.g., minimum or maximum 
resale price maintenance) and non-price restraints (e.g., exclusive territorial or customer 
arrangement, exclusive dealings, tie-ins, selective distribution, and quantity forcing).
1123
 
The exemption is on the premise that vertical agreements are generally less detrimental to 
competition than horizontal agreements.
1124
 This is in line with the commonly accepted 
approach which recognises that vertical agreements are generally efficient and thus 
procompetitive.
1125
 
 The Restriction to Competition Test 6.2.2.2.
The mere existence of an agreement is not always indicative of anti-competitiveness. For 
this, agreements need to undergo the restriction to competition test. Both the TCA and the 
SCA apply this test. The TCA prohibits agreements between undertakings that result in 
monopoly, and reduce or eliminate competition in the relevant market.
1126
 The Guidelines 
on Section 27 later clarified that the TCC evaluates the agreement by reference to its 
effect.
1127
 The TCA provides a lengthy list of agreements falling within its application.
1128
 
It considers price-fixing, big-rigging, and agreements with intention to create market 
dominance or market control as hard core restrictions under the per se rule. Meanwhile, 
market sharing, limiting production to less than the market demand, reducing the quality of 
the goods or services while maintaining or raising the price, sharing a sole distributor, and 
limiting purchase or distribution conditions or practice to achieve the uniform or agreed 
practice could be exempted with an express ex ante permission of the TCC provided that 
there is commercial necessity. There is no indication pertaining to the analysis of the rule 
of reason and the exclusion of agreements with countervailing benefits is conspicuously 
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absent. It is possible that the TCA is more concerned about determining the existence of 
hard-core cartels under the per se rule. 
The SCA evaluates the agreement with reference to its object or effect, and the appreciable 
prevention, distortion or restriction of competition within Singapore.
1129
 The statute then 
proceeds to compile a list of what constitutes restriction to competition. Restriction to 
competition is when companies: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or 
investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.
1130
 
Conversely, an agreement will fall outside of the scope of Section 34 when it has an 
insignificant effect on the market.
1131
 The CCS Guidelines on the Section 34 Prohibition 
further clarify that an agreement generally has no appreciable adverse effect on 
competition: 
- If the aggregate market share of the parties to the agreement does not 
exceed 20% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement; 
- If the market share of each of the parties to the agreement does not 
exceed 25% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, 
where the agreement is made between non-competing undertakings; 
- In the case of an agreement between undertakings where each 
undertaking is a small or medium enterprise.
1132
 
In this regard, the primary factor considered under the rule of reason test is market share 
threshold. An agreement involving price-fixing, bid-rigging, market sharing or output 
limitations are considered hard-core restriction under the per se rule.
1133
 
In addition, the SCA grants exemption to agreements with net economic benefit.
1134
 These 
are considered to be agreements with a countervailing effect to competition, agreements 
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contributing to improving production or distribution, or promoting technical or economic 
progress insofar as they do not impose on the undertakings concerning restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives or afford the undertakings 
concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
goods or services in question. 
6.2.3. The Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position 
 The Definition of Dominant Position 6.2.3.1.
Coincidentally, the concept of dominant position was introduced in both Thailand and 
Singapore in 2007
1135
 despite Thailand having had a comprehensive competition statute 
since 1999. According to the Notifications on Criteria for Business Operator with Market 
Domination, the following are considered to be in a dominant position under the TCA: 
1. A business operator in any goods or services, with market share in the 
previous year over 50% and at least THB 1,000 million [approximately 
USD 28 million] turnover; or  
2. The top three business operators, in any goods or services, with combined 
market share in the previous year over 75% and at least THB 1,000 million 
turnover. 
The exception is for a business operator with the market share less than 
10% or turnover less than THB 1,000 million in the previous year.
1136
 
The language chosen demonstrates that a dominant position need not be exclusively held 
by a single undertaking but can be shared between three undertakings. In addition, the 
market share is the sole criteria in determining market dominance. 
In comparison, the CCS states that the market share criterion alone may not be sufficiently 
reliable and suggests other determinants may need to be considered as well. These could 
include entry barriers, the degree of innovation, product differentiation, the responsiveness 
of buyers to price increases, and the price responsiveness of competitors.
1137
 This position 
has been sustained by the Competition Appeal Board.
1138
 Henceforth, the factors that could 
be considered include the market share of the undertaking, the ability of the undertaking to 
profitably sustain prices above competitive levels, the undertaking’s ability to eliminate or 
weaken competitors, the existence of countervailing buyer power as well as barriers to 
entry in the market. However, the primary factor remains the market share. It follows that 
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the CCS generally considers market share of above 60 percent as an indicator of a 
dominant position in the relevant market.
1139
 
Some differences also emerge in the conceptualisation of dominance, most notably in the 
evaluation of dominant position. Here again, the TCC operates under a more restrictive 
analysis by depending exclusively on the criterion of market share threshold. It is possible 
that this decision was based on economic practicality
1140
 and legal certainty suitable for an 
inexperienced competition authority at the cost of unreliable technical accuracy.
1141
 
 The Classification of Abuse 6.2.3.2.
When it is established that an undertaking is in a dominant position, the second test to 
determine whether the undertaking’s behaviour is an abuse of dominant position will take 
place. According to the TCA the abuse is: 
(1) unreasonably fixing or maintaining purchasing or selling prices of goods 
or fees for services;  
(2) unreasonably fixing compulsory conditions, directly or indirectly, 
requiring other business operators who are his or her customers to restrict 
services, production, purchase or distribution of goods, or restrict 
opportunities in purchasing or selling goods, receiving or providing services 
or obtaining credits from other business operators;  
(3) suspending, reducing or restricting services, production, purchase, 
distribution, deliveries or importation without justifiable reasons, or 
destroying or causing damage to goods in order to reduce the quantity to be 
lower than the market demand;  
(4) intervening in the operation of business of other persons without 
justifiable reasons.
1142
 
In sub-paragraph (4) the TCA might overtly enlarge the concept of abuse. Without actual 
decisions or guidelines to aid in clarifying the ambiguous statute, it is impossible to 
estimate the scope of the text. There is no indication of whether the TCA based its 
classification of abuse on actual or potential impact of the conduct on competition. 
In comparison, the SCA lists a broader classification of abuse as follows: 
(a) predatory behaviour towards competitors; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
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(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of contracts.
1143
 
Both actual and potential effect of the conduct in competition is accepted.
1144
 Despite the 
different language used in the TCA and the SCA, the two sets of classification of abuse 
resemble each other in nature since they both refer to exploitative and exclusionary 
conduct. 
6.2.4. The Merger Control 
 The Definition of Merger 6.2.4.1.
Section 26 of the TCA prohibits anticompetitive mergers. Mergers are deemed to have 
arisen in the following contexts: 
(1) a merger made by a producer with another producer, by a distributor 
with another distributor, by a producer with a distributor, or by a service 
provider with another service provider, which has the effect of maintaining 
the status of one business and terminating the status of the other business or 
creating a new business; 
(2) a purchase of the whole or part of assets of another business with a view 
to controlling business administration policies, administration and 
management; 
(3) a purchase of the whole or part of shares of another business with a view 
to controlling business administration policies, administration and 
management.
1145
 
The TCA chooses the term “merger” to encompass a broader concept which includes 
merger, acquisition, direct and indirect control, joint venture, as well as horizontal and 
vertical mergers. Essentially, a merger occurs when previously independent undertakings 
are transformed into a single new entity irrespective of the precise nature and language of 
the concentration. Despite introducing further clarification to the TCA, there remains 
persistent ambiguity in many important issues. For instance, there is no explanation 
regarding the appraisal of the business concentrations. None of the known tests – the 
dominance test, the substantial lessening of competition test, the significantly impede 
effective competition test – are mentioned in the TCA nor secondary regulations. 
Incidentally, merger control is the only major provision of the TCA that has no practical 
guidelines. 
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The SCA utilises the same approach in defining a merger. According to the statute, a 
merger occurs if: 
(a) two or more undertakings, previously independent of one another, 
merge; 
(b) one or more persons or other undertakings acquire direct or indirect 
control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings; or 
(c) the result of an acquisition by one undertaking (the first undertaking) of 
the assets (including goodwill), or a substantial part of the assets, of 
another undertaking (the second undertaking) is to place the first 
undertaking in a position to replace or substantially replace the second 
undertaking in the business or, as appropriate, the part concerned of the 
business in which that undertaking was engaged immediately before the 
acquisition.
1146
 
Similarly, the SCA employs the term “merger” to cover merger, acquisition, direct and 
indirect control over the whole or part of an undertaking, and a joint venture to perform on 
a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. Mergers occur when 
two or more previously independent undertakings merge. In relation to direct and indirect 
control, the CCS clarifies that “[t]he existence of control is determined by whether decisive 
influence is capable of being exercised, rather than the actual exercise of such 
influence.”1147 In addition, a change in the control, for instance from joint control by two 
undertakings to sole control, is sufficient to constitute a merger.
1148
 The CCS admits 
decisive influence exists if there is ownership of more than 50 per cent of the voting rights 
of the undertaking.
1149
 Consequently, if the ownership is between 30 and 50 per cent, the 
CCS is of the opinion that there exists a rebuttal presumption of decisive influence.
1150
 
 The Organisation of Merger Control 6.2.4.2.
Once the existence of a merger is established, its assessment is based on its economic 
effect on the relevant market. The TCA prohibits mergers which may result in a monopoly 
or unfair competition.
1151
 As late as 2013, the Resolutions on Criteria for Business 
Combination clarified that the TCC considers competition issues likely to arise when the 
transaction concerns: 
- at least 30 % of market share before and after the merger and the 
previous year’s sale/revenue of over THB 2 billion [approximately USD 
55 million]; or 
                                                 
1146
 SCA, sec. 54(2). 
1147
 Competition Commission of Singapore, CCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Merger (2007) 
para. 3.8. 
1148
 Proposed Acquisition by Heineken International B.V. of Asia Pacific Breweries Limited [2012] CCS 
400/005/12, para. 20. 
1149
 CCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Merger, para. 3.10. 
1150
 Ibid. 
1151
 TCA, sec. 26. 
169 
 
- the acquisition of at least 25 % of share in the case of a public limited 
corporation or 50 % of share in the case of limited corporation with one 
or a combination of both with market share of at least 30 % and 
combined the previous year sale/revenue of at least THB 2 billion 
[approximately USD 55 million] in relevant market.
1152
 
The TCC must be notified of transactions falling within this threshold prior to their 
conclusion. Like most merger control regimes,
1153
 Thailand uses the mandatory 
notification system. The criteria presented are market shares both before and after the 
transaction, and the sales or revenue in the preceding year. The need for a dedicated 
threshold for different categories of company remains unclear. Despite introducing greater 
clarification to the TCA, the Resolution does not adequately disperse the ambiguity 
surrounding the statute. Nevertheless, the TCA contains the balancing approach and allows 
the TCC to grant temporary permission to the transaction falling under Section 26 of the 
TCA provided that there is reasonable necessity.
1154
 
A voluntary notification system is in place in Singapore and applies to both mergers and 
anticipated mergers.
1155
 This is probably a direct transplant of the UK merger control.
1156
 
Consequently, merging undertakings are not required to submit the transaction for review 
to the competition authority, unless the transaction is likely to pose anticompetitive risk.
1157
 
The CCS firmly believes the choice is most appropriate for Singapore since most mergers 
are “unlikely to raise competition concerns.”1158 By not notifying the CCS, however, 
undertakings faced the risk of an ex post facto investigation by the competition authority. 
In exercising merger control, the SCA selects the SLC test.
1159
 This means that the focus is 
on the impact of the merger on the relevant market, in particular changes in market 
structure and concentrations. The CCS considers competition concerns are likely to arise 
if: 
- the merged entity will have a market share of 40 % or more; or 
- the merged entity will have a market share of between 20 % to 40 % and 
the post-merger CR3 is 70 % or more [the CR3 refers to the combined 
market share of the three largest firms in the relevant market].
1160
 
To summarise, the predominant criteria are market share and the concentration ratio. 
Market share is merely one of the indicators of potential competition concerns - for 
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instance barriers to entry and expansion and countervailing buyer power.
1161
 Market share 
alone cannot give rise to the presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen the 
competition.
1162
 It follows that competition concerns could still be raised even if the market 
share is below the market share threshold. The CCS has admitted that it would be unlikely 
to investigate small firms where the turnover in Singapore in the financial year preceding 
the merger is below SGD 5 million [approximately USD 3.6 million], and the combined 
worldwide turnover in the financial year preceding the merger is below SGD 50 million 
[approximately USD 35.8 million].
1163
 
Singapore’s appraisal of mergers contains the balancing approach. The SCA shall not apply 
to any merger if the efficiency arising or that may arise from the merger outweighs the 
adverse effects due to the substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market in 
Singapore.
1164
 The difficulty lies in the evaluation of efficiency. It is suggested that the 
CSS considers the increase of rivalry in the market provided that no substantial lessening 
of competition would result from the transaction, and net economic efficiencies regardless 
of the substantial lessening of competition caused.
1165
 In claiming the efficiency defence, 
applicants must provide detailed and verifiable evidence.
1166
 
Fragmentations continue in the assessment of mergers. While Singapore’s competition 
regime prefers the SLC test, it would appear that Thailand is leaning towards the 
dominance test. Nevertheless, they both utilise the balancing approach. 
 Institutional Provisions of Competition Law 6.3.
This section will examine the choices made by Thailand and Singapore regarding their 
competition institutional model. In order to carry out its responsibilities, it is crucial that a 
competition institution possess the following attributes: independence, accountability, 
fairness, transparency, confidentiality, effective powers, influence, resources, and 
cooperation skills. This section will, however, focus on only the principle of independence 
which is accorded priority by the ASEAN. 
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6.3.1. Institutional Models 
Although there is stark diversity in the design of competition institutions,
1167
 there are three 
accepted referential models: the bifurcated judicial model, the bifurcated agency model and 
the integrated agency model. These are based on the arrangement of the principal functions 
of competition enforcement – investigation, enforcement, and adjudication.1168 
 Thailand 6.3.1.1.
Thailand opts for the bifurcated judicial model. This separates investigative and 
enforcement functions from the adjudicating function
1169
 on account of the TCC, with the 
aid of its Office, assuming the former roles. 
The TCA gives the TCC as well as competent officials from the Office extensive power of 
investigation. They can request information or statements from relevant parties
1170
 under 
the penalty of criminal imprisonment not exceeding three months and/or a modest fixed 
fine.
1171
 Obstructing competent officials’ duties1172 and failing to provide reasonable 
assistance are also punishable by both imprisonment and fine.
1173
 The TCC never specifies 
what constitutes reasonable assistance in this context and remains silent on penalties for 
supplying incomplete or incorrect information. Moreover, the competent officials reserve 
the right to enter the premises without a warrant to search and seize evidence on the 
property when a flagrant offence is being committed or if there is reasonable suspicion that 
the evidence maybe lost while waiting for the search warrant.
1174
 In addition, they also 
have the power to arrest offenders under the TCA.
1175
 Their arresting power is similar to 
that of an administrative or police officer under the Criminal Procedure Code.
1176
 The 
reason commissioners and competent officials being given such extensive investigative 
power is to best help them with the gathering of evidence due to the heavy burden of proof 
requirement for the infringement of competition law. Yet, it is precisely this same 
reasoning that has made the investigation too cumbersome for the authorities who have 
voiced their concerns over difficulties in evidence gathering.
1177
 The law has given vast 
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investigative power to civil servants with no background or training in gathering 
information. It is not advisable to coerce resource-starved competition authorities to give 
ambitious legal commands to powerful economic and political entities.
1178
 
The TCC is also has broad enforcement power encompassing criminal imprisonment, 
monetary fines, administrative orders, and injunctions. The sanction for non-compliance of 
competition law is criminal imprisonment not exceeding three years and/or a fixed fine not 
exceeding THB 6 million (approximately USD 191,000).
1179
 The amount shall be doubled 
in the case of repeated offence.
1180
 These penalties apply universally to all infringements of 
competition law, thus making them both mild and draconian. The monetary fine is fixed 
without any regard to the undertaking’s size, market share or annual turnover of the 
preceding year. Because it is substantially low, it has a questionable deterring effect. 
Deterrence only occurs when the potential gain from violation of the law is outweighed by 
the severity of the sanction.
1181
 Given the meagre fine, it is implausible to expect potential 
competition law violators to be deterred. At the same time, the sanction can be considered 
to be severe because it indiscriminately covers infringements of every substantive 
provision including: abuse of dominant position, mergers, restrictive agreements and unfair 
competition. The universal criminal sanction directly affects the aforementioned strict 
burden of proof which in turn, dilutes the competition authority’s power of investigation. 
Despite such extensive investigating power, the TCC was criticised for not using it 
properly.
1182
 
The TCC has exclusive power to issue administrative orders. It has the power to order 
suspension, cessation or rectification with regard to abuse of dominant position, mergers, 
anticompetitive agreements, and restrictions in international agreements.
1183
 Furthermore, 
its power is not limited to behavioural remedy but extends to structural remedy of an 
undertaking. In the case of an undertaking with dominant position of more than 75 per cent 
of market share, the TCC may order the restructuring of market share.1184 Despite having 
these vast enforcement powers, there is no record of any issued order by the TCC.  
Faced with difficulties in exercising the enforcement power given by the TCA, the TCC 
favours judicial recourse. When the TCC decides to enforce a case, it transfers its findings 
to the public prosecutor
1185
 who is not under any obligation to follow its recommendation. 
In the case of non-prosecution decision, the Chairman of the TCC may direct its objection 
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to the Director-General of Public Prosecution for its final decision.
1186
 The Director-
General is not bound by this objection. Consequently, the decision to enforce competition 
law is not in the hands of the TCC. To date, the Prosecutor has never followed the TCC’s 
decisions. The most significant refusal to enforce is the motorcycle case, a case concerning 
an exclusive dealing agreement entered into between a motorcycle manufacturer and its 
distributors.
1187
 The TCC built its case around the provision of the violation of unfair 
competition provision. At the time, the provision on abuse of dominant position could not 
be enforced due to the unavailability of the criteria of dominant position. In this case, the 
TCC has been heavily criticised for making claims without supporting evidence or 
reasoning.
1188
 
 Singapore 6.3.1.2.
Singapore has chosen the integrated agency model with the CCS assuming the roles of 
investigation, enforcement and adjudication. Its power of investigation is as expansive as 
that of Thailand’s insofar as the CCS or its officers has the power to require specified 
documents or information both pre-investigation
1189
 or as part of the investigation
1190
 and 
to enter premises with or without a warrant.
1191
 
1192
 Similarly to the case of Thailand, the 
SCA prescribes relatively harsh penalties, both financial and criminal, to any non-
compliance with the CCS’s exercise of its investigation power. Any non-compliance is 
considered an offence
1193
 and is liable to a fine not exceeding SGD 10,000 [approximately 
USD 6,900] or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or the combination of 
both.
1194
 In contrast to Thailand’s competition law regime, criminal sanction is only 
allowed in the context of non-compliance to the investigation of the CCS. The extensive 
investigative power is not without its limitations. Communication between undertakings 
and legal counsel are privileged and thus excluded.
1195
 
The CCS holds broad power in enforcing competition law. It can give directions to rectify 
the anticompetitive situation including modifying or terminating the anticompetitive 
agreement, modifying or discontinuing the abuse of dominant position conduct, modifying 
the structure of a merger or ordering the dissolution of an already realised merger.
1196
 In 
essence, the CCS’s enforcement power covers both structural and behavioural remedy. In 
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the context of merger control, the CCS may accept commitments to remedy, mitigate, or 
prevent adverse effects of a merger prior to a formal decision.
1197
 Financial penalties can 
only be imposed if it is proven that the infringement has been committed intentionally or 
negligently.
1198
 For instance, the CCS considers that collusive tendering or bid-rigging 
arrangements are serious infringements of section 34 prohibition which have as their object 
the restriction of competition and are likely to have been, by their nature, committed 
intentionally.
1199
 In addition, price-fixing agreements have, by nature, the object of 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition and the parties involved must have 
undeniably been aware of them.
1200
 Therefore, intention and negligence are naturally 
assumed in the case of hard-core restrictions. Furthermore, the financial penalties cannot 
exceed ten per cent of the turnover of the undertaking in Singapore for each year of 
infringement for such period (up to a maximum of three years).
1201
 These clauses indicate 
the CCS’s preference for rectifying anti-competitiveness, and therefore, the market in 
Singapore, rather than focusing on pecuniary damages. It conforms to the more cost-
effective approach to compliance employed by the CCS.  
Regardless of the addition of intentional and negligence clauses, the imposition of financial 
penalty still serves the double function of reflecting the seriousness of the infringement 
caused to the relevant market and deterring future anticompetitive conduct or agreements. 
The CCS reserves the discretionary right to determine the amount of the financial 
penalty.
1202
 It will be calculated according to the seriousness of the infringement, the 
turnover of the undertaking in Singapore in the preceding year, the duration of the 
infringement, other relevant factors such as the deterrent value, and any further aggravating 
or mitigating factors.
1203
 In the past, the CCS based its calculation on other complementary 
factors such as economic or financial benefits derived from the infringement,
1204
 as well as 
size and financial position of the undertakings in question.
1205
 However, the economic 
difficulties of the cartels will not be taken account by the CCS in considering reducing the 
penalties imposed.
1206
 The ability of the CCS to levy financial penalty is thus correctly 
labelled as “the most significant weapon in the CCS’ armoury.”1207  In contrast, 
criminal sanction only applies to failure to comply or cooperate with the CCS’s 
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investigation.
1208
 Furthermore, under section 81 of the SCA, officers of a body corporate, 
such as director, manager, or secretary, are liable to punishment if they have consented to 
or connived with an offence or the offence is due to neglect on their part. Critics asserted 
that Singapore’s competition law regime would benefit from an increased penalty ceiling, 
in particular an expansion to include worldwide turnover in the statutory penalty 
ceiling.
1209
 However, it is plausible that the limitation of the penalty to domestic turnover is 
one of practicality since Singapore has a small open economy.  
6.3.2. The Fading Importance of Independence 
It is widely acknowledged that the principle of independence is at the core of competition 
authorities’ efficacy.1210 While jurisdictions often differ in their formulation of 
independence, competition authorities should be insulated from political and budgetary 
interference.
1211
 Neither Thailand’s nor Singapore’s competition regime embraces this 
concept. 
 Thailand 6.3.2.1.
The TCA does not create an independent competition agency from its inception. By design, 
the TCC is placed directly under the purview of the executive branch. The TCC is chaired 
by the Minister of Commerce, despite the TCA’s explicit exclusion of political figures from 
the TCC’s composition.1212 The cabinet minister is joined by the Permanent Secretary for 
the Ministry of Commerce as vice-chairman and the Director-General for the Department 
of Internal Trade in the Ministry of Commerce as secretary.
1213
 Both positions are held by 
senior bureaucrats. Other commissioners include the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry 
of Finance and between eight to twelve experts in the field of law, economics, commerce, 
business administration or public administration.
1214
 From the formation of the TCC, it 
would appear that the TCA has managed to secure direct representation on the executive 
branch. In addition, there have been complaints that the members lack expertise in the area 
of competition law.
1215
 Some criteria, notably expertise in business and public 
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administration, stated in the statute seem too ambiguous and to a certain extent, irrelevant 
to competition law enforcement. 
In addition, at least half of these experts must be selected from the private sector.
1216
 The 
institution’s non-autonomous structure is reinforced by a subsequent regulation that further 
opened up opportunities for businesses. The Ministerial Regulations assert that the private 
sector experts are to be nominated by the two most prominent trade associations in 
Thailand, namely the Federation of Thai Industries and the Board of Trade of Thailand.
1217
 
Since big businesses tend to dominate these trade associations, the probability of 
representatives from small- and medium-sized enterprises obtaining a nomination is small. 
Consequently, large businesses are over-represented at the TCC. With regard to the 
remaining experts, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance each put 
forward nominations.
1218
 The final list of candidates shall be proposed by the Ministry of 
Commerce and appointed by the Cabinet.
1219
 It is feasible that the candidates chosen are 
those who are sympathetic to the government cause. Furthermore, the ex-officio members 
are senior bureaucrats and the TCC is staffed by civil servants of the Department of 
Internal Trade in the Ministry of Commerce.
1220
 The entire nomination process is under the 
discretion of involved authorities with no public announcement or solicitation for qualified 
candidates. It indicates direct interference from both the private sector and the executive 
branch. The TCC’s architecture is consistently respected by eight Commissions. In so 
doing, the TCA supports obvious conflict of interest in the TCC. There are at least two 
recorded incidences of commissioners being affiliated with undertakings under 
investigation by the TCC.
1221
 The situation was further aggravated when there was no 
record of the commissioners in question recusing themselves from the TCC during the 
investigation or decision-making process.
1222
 
Such a design exposes the TCC to regular political intervention. Corporate lobbies occur 
throughout the investigation periods both openly and behind the scenes. One such example 
resulted in the delay of the promulgation of the dominant position threshold.
1223
 In 2000, 
the TCC proposed dominant position criteria of 33 per cent of market share and THB 1 
billion sales revenue in the relevant market. However, the proposal was met with strong 
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opposition from the Federation of Thai Industries who counter-proposed a threshold of 50 
per cent of market share. The TCC’s proposal was subsequently discarded. As shown 
earlier in this chapter, the dominant position criteria would not get adopted until 2007.
1224
 
They were eventually defined according to the proposition from the business sector. At the 
same time, they greatly restrict the scope of application of the law since few undertakings 
actually fit the description. 
The non-independence of the competition institution from both political and corporate 
influences is referred to the Appellate Committee that has the power to review the TCC’s 
decisions.
1225
 Its decision is considered to be final.
1226
 The Appellate Committee consists 
of seven members appointed by the Council of Ministers with government officials from 
the Department of Internal Trade under the Ministry of Commerce serving as secretary and 
assistant-secretary to the committee.
1227
 According to the TCA, the Appellate Committee 
shall consist of government officials and experts in the area of law, economics, business 
administration and public administration.
1228
 The qualifications for the appellate body are 
identical to that of the TCC. The similarity continues with the composition of the Appellate 
Committee which is receptive to interferences from business sector and the executive 
branch. The Appellate Committee has, naturally, never been called upon as there has never 
been an enforcement case. 
A representative from the Office denied any political interference, citing fundamental 
human rights as its justification but ultimately argued that the agency had to be a part of 
the government body in order to facilitate its launch especially in the area of financial 
budgeting, human resources and information gathering.
1229
 There were no attempts made 
to justify the direct involvement of the private sector in the TCC. 
In a country where competition law has been transplanted into an environment where the 
concept of competition was previously unknown, competition authority without any link to 
other ministerial bodies risks becoming isolated and incapable of enforcing the competition 
statute.
1230
 The incorporation with an influential Ministry can help boost the agency 
authority and aid in its actual enforcement against both private entity and occasionally, 
other governmental bodies. It is therefore understandable that a new institution would wish 
to be launched under the tutelage of the executive branch provided that it was only 
temporary. When the institution matures, it is imperative to transition to a more 
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autonomous formation.
1231
 Such is not the case for the TCC since its political and financial 
dependence on the government is permanent. 
 Singapore 6.3.2.2.
The CCS, like the TCC, does not seem to value the principle of independence. Its political 
dependence on the government is evident in its composition: the CCS comprises between 
two and sixteen members with a chairman,
1232
 all of whom are appointed by the Minister 
of Trade and Industry.
1233
 The qualifications required to be appointed are competence and 
experience in industry, commerce, or administration or professional qualifications or other 
suitablity .
1234
 These seem to be broader than the qualifications required by the TCC. The 
close connection between the Minister and the CCS is not viewed favourably
1235
 and there 
could be doubts about the CCS’s willingness and ability to investigate the conduct of the 
government and its entities. However, the CCS answered this concern with the 
infringement decision issued against SISTIC. This is a government-linked company whose 
business has persistently had 90 per cent of the market share. Thus the decision was made 
on the basis of its abuse of dominant position, with reference to its provision of exclusive 
agreements.
1236
 “It is a positive indication that government liability under [the SCA] is not 
illusory.”1237 
The tradition of non-independence persists at the appeal stage. The Competition Appeal 
Board [hereinafter the Appeal Board] consists of up to thirty members who are appointed 
by the Minister according to the same qualifications as members of the CCS except for 
Chairman of the Appeal Board, who must be qualified as a Judge of the Singapore’s 
Supreme Court.
1238
 All the functions and duties are exercised by the committee consisting 
of at least three members of the Appeal Board.
1239
 It has extensive power to:  
(a) remit the matter to the [CCS]; 
(b) impose or revoke, or vary the amount of a financial penalty; 
(c) give such direction, or take such other step, as the [CCS] could itself 
have given or taken; or 
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(d) make any other decision which the [CCS] could itself have made.
1240
 
In this regard, the Appeal Board has the power to rehear the case during the process of 
which the Board has the power to summon witnesses and admit or exclude evidence. In the 
past, it has ordered a reduction in financial penalties, ruling that in so doing, the deterrent 
effect would not be compromised.
1241
 The right of appeal is restricted to only the party 
directly affected by the CCS’s decision; that is , any party to an anticompetitive agreement, 
any party whose conduct was considered abuse of dominance by the CCS, or any party to 
an anticipated merger or a merger.  A decision made by the Appeal Board can be appealed 
in front of the High Court. The High Court will confirm, modify or reverse the Appeal 
Board’s decision.1242 The decision of the High Court is considered to be made in the 
exercise of its original civil jurisdiction and further rights of appeal can be extended to the 
Court of Appeal. 
The process of the appointment of the Appeal Board exposes it to regular political 
intervention from the government. The appointment of Board members and the budgetary 
funding by the Minister of Trade and Industry deprive the Appeal Board of both political 
and financial independence.
1243
 Exacerbating the situation, members of the Appeal Board 
may at any time and without justification be removed by the same Minister who appointed 
them.
1244
 Nonetheless, Ong insisted that the absence of independence in the constitution of 
Singapore’s competition regulatory body was born out of “fairly pragmatic 
considerations”1245 since the CCS was staffed initially by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. It is thus to be expected that the traditional non-independence culture would 
survive. 
 Conclusion 6.4.
From this chapter’s analysis of two of the largest ASEAN economies, it is clear that the 
AMSs regimes differ widely in scope, both in substance and in institutional design. They 
differ in origin, and are placed within different socio-political contexts. The arguments 
made in relation to Thailand and Singapore are merely a microcosm of a much wider 
situation but at the same time, representative of the overall malaise in the region. This 
chapter has revealed that the commonalities in Thailand’s and Singapore’s competition law 
regimes do not extend beyond a superficial façade. The discrepancies are most notable in 
the area of competition law-related assessment and cover a large area from the scope of 
competition law to the institutional model. Consequently, the discrepancies in the 
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enforcement of national competition laws within the region have made soft harmonisation 
as envisioned by the ASEAN improbable. 
Since the local terrain is uneven, it is difficult to ascertain the suitability of the ASEAN’s 
regional design. Regardless of the complications, Wisuttisak argued that the ASEAN 
Guidelines are compatible with the AMSs’ competition laws.1246 His hypothesis was based 
principally on the scope of the AMSs’ competition statutes. While both the TCA and the 
SCA share a similar functional approach in defining undertaking using the Guidelines, 
there remains a noteworthy difference in the exclusion of state-owned enterprises and 
farmers’ groups in the TCA. Furthermore, Chapter 4 explained that the ASEAN has 
exhibited conflicting views regarding the scope of competition law through two sets of 
consecutive Guidelines. It remains ambiguous whether the prevailing vision is for a broad 
model in which the competition law applies to all business engaged in commercial 
economic activities in all sectors including state-owned enterprises,
1247
 or for a more 
restrictive one in which state-owned enterprises can be excluded from the application of 
national competition law.
1248
 The variance in the treatment of state-owned enterprises by 
Thailand’s and Singapore’s competition statutes confirms this state of confusion.  
With regard to other areas of competition law, the ASEAN’s approach appears more 
receptive to the AMSs’ experiences. The Guidelines I certainly admit so in their 
formulation.
1249
 In defining the term “agreement” as “a consensus on the actions each party 
will, or will not, take,”1250 the Guidelines I replicate the exact formulation used by the CSS 
Guidelines on Section 34 Prohibition.
1251
 The similarity continues with the inclusion of 
concerted practice in the definition.
1252
 However, unlike the SCA, the Guidelines I do not 
exclude vertical agreements from the application of anticompetitive prohibition provision 
to conform to standard international practice.
1253
 Moreover, there are some notable 
discrepancies in the qualification of agreements falling within the rule of reason or the per 
se rule. By placing market sharing, and limiting or controlling production under the rule of 
reason analysis, the TCA’s classification of hard-core restrictions appear more restrictive 
than the SCA and the ASEAN Guidelines I.
1254
 The appreciable test conducted by the TCC 
appears to be limiting since it only takes into consideration the effect of the anticompetitive 
agreement. Moreover, the TCA does not contain a provision on granting exemptions or 
exclusions to certain agreements and conducts which have significant countervailing 
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benefits despite the Guidelines I’s encouragement to the contrary.1255 The Guidelines I 
resemble more the approach taken by the SCA in the context of anticompetitive 
agreements. This is demonstrated through similar approach to the appreciable effect to 
competition test, the classification of hard-core restrictions, and the exemptions for 
agreements with countervailing effects. Some differences also emerge in the concept of 
dominance especially in the evaluation of dominant position. Here again, the TCC operates 
under a more restrictive analysis by relying exclusively on the criteria of market share 
threshold. Despite the different language used by the TCA and the SCA, the two sets of 
classification of abuse appear to be similar in nature since they contain exploitative and 
exclusionary conduct, both of which are suggested by the Guidelines I.
1256
 In addition, both 
the SCA and the ASEAN embrace the form- and effect-based analysis. In the domain of the 
control of concentrations of undertakings, the Guidelines I carry on the Thailand’s and 
Singapore’s legal tradition of employing the term ‘merger’ to envelope various types of 
concentrations of undertakings.
1257
 Fragmentations continue their presence in the 
assessment of mergers. Only Singapore and the ASEAN support the SLC test
1258
 whereas 
Thailand favours the dominance test; all the regimes examined in this chapter utilise the 
balancing approach.
1259
 The TCA adopts mandatory merger notification regime while the 
SCA chooses the voluntary notification regime. The Guidelines I support both notification 
regimes. Perhaps where the discrepancy is most obvious is in the institutional model. The 
ASEAN’s preference for an integrated model1260 echoes the choice made by Singapore’s 
competition regime. The ASEAN should be disappointed as the only strong suggestion it 
has made with respect to competition policy has been ignored by the AMSs. Indeed, the 
principle of the independence of competition law institution, which is highly regarded by 
the ASEAN,
1261
 is not held in the same regard by either Thailand’s or Singapore’s 
competition authorities. 
It is possible that the ASEAN’s approach is very similar to Singapore’s competition law 
regime because they are both based largely on an internationally accepted model. Many 
differences still persist but the AMSs have not shown any interest or progress in adapting 
their competition laws to more closely resemble each other’s. The willingness to undertake 
soft harmonisation is simply not present. 
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 Conclusion: Towards the Harmonisation of the ASEAN Chapter 7
Regional Competition Law 
This thesis has examined the prospects of developing an effective competition policy 
framework within the ASEAN and in doing so, has furnished an account of the relevant 
laws and policies at both the domestic and the regional levels. Each of the previous 
chapters addressed particular research issues and came to specific conclusions. This 
chapter summarises the analysis undertaken as a whole and addresses its implications 
towards the harmonisation of competition enforcement in the ASEAN region, as well as 
offers a glimpse into the future of ASEAN regional competition policy under the AEC. 
The prognosis for the ASEAN’s regional competition policy has always been uncertain; 
this was apparent when the AMSs all ignored the common competition policy objective set 
out in the Guidelines I.
1262
 Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the goals of “the promotion 
and protection of the process of competition” are not replicated in any of the AMSs’ 
domestic competition law statutes. While the situation is understandable in the cases where 
the AMSs’ competition statutes were enacted before the announcement of the creation of 
the AEC in 2003 (most notably Indonesia and Thailand), there is no justifiable explanation 
in the cases of Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Myanmar. By ignoring 
the common reference guide published by the ASEAN Secretariat, the AMSs 
communicated their unwillingness to harmonise their national competition policies with 
that of the ASEAN’s. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the ASEAN employs a soft harmonisation approach regarding 
substantive competition law. This approach is a non-binding multilateralism which offers 
more flexibility and practicality than binding commitments. The primary flaw of the soft 
harmonisation approach is its over-reliance on participating states’ voluntary commitment 
and willingness to follow the regional approach. Most of the ASEAN’s contributions 
regarding substantive competition policy concentrate on supporting the enactment of 
domestic competition law statutes. The ASEAN has never proposed a framework unique or 
conducive to its vision. Instead, it is content with presenting known best practices in the 
field of competition law and policy to the AMSs. The AMSs are free and even encouraged 
to neglect the ASEAN’s assembled efforts in favour of their own particular needs, 
situations, or preferences. Giving the AMSs such a large margin of flexibility could result 
in a regional organisation that is a vehicle for economic, social, and political divergence on 
various issues rather than compelling the AMSs to move towards regional economic 
integration.
1263
 Chapter 5 discusses the ASEAN’s supporting role in the construction of a 
national competition institution. The ASEAN has neither established a supranational 
institution nor a representative institution composed of national representatives at regional 
level. In their stead, it has created an expert competition organ called the AEGC which is 
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composed of national competition authorities or related governmental officials in the case 
of the AMSs without relevant competition law authorities. Furthermore, the ASEAN has 
opted to resolve regional competition issues through national extraterritorial solutions, 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
The actual approaches taken by the ASEAN display an obvious disconnect from the 
announced goal. The ASEAN would like a spontaneous move towards harmonisation by 
the AMSs through increased contact among competition authorities and relevant officials 
with the help of the information provided and facilitated by the ASEAN. However, an 
examination of the AMSs’ competition law regimes in Chapter 6 has revealed that the 
spontaneous harmonisation of national competition laws as envisioned by the ASEAN is 
unlikely to occur. Despite sharing some similarities in the broad principles of competition 
law across jurisdictions, the AMSs’ domestic competition laws are not harmonised. For 
instance, Malaysia’s competition law does not contain provisions on merger control. 
Further discrepancies are observed between the scope of competition law and the actual 
competition assessment in the enforcement of the law. While all the AMSs with 
competition law statutes have established national competition authorities, different models 
have been adopted. It appears that the AMSs continue to largely ignore the approaches 
charted by the ASEAN. Moreover, the ASEAN has failed to pressure the AMSs to follow 
through with its single commitment to introduce national competition law before the 
institution of the AEC at the end of 2015, as appeared in the Blueprint.
1264
 To date, only 
seven members have fulfilled this commitment: Indonesia,
1265
 Thailand,
1266
 Vietnam,
1267
 
Singapore,
1268
 Malaysia,
1269
 Myanmar,
1270
 and the Philippines.
1271
 Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia and Lao PDR are still in the process of drafting the bill. The AMSs’ failure to 
fulfil their expectations could prove problematic in accomplishing the regional framework 
of competition law. COMESA, for instance, has encountered unsurmountable problems 
because some of its member states, notably Malawi, could not meet their domestic 
enforcement obligations.
1272
 
As is often the case when pursuing regional competition law in developing economies, the 
ASEAN is faced with various challenges such as differences in socio-political situations, 
uneven economic development, resource restrictions, and lack of a competition culture. 
Some obstacles are decidedly ASEAN-specific: AMSs’ diversity in the area of economics 
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and politics, and the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN approach to regional competition law 
corresponds well to the organisation’s inherent limitations. It does not attempt to overcome 
the obstacles but instead chooses to confine itself comfortably within the boundaries. The 
path of soft harmonisation without a regional organ with the necessary allocated power to 
impose a competition law regime model or monitoring compliance by members with the 
regional vision is symptomatic of the ASEAN Way. 
In Chapter 2, this research established that there is no optimal template for regional 
competition policy. While in many cases the EU model serves as an inspirational model for 
emerging regional competition regimes, each regime needs to adapt the model to its own 
particular needs and local context. In the pursuit of regional harmonisation of competition 
policy on which the AEC is based, the ASEAN has chosen a configuration of soft 
harmonisation of substantive law but without a central institution. The combination is a 
mixture of the MERCOSUR’s harmonisation approach, which focuses on encouraging the 
member states to enact and enforce national competition law, and the NAFTA’s free trade 
area agreement’s lack of a dispute resolution system. Furthermore, the ASEAN is the sole 
regional organisation with the aim of market integration without a competition law-related 
regional institution. In this regard, it would seem that the ASEAN is charting a new road 
for regional competition law that is distinctive from other models. 
In conclusion, with a regional framework that aims to inform rather than create a common 
approach and without a regional institution capable of enforcement or monitoring duty, it is 
unlikely that the ASEAN’s approach to competition law would be effective. Furthermore, 
the only engagement required from the AMSs – the introduction of national competition 
law – is not unanimously followed. It is thus inconceivable that the ASEAN would achieve 
its ambitious goal of regional harmonisation of competition policy. The AEC is at risk of 
operating as an internal market devoid of an effective regional competition policy, despite 
being previously hailed as the most feasible pillar of the ASEAN Community.
1273
 It 
appears that although the ASEAN has made significant progress, it has not yet achieved its 
objective of constructing a single market.
1274
 While it is plausible that the AEC failed at its 
launch, the ASEAN would never announce or acknowledge this. Consequently, the 
ASEAN is in danger of joining many other developing economies’ experiences with 
regional competition law in that they only exist in the text. 
On 31 December 2015, the ASEAN celebrated the arrival of the ASEAN Community.
1275
 
It is crucial to recall that the AEC offers, or is intended to offer, regional economic 
integration with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and a freer 
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flow of capital
1276
 without regional competition law. The aspiration to intensify the 
development of competition policy in the region remains and is expected to progress even 
after the entrance of the AEC.
1277
 A sliver of hope presents itself in the form of a formal 
recognition of the need to have common core elements with respect to the legal 
frameworks on competition policy and law amongst the AMSs.
1278
 It remains to be seen 
whether the project will come to fruition and in what form. 
It has been suggested that “[m]ore time may be needed for ASEAN to have a systematic 
harmonisation of competition law.”1279 This thesis reserves some doubts regarding the 
proposed solution. The temporal extension could only serve to prolong the problematic 
state of the ASEAN regional competition policy.  
How then should the ASEAN proceed in order to achieve regional harmonisation of 
competition law? The most effective solution is through the reconstruction of the 
ASEAN’s internal mechanism. The doctrine of the ASEAN Way has been a monumental 
obstruction to achieving meaningful regional integration. It has been demonstrated 
throughout this thesis that harmonisation, whether soft or hard, cannot happen without a 
central organ competent of enforcing regional competition law and monitoring member 
states’ compliance with the regional framework. A departure from such classical non-
interference measure the likes of the ASEAN Way would allow the ASEAN to finally form 
necessary measures to accomplish harmonisation. In this regards, the establishment of 
common substantive rules as well as a centralised institution capable of enforcing 
members’ compliance to the former - both measures rendered impossible by the 
preeminent existent of the ASEAN Way - could become a reality. The abandonment of the 
ASEAN Way would also allow the ASEAN’s institutional structure to evolve beyond its 
original conception, which is the informal cooperation, and suitably match with the new 
integration identity of the organisation. It is noteworthy that while the ASEAN as an 
organisation has constantly undergone transformation, the institutional structure has 
principally remained the same. The ASEAN has long operated under “a highly 
decentralised structure”1280 with no supranational institution. While the ASEAN Secretariat 
is the main regional institutional body, it does not possess decision-making power. 
Decisions are made through consultation and consensus at the ASEAN Summit in 
accordance with the principle of non-interference or the ASEAN Way.
1281
 Unfortunately, 
this alternative is unlikely to be considered by the ASEAN and would undoubtedly be met 
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with strong objections from the AMSs considering their historical preference for state’s 
sovereignty over the principle of supranationality. 
Another possibility to achieve harmonisation is through the adjustment of the AEC’s 
ambitious goal from economic integration with a single market to mere economic 
cooperation. Relegating the goal of the AEC to simple regional cooperation has the benefit 
of compatibility with existing regional competition law framework of soft harmonisation 
of substantive rules without a centralised institution. It requires less substantial change than 
the previous alternative and is thus poised to receive more positive reception from the 
AMSs. It appears that setting realistic and achievable goals would be more valuable than 
having an ambitious-yet-impossible trial.
1282
 If the ASEAN were to pursue this option, it 
would evidently need to adopt a more balanced approach to granting the AMSs flexibility 
in its enforcement of the regional economic cooperation in order to avoid a repetition of 
the history of the ineffective PTA and the AFTA. 
At the same time pursuing an economic cooperation aim under the auspice of economic 
integration community could be deemed misleading. A question could also arise whether a 
revision of the AFTA to include competition rules similar to the experience of the EFTA 
would not be more appropriate considering the AFTA is still in effect. In particular, the 
AFTA could serve as a precursor to the deeper integration system of the ASEAN 
Community where countries could progressively harmonise their national laws. 
Alternatively, the AFTA could also act as a more integrated vehicle for the AMSs which 
are capable and willing to achieve truthful economic integration beyond the current level 
offered by the ASEAN. Regardless of its possible new purposes, the AFTA’s effectiveness 
is still weighted down by its lack of dispute resolution system. A concrete mechanism of 
dispute resolution therefore needs to be established first. The AFTA Council, a ministerial-
level council which already has the role of supervising, coordinating and reviewing the 
implementation of the AFTA, should be granted an additional dispute resolution role. 
Furthermore, if much of the EFTA’s effectiveness in harmonisation relies on the EU 
system, the AFTA does not possess the same luxury. The ASEAN is currently not a 
dependable foundation on which it could rely. Consequently, walking the path paved by 
the EFTA while desirable is simply of little practical possibility for the ASEAN. 
Regardless of the attractiveness of previous alternatives, the most realistic and achievable 
approach is to enhance the responsibilities of the AEGC. This could be done through the 
inclusion of new tools such as the peer review of the AMSs’ domestic competition policies 
in comparison with the approaches of the ASEAN, the installation of deeper cooperation 
and coordination efforts, and concrete communication between national competition 
authorities concerning the enforcement and development of domestic competition law 
regimes. The peer review system, in particular, corresponds well to the nature of the 
ASEAN organisation which relies on good relationship and mutual respect between 
members without infringing on their sovereignty. While it is understandable that 
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establishing a centre of merger notification for mergers with regional dimension within the 
ASEAN will be challenging, the AEGC could considerably benefit from acting as an 
information centre for merger notification filings on a regular basis. 
To continue with the research of this thesis, which has focused on the perspective of the 
ASEAN’s regional competition policy, further research could fruitfully explore the 
ASEAN’s direction after the entrance of the AEC. It would be interesting to examine 
whether the ASEAN could make more progress with regard to its competition policy 
within the region and whether it will finally adopt any measures to properly address the 
challenges of regional competition policy. In light of the ASEAN’s recent 
acknowledgement of the necessary establishment of common core elements on competition 
policy amongst the AMSs, the ASEAN’s next move will be eagerly anticipated. The 
AMSs’ actions in the field of competition law should also be carefully observed to 
determine whether they remain separated, further divided, or spontaneously more 
harmonised in the era of the AEC. It is unclear whether the ASEAN could successfully 
persuade the three remaining AMSs–Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia and Lao PDR–to 
implement domestic competition law regimes. It is even less evident whether the ASEAN 
could encourage the AMSs to voluntarily harmonise their competition law statutes. In this 
regard, the role of the AEGC in the wake of the AEC should not be ignored. It remains to 
be seen whether it retains the simple role of the facilitator between national competition 
authorities and relevant officials. The role and place of the AEGC and, by extension, the 
ASEAN related to competition law within the Southeast Asia region is a subject that 
should be further pursued. Observance of the actual outcome of the AEC is necessary as it 
is an important pillar of the ASEAN Community and could be beneficial to the literature of 
regional competition policy. Finally, the examination of foreign influence in the adoption 
and enforcement of competition law in Southeast Asian countries could result in a better 
understanding of the local climates of the ASEAN’s competition policy. 
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